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SUMMARY
 
The Skylab Program was established as a precursor
 
space station with the multiple objectives of proving the
 
worth of a permanent space station, of exploring the physio­
lbgical limits of man's endurance in space flight, and
 
conducting a series of space oriented experiments. The
 
program has been successfully concluded and, in addition
 
to the above, has left a legacy of lessons, of a technical
 
and managerial nature, to be followed by the developers
 
of the next space station. It is the purpose of this report
 
to record some of the lessons from Skylab to be added to
 
the previous reports as well as to document the observations
 
of the Program Director.
 
The technical and scientific results,of the Skylab
 
experiments have been documented and published by the
 
individual investigators as a part of their experiments.
 
From the point of view of the value of a manned space station
 
in the achievement of scientific objectives, numerous examples
 
are chronicled in those reports. In summary, the value
 
of a continually manned space station has been shown in
 
the solar observations (where fine-grained geometric and
 
color details were observed when none had been anticipated),
 
in the medical experiments (where subtle additions to the
 
experiments added to the scientific results), in the ground
 
observation programs (where the trained observers detected
 
phenomena not predicted), and in the general conduct of
 
the experiments where the trained operator was able to correct,
 
adapt, and change the experiment procedures and, thus, improve
 
the scientific output.
 
The unique capabilities of man to repair and fix equipment
 
and experiments is well known and in Skylab proven to be
 
true in space as well as on the Earth. The primary advantage
 
of a manned space station as compared with an automated
 
spacecraft is the ability to respond to previously unforeseen
 
anomalies. The ability of the manned operator to respond
 
to unprogrammed events was clearly demonstrated during the
 
9-month operating period of Skylab. Beginning with the
 
difficult activities associated with the deployment of the
 
thermal shield and the freeing of the solar panel; and con­
tinuing on through the repair of the coolant system, the
 
Skylab crews repeatedly demonstrated that the ability of
 
man to repair, fix, and correct the flight systems was
 
invaluable and essential.
 
The value of man in space exploration was clearly
 
demonstrated.
 
The inherent value of a long-duration space observation
 
platform is almost axiomatic and has been demonstrated
 
repeatedly in the automated satellite programs. Skylab
 
reinforced that conclusion and added the dimension of manned
 
flexibility. The presence of the trained astronauts gave
 
the ground-based scientists the freedom of changing their
 
desired observation program to respond to earlier results.
 
Unmanned programs are limited in the ability to reprogram
 
events by the size and capabilities of the spacecraft computer.
 
Having a man onboard permits a flexibility of operation
 
comparable to that available to an investigator in a ground­
based laboratory.
 
The medical experiments on Skylab were designed to
 
produce data which would permit the detailed analysis of
 
the response of the body functions to long-duration flight.
 
All of the experiments performed properly and the data has
 
been analyzed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
 
report the details of the medical experiments, but is appro­
priate to record that, for the 84 days of Skylab, no
 
physiological limitation to manned flight was found.
 
A manned space station has no serious physiological
 
limitation, although obviously the presence of man must
 
be taken into account in the system designs.
 
.The development of a-space station is a complex problem
 
which requires a variety of technical and managerial expertise.
 
Skylab pointed the way in a variety of areas: habitability
 
results point toward the correct designs; the control moment
 
gyros proved that this type of attitude control is practical
 
and possible; the integrated solar power systems demonstrated
 
the principles needed for a large, solar-powered electrical
 
system, and the principles of the passive/active thermal
 
control system have been shown; the principles of management
 
for a complex and far-reaching development program have
 
been evolved and demonstrated. This paper intends to record
 
and explain some of these technical and managerial lessons.
 
-In summary, Skylab has proven that a long-duration,
 
manned space station is a practical and desirable step in
 
space exploration. The experiences and lessons of Skylab
 
have pointed the way to design, develop, and manage a large
 
space station project.
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INTRODUCTION
 
A. Purpose and Scope of Paper
 
The development activities of a major .space project
 
are generally hectic, filled with crises and trauma, and
 
rapidly paced. The records left behind'for follow-on programs
 
tend to be factual reports (i.e., References 1, 2, 3, 4,
 
5, 6, and 7), reports of accomplishments (i.e., References 8,
 
9, and 10), or results of investigations (i.e., Reference 11).
 
The files are generally filled with the records of the day­
to-day activities. Littre or no time is set aside for analy­
sis and reflection on the lessons which were learned (frequently
 
the hard way). Such lessons are generally confined to personal
 
experiences and are used by the individuals involved as
 
they move on to the next project.
 
Skylab was destined to be no exception. However, near
 
the conclusion of the program the Program Director recognized
 
that since no follow-on space station projects were planned

in the near future, the unique experiences of this development
 
might nev'er be passed on to future generation developers.
 
Consequently, a series of "Lessons Learned" documents were
 
requested and developed. These documents (References 12,
 
13, 14, 15, and 16) represent the view of the development
 
engineers. This paper is an attempt to summarize and record
 
the major program development lessons learned by the Program

Director, and as such, represents his personal views. Some
 
of the experiences mentioned in References 1 through 16
 
may be repeated herein, if similar lessons are applicable.
 
In particular, many of those included in Reference 13 were
 
those of the Director, although most of the lessons contained
 
here are recorded for the first time.
 
These experiences, while primarily aimed at lessons
 
applicable to space station development, should have a wider
 
application in the development of many large, complex projects.
 
B. General Description
 
The Skylab (Figure 1) was the Free World's first
 
experimental space station preceded only by a far less
 
sophisticated space station, also experimental in nature,
 
the Salyut of the Soviet Union. Both vehicles were similar
 
in many respects--both contained working areas, the experi­
ment descriptions were similar, both were revisited. However,
 
the space stations were dissimilar in size, Skylab containing
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Figure 1
 
SKYLAB SILHOUETTED AGAINST EARTH. DARK SKY, AS VIEWED FROM COMMAND/SERVICE .MOIDULE
 
11,300 cubic feet and Salyut 3,500 cubic feet. Salyut

apparently has a propulsion system, whereas Skylab did not.
 
The maximum mission duration for Salyut was 26 days, whereas
 
Skylab extended manned space experience to 84 days. Skylab
 
was stabilized by attitude thrusters. Skylab proved the
 
utility of long-duration manned flight in low earth orbit.
 
A complete description of the Skylab hardware and facilities
 
will be given later (Appendix I), but a brief outline is in
 
order here to set the stage for what follows. The space

station, Skylab (Figure 2), consisted of several modules,
 
each with a specific function (at least originally) and
 
each manufactured by a different industrial organization.

The largest segment, the orbital workshop (Figure 3), served
 
as the main living area and contained eating, sleeping,
 
and waste management facilities. In addition, the workshop
 
contained the medical experiment area and storage of several
 
other experiments. Attached to this section was the section
 
known as the Airlock Module (Figure 4). This section served
 
as the "engine room," with the controls for the electrical
 
power and environmental control systems located here. It
 
also contained the hatch for the flight crews to egress

the space station in orbit for extravehicular activities,
 
hence the name, Airlock. Connected to the Airlock Module
 
was the Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA) (Figure 5), which
 
contained the docking mechanism for accommodating the repeated

visits of the ferry module (the Apollo Command and Service
 
Module), as well as the auxiliary docking mechanism needed
 
for potential rescue missions. The MDA also contained the
 
majority of the earth resource experiments as well as the
 
control panels for the solar observation experiments. The
 
final module which contained these solar instruments was
 
designated the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) (Figure 6).

In orbit the ATM was solar oriented with its axis perpendicular
 
to the major axis of the space station. (During the launch
 
phase, the ATM was oriented along the major axis and was
 
covered, along with MDA and the Airlock, by a protective
 
shroud (Figure 7).)
 
The space station, that is the workshop, A/L, MIA,
 
ATM, all supporting equipment, all consumables and experiments,
 
was placed into orbit using the first two stages of the
 
Saturn V rocket (Figure 8). The launch was from Pad A.
 
Complex 39, Kennedy Space Center, Florida, on May 14, 197 3 ,
 
at 17:30 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time).
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Skylab was manned for three periods by separate three-man
 
crews. The periods of occupancy were 28, 59, and 84 days,
 
all of which occurred during a 9-month active life of the
 
spacecraft. The crews were launched in a modified Apollo
 
Command and Service Module (CSM) using a Saturn IB launch
 
vehicle (Figure 9). The Saturn IB, a two-stage booster,
 
was launched from Pad B of Complex 39. Recovery of the
 
Command Module, the crews, and the returned experimental
 
data was in the Pacific Ocean in an area west of San Diego,

California. Launch of the first manned mission was at 13:00
 
GMT on May 25, the second launch was at 11:10:50 GMT on
 
July 28, and the final manned launch was at 14:01:23 GMT
 
on November 16, 1973.
 
The achievements of Skylab are well documented and,
 
when viewed in retrospect, are noteworthy and significant.
 
With respect to the statistics, Table I lists the achieve­
ments by experiment group. A total of 69 experiments were
 
planned preflight, and of these, 66 were performed during
 
the missions. Four experiments were added during

the life of Skylab. In addition, 20 detailed test objectives
 
(DTO's) were performed, as well as 25 student investigations
 
and 20 science demonstrations. A total of 238,600 feet
 
of magnetic tape and 46,146 frames of film were used to
 
record the results of the earth resources expriments.

One hundred and seventy-five thousand, forty-seven frames
 
of film were used for data recording for the solar experiments.
 
The length of the manned periods of Skylab, 28, 59,
 
and 84 days, was selected to investigate the effects of
 
the space environment on the physical and psychological
 
well-being of man. Previous long-duration manned flight,
 
the 14-day Gemini VII flight, showed that the proposed 14-day

duration of the Apollo lunar flights posed no problem for
 
the crew, but medical data from this mission and from later
 
Apollo missions gave confusing indications when extrapolated
 
to very long missions. The Skylab missions, with the step­
by-step increase in duration, were planned to give evidence
 
of any physical limitation of man when exposed to zero gravity.

(This paper will not cover the results of the experiments,
 
however, it is worthy to note that no serious physical
 
limitation on manned missions was found through the 84-day

missions.) Not only were the crew examined soon after the
 
completion of a flight, but also for the first time, through

the medical experiments, the behaviors of the body systems
 
were monitored at regular intervals throughout the missions.
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FIGURE 9
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TABLE 1 - Experiment Summary
 
Manhours Number of investigations 
Experiment group Percent 
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Total Planned Actual deviation 
Solar physics 117.2 305.1 519.0 941.3 880++ 941++ 7.1 
Astrophysics 36.6 103.8 133.8 274.2 168 345 105 
Earth observation 71.4 223.5 274.5 569.4 62 99 60 
Life science 145.3 312.5 366.7 824.5 701 922 32 
Engineering and technology 12.1 117.4 83.0 212.5 264 245 -3.4 
Materials science and 5.9 8.4 15.4 29.7 10 32 220 
manufacturing in space 
Student 3.7 10.8 14.8 29.3 44 52 18 
Totals 392.2 1081.5 1407.2 2880.9 ++Manhours 
*Film, frames 28,739 24,942 73,366 127,047 
**Film, frames 9,846 16,800 19,400 46,046 
Magnetic tape, feet 45,000 93,600 100,000 238,600 
The technology required to accomplish Skylab was also
 
a significant legacy to future designers. Very few critical
 
systems represented significant advances in the technological
 
state-of-the-art (notable among these were the control moment
 
gyros which stabilized the workshop). However, many critical
 
systems were unique simply because of their size and reliability
 
requirements. Others, such as the waste management system,
 
represent innovative'and imaginative applications of relatively
 
simple technology.
 
The third achievement of Skylab is in the area of technical
 
management of diversified groups of engineers, scientists,
 
and technicians into an effective team--a team which responded
 
to the challenge and created the success of Skylab in the
 
face of seeming disaster.
 
At about I minute after liftoff, the micrometeorite
 
shield was torn from the workshop. This in turn caused
 
one workshop solar array to be ripped off and the other
 
array to be jammed in the stowed position (Figure 10).
 
As a result, the underpowered, overheated workshop (the
 
meteoroid shield served also as a part of the thermal system)
 
seemed destined to be a $2.4 billion hulk in space. The
 
Skylab operations team was able to stave off total disaster
 
for 10 days while the development team conceived, designed,
 
built, tested, and launched the equipment needed to correct
 
the problems. (Further details follow under Mission Summary.)
 
The outstanding performance of the flight crew in these
 
critical operations is well known and well documented.
 
This ability to respond quickly by the ground and flight
 
teams was repeated several times throughout the mission
 
and saved the Skylab workshop several times.
 
Skylab was not completed without a considerable investment
 
in both costs and resources. A total of over $2.4 billion
 
dollars was appropriated by Congress for Skylab over a 12-year
 
period.
 
The first activity leading directly to Skylab began
 
in 1961 with studies of the usage of Apollo hardware and
 
the final activity is expected in 1977/1978 with the completion
 
of the analysis of the Skylab experiment data. The efforts
 
required to develop and operate Skylab included major efforts
 
by three of the NASA Centers, the George C. Marshall Space
 
Flight Center, the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, and the
 
John F. Kennedy Space Center. In addition, corollary
 
activities were located at the Langley Research Center,
 
the Ames Research Center, the Goddard Space Flight Center,
 
the Wallops Flight Center, and the Lewis Research Center.
 
The direction of this national activity was centered at
 
the Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA Headquarters,
 
Washington, DC.
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Major development activity was carried on at industrial
 
plants located throughout the United States. Prime contracts
 
were executed at the McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company
 
at Huntington Beach, California, for the Orbiting Workshop
 
and at St. Louis, Missouri, for the Airlock Module; the
 
Multiple Docking Adapter was developed by the Martin-Marietta
 
Corporation, Denver Division. The Saturn V launch vehicle
 
was a product of The Boeing Corporation, Michoud, Louisiana
 
(for the first stage SIC), the-Rockwell International Corpora­
tion, Seal Beach, California (for the SII second stage),
 
and the International Business Machine Corporation, Huntsville,
 
Alabama, (for the Instrument Unit); the Rockwell International
 
Corporation, Downey, California, was responsible for the
 
Command and Service Module. The Chrysler Corporation, Michoud,
 
Louisiana, produced the first stage of the Saturn IB;
 
McDonnell-Douglas, Huntington Beach, California, also
 
produced the S-IVB stage, the second stage of the Saturn IB
 
manned vehicle.
 
In addition to these prime contractors, other major
 
activity was also conducted at the Ball Brothers Corporation,
 
Boulder, Colorado; General Electric Corporation, Valley
 
Forge, Pennsylvania; the Bendix-Corporation, Teterboro,
 
New Jersey; Honeywell Corporation, Lexington, Massachusetts;
 
the Navel Research Laboratory, Washington, DC; the High
 
Altitude Observatory, Boulder, Colorado; Harvard College
 
Observatory, Cambridge, Massachusetts; the Dudley Observatory,
 
Albany, New York; and Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
 
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. A complete list of all Skylab
 
contracts can be found in Reference 17.
 
Skylab was designed and operated as an experimental
 
space station and as such, a number of specific scientific,
 
application, and medical experiments were performed (Table II
 
and Appendix II). It is not the intent of this dissertation
 
to report on the results of these investigations in any
 
but a summary manner. The detailed results of the investi­
gations are being reported by the Principal Investigators
 
in a variety of scientific journals and meetings. Summaries
 
of the results have been presented at the Skylab Medical
 
Symposium (Reference 18) held at the Johnson Medical Center,
 
Houston, Texas; the Materials Processing Symposium (Reference 19),
 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama; the Comet
 
Kohoutek Conference (Reference 20), MSFC; the Earth Resources
 
Conference (Reference 21); and the Skylab Science Symposium,
 
MSFC (Reference 22).
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Table II - Skylab Experiment Complement
 
Life sciences* 

M071 Mineral balance 

M073 Bioassay of body fluids 

M074 Specimen mass measurement 

M078 Bone mineral measurement 

M092 Lower body negative pres-

sure 

M093 Vectorcardiogram 

MIll Cytogenic studies of the 

blood 

M112 Man's immunity in vitro 

aspects 

M113 Blood volume and red cell 

life span

M114 Red blood cell metabolism 

M115 Special hematologic effect 

M131 Human vestibular function 

M133 Sleep monitoring 

M151 Time and motion study 

M171 Metabolic activity
 
M172 Body mass measurement 

S015+ Effects of zero gravity on 

human 	cells 

S071+ Circadian rhythm, pocket

mice 

S072+ 	Circadian rhythm, vinegar 

gnat 

Solar physics 
*S020 X-ray and ultraviolet solar 
photogranhy 
S052 White light coronagraph 
S054 X-ray spectrograph 
S055A Ultraviolet scanning poly-
chromator spectroheliometer 
S056 X-ray telescope 
S082A Extreme ultraviolet spec-
troheliograph 
S082B Spectrograph and extreme 
ultraviolet monitor 
- Hydrogen-alpha 
Earth observations* 

S190A Multispectral photographic
facility 

S190B Earth terrain camera
 
S191 Infrared spectrometer
 
S192 Multispectral scanner
 
S193 Microwave radiometer, 

scatterometer, & altimeter 

S194 L-band microwave radiometer 

S009 

*SO19 

*S063 

S073 

*S149 

S150 

S183 

8228 

S230 

S201 

8232 

8233 

M512 

M551 

M552 

M553 

M518 

M556 

M557 

M558 

M559 

M560 

M561 

M562 

M563 

M564 

M565 

M566
M479 

Astrophysics
 
Nuclear emulsion
 
Ultraviolet stellar
 
astronomy
 
Ultraviolet airglow horizon
 
photography
 
Gegenschein and zodiacal
 
light
 
Particle collection
 
Galactic X-ray mapping
 
Ultraviolet panorama
 
Transuranic cosmic rays
 
Magnetospheric particle
 
composition
 
Cometary physics
 
Barium Plasma Observations
 
Comet Kohoutek Photography
 
Materials science and
 
manufacturing in space
 
Materials processing in
 
space
 
Metals melting

Exothermic brazing

Sphere forming
 
Multipurpose electric
 
furnace
 
Vapor growth of II-VI
 
compounds

Immiscible alloy compo­
sitions
 
Radioactive tracer dif­
fusion
 
Microsegregation in
 
germanium
 
Growth of spherical
 
crystals
 
Whisker-reinforced com­
posites
 
Indium antimonide crystals
 
Mixed III-V crystal growth
 
Metal and halide eutectics
 
Silver grids melted in
 
space
 
Copper-aluminum eutectic
Zero gravity flammability
 
*Johnson Space Center
 
development responsibility
 
+Johnson Space Center
 
integration responsibility
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Table II - Skylab Experiment Complement (cont.)
 
Engineering and technology 	 Science demonstrations
 
*DO08+ Radiation in spacecraft 
D024 Thermal control coatings 
M415 Thermal control coatings 
(IU) 
M487 Habitability of crew quarters 
*M509 Astronaut maneuvering 
equipment 
*M516+ Crew activities and main-
tenance 
T002 Manual navigation sight-
ings 
T003 Inflight aerosol analysis
T013 Crew vehicle disturbances 
T020 Foot-controlled maneuvering 
unit 
*T025 Coronagraph contamination 
measurements 
T027 Contamination measurements 
- Proton spectrometer 
Student investigations 

ED11 Atmospheric attentuation 

of energy 

ED12 Volcanic study 

ED21 Libration clouds 

ED22 Objects within Mercury's 

orbitSD22
ED23 	Quasars 

ED24 X-ray stellar classes 

ED25 X-rays from Jupiter

ED25 Ulravioletns from

ED26 	 Ultraviolet emissions from 

pulsars 

ED31 	Bacteria and spores

ED32 In vitro immunology 

ED33 Microorganisms in varying 

gravity 

ED41 Motor sensory performance
 
ED51 Chick embryology
 
ED52 Web formation
 
ED61-62 Plant growth and plant
 
phototropism

ED63 Cytoplasmic streaming 

ED72 Capillary study 

ED74 Mass measurement
 
ED75 Brownian motion 

ED76 Neutron analysis 

ED77 Universal gravity
 
ED78 Liquid motion
 
*SD1 

*SD2 

*SD4 

*SD5 

*SD6 

*SD7 

*SD8 

*SD9 

*SD9 

*SD10 

*SDII 

*SD12 

*SD13 

*SDI4 

SDl5 

SDI6 

SD17 

SD18

SD19 

SD20 

SD21 

SD23 

SD24 

SD28 

SD29
SD30 

Gravity gradient effects
 
Magnetic torque
 
Momentum effects
 
Energy loss and angular
 
momentum
 
Bead chain
 
Wave transmission re­
flection
 
Wilberforce pendulum

(Part I) Water drop
 
(TVl07) (Part II) Fluid
 
mechanics series
 
Fish otolith
 
Electrostatic effects
 
Magnetic effects
 
Magnetic electrostatic
 
effects
 
Airplane
 
(TVll5) Diffusion in liquids
 
(TVlll) Ice melting
 
(TVII2) Ice formation
 
(TVII3) Effervescence
 (TV102) Immiscible liquids
 
(TVI01) Liquid floating zone
 
(TV106) Deposition of silver
 
crystals
 
(TV03) Liquid films
 
(TVII6) Lens formation
 
(TV114) Acoustic positioning
 
(TV104) Gyroscope

(TV118) Cloud formation
(TV10) Orbital mechanics
 
SD33 (TVI05) Rochelle salt growth
 
S3 TlS eto niomn
 
SD34 (TV108) Neutron environment
 
SD35 (TV Charged particle
ml7) 

mobility
 
*Johnson Space Center
 
development responsibility
 
+Johnson Space Center
 
integration responsibility
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C. Scope of Paper
 
The references and bibliography listed prdvided the
 
documented results of the Skylab Program and form the founda­
tion of this dissertation. However, this analysis is a
 
result of the author's experiences as the Director of the
 
Skylab Program. These experiences cover program conception,
 
proceed through design, development, fabrication, test,
 
and assembly, and continue through launch operations, flight
 
operations, and finally, crew recovery.
 
(All aspects of the program planning and execution
 
were encountered. Financial, schedule, and resource management
 
problems, as might be expected, were part of the develop­
ment. However, this paper will not attempt to cover financial
 
and resource management except as is relevant in the area
 
of program management.)
 
The analysis of the program lessons contained herein
 
is that of the author, and the conclusions reached may or
 
may not coincide with those of other individuals, either
 
who have or have not been associated with Skylab. The
 
conclusions do not necessarily represent those of NASA.
 
This is not to imply that they are consciously different
 
from any official position of NASA, but does mean that no
 
attempt has been made to coordinate, integrate, or assimilate
 
the conclusions and analysis with any other group or individuals.
 
The discussion is, again, that of the author.
 
An attempt has been made to keep the conclusions general
 
in nature and applicable to large technology programs in
 
general. Certain of the conclusions are in themselves generally
 
applicable to development programs of any scope. However,
 
the conclusions should be applied on a selective basis when
 
all development factors are included. That is to say, the
 
size, cost, and scope of the activity will dictate the degree
 
to which the conclusions should be applied. However, the
 
conclusions expressed here should be directly and completely
 
applicable to the development of a large permanent space
 
station.-

THE HISTORY OF SKYLAB
 
Skylab was an evolutionary program; that is, it did
 
not spring forth as a fully developed concept. The initial
 
concepts were studied under the Apollo Extension Systems
 
Program, which was a systematic examination of uses of
 
potentially excess Apollo hardware. By 1962 a concept of
 
using an S-IV stage as a laboratory in space began to emerge.
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Several distinct program steps led to the final configuration
 
in 1969. The evolutionary development naturally resulted
 
in some inefficiencies, compromises, and appendages, and
 
many remained until the completion of the program. (An
 
evolutionary development should be avoided since the resulting
 
system is an inefficient compromise.)
 
The development program was a complicated one despite
 
the fact there was little high-risk technology involved.
 
Skylab technology was primarily current "state-of-the-art."
 
However, the individual modules were complex,, contained
 
a large number of items, such as experiments, and, therefore,
 
had many interfaces. At the same time, the interaction
 
between the modules was relatively complex.
 
The development and test of space systems and missile
 
systems has evolved over the years and has resulted in a
 
systematic and logical sequence of testing which normally
 
begins with verification and qualification at the lowest
 
component level and proceeds through subelement, subsystem,
 
system, module, and finally integrated testing. In this
 
manner, the final vehicle, as it is on the launch pad, has
 
had many hours of test to Verify each element at its lowest
 
level and to predict how it will behave in the presence
 
of a myriad of other components. Off-nominal testing is
 
employed to examine the behavior when the component is sub­
jected to unusual stresses, and finally, qualification testing
 
is designed to prove the system will operate properly in
 
the expected flight environments.
 
The Skylab development did not completely ignore this
 
evolution, but several innovative steps were adopted. Since
 
many of the components had been used in previous programs
 
(e.g., Gemini, Apollo, and ERTS), the verification cycle
 
could be accomplished by examining the similarity of use
 
and environment and only testing where engineering analysis
 
and judgement indicated a need. Secondly, many components
 
did not represent significant new applications and verifica­
tion could be accomplished by analysis and calculations.
 
Thirdly, where components were new and unique, but where
 
sufficient design margin could be employed, testing was
 
eliminated or reduced. And finally, where testing was
 
considered essential, systems level qualification was
 
considered in lieu of component qualification.
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Because of the physical size of the modules, it was
 
not possible to conduct all of the customary integrated
 
tests in the Skylab development and verification cycle.
 
Also, the various modules did not meet until delivery
 
to the launch site (with the exception of the MDA and
 
Airlock) since their development, fabrication, and check­
out were accomplished at a number of locations throughout
 
the Nation and, in some cases, the World. This necessitated
 
a sequence of interface control verification methods and
 
simulator tests to minimize the testing time at KSC.
 
Improperly designed modules would have resulted in excessive
 
delays in correcting physical, electrtc, and electronic
 
mismatches. A careful examination of these verification
 
sequences will give future developers an insight as to the
 
effectiveness of the Skylab methods as well as an assessment
 
of the potential of improved methods and techniques.
 
The multidisciplined set of experiments and activities
 
planned and accomplished on the space station had a variety
 
of often conflicting and interacting requirements. For
 
example, the solar instruments required that the vehicle
 
be oriented in a solar inertial attitude while the earth
 
resource experiments needed to be pointed along the earth
 
radial vector (termed Z local vertical). The demands for
 
crew time, electrical power, and attitude peculiarities
 
created an operational challenge which represented a unique
 
step forward in flight planning and execution.
 
There is no date which can be said to mark the beginning
 
of the Skylab Program. The evolution of the program can
 
be traced back to the early days of the Apollo Program,
 
although the ideas concerning space stations go back many
 
years prior to that. Indeed, the ideas about space stations
 
fill science fiction and were discussed by Dr. Oberth in
 
1923. However, the specific configurations which led to
 
Skylab began in 1960 with early studies of other uses for
 
Apollo hardware.
 
The Apollo Program was initiated by President Kennedy
 
in 1960, and a versatile set of hardware was developed.
 
The launch vehicles (Saturn IB and the larger Saturn V)
 
provided the Nation with a heavy lift capability which
 
was unparalleled. The Command and Service Module (CSM)
 
was a highly maneuverable vehicle for manned use in both
 
earth orbit as well as in translunar space. It has proven
 
to be a versatile spacecraft. The Lunar Module was a more
 
specialized craft which, while it was not utilized for other
 
23 
purposes, provided components and techniques which have
 
been applied in a number of programs. Equally important,
 
the resources applied to the lunar landing provided the
 
Nation with a range of facilities which made possible a
 
wide range of future programs. The Kennedy Space Center
 
has provided the buildings and facilities needed to assemble,
 
test, and launch the space ventures of the future. At the
 
Johnson Space Center (initially the Manned Space Craft Center)
 
the data handling and computing facilities of the mission
 
control center, as well as the thermal vacuum chambers,
 
crew trainers, simulators, centrifuges, and other testing
 
devices, permitted the control of a variety of missions.
 
The manufacturing facilities, testing complexes, and labora­
tories of the Marshall Space Flight Center were available
 
to undertake whatever future tasks were identified. The
 
Goddard Space Flight Center contributed the world-wide
 
network of microwave, cable, land-line, and satellite links
 
which permitted monitoring, control, and access to the space
 
ventures. Equally important, the space and missile develop­
ment programs of the Nation provided the industrial base,
 
the manpower, tooling, technology, and skills needed for
 
future space activities.
 
The most important requirement, the know-how, existed
 
in a limited number of people, and it was the availability
 
of those individuals which primarily dictated the timing
 
of the program which began as the Apollo Extension System
 
or AES. Studies were conducted under this early (1961)
 
project which examined a wide variety of uses for the Apollo
 
hardware. Quite early the Command and Service Module (CSM)
 
was identified as being adaptable to a wide variety of earth
 
orbiting missions for scientific purposes. One of the early
 
missions identified was the use of the CSM as a carrier
 
for a variety of solar telescopes which would be placed
 
in orbit. The astronauts were to deploy and operate them
 
in a study of the Sun and its activities. This cluster
 
of solar telescopes was called the Apollo Telescope Mount
 
or ATM. (For the remainder of Skylab, the instruments changed,
 
the ATM configuration changed, the mode of operation changed,
 
but the name remained.)
 
At the same time, other studies examined the use of
 
the upper stage of the Apollo launch vehicles, the S-IVB,
 
as a workshop. By 1965, the concept of the "spent stage"
 
workshop had been formulated, while at the same time, the
 
Gemini experience with extravehicular activity (EVA) indicated
 
the need for the study of man in weightlessness. Thus,
 
an early version of the workshop consisted of a scheme for
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permitting an astronaut to open a hatch in a "spent" S-IVB
 
stage in orbit after it had performed its primary mission
 
as a propulsive stage. There, the study of man in space
 
could proceed under relatively controlled and confined
 
conditions.
 
The problems of easily opening a hatch which would seal
 
the liquid hydrogen tank of the stage while it was a pro­
pulsive unit led the Apollo Applications Program Office (formed
 
in August 1965) to solicit the Douglas Aircraft Corporation
 
proposal to develop an S-IVB Orbital Workshop involving an
 
"in-orbit" conversion of the propulsive S-IVB into a shelter
 
suitable for habitation.
 
Late in 1965 and early in 1966, studies showed that
 
the spent stage concept needed services (i.e., power,
 
consumables, etc.) which might be supplied by the proven
 
Gemini components. Consequently, a fixed price contract
 
was negotiated with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation to
 
produce an airlock for the S-IVB spent stage workshop. During
 
that same period, the planning for the Apollo Applications
 
Program firmed up, assignments were made, experiments were
 
selected, and some hardware was fabricated.
 
By December 1965, the cluster concept was officially
 
scheduled. The cluster concept (at that time) envisioned
 
the launch of a "wet workshop" (i.e., the use of the S-IVB
 
as a propulsive stage first) followed by a manned launch
 
with a subsequent rendezvous, docking, and entry into the
 
workshop for experimentation. Six months later, a second
 
crew was to visit the workshop to be followed immediately
 
by the launch of an unmanned modified Lunar Landing Module
 
(LM) which was equipped with an ATM solar observatory.
 
Thus, the relatively simple concept of using the empty
 
S-IVB stage to study the weightless maneuvering of an astronaut
 
had evolved into a complex set of hardware developments and
 
operational concepts. By this time, habitability requirements
 
had been added (i.e., crews quarters, two floors, walls),
 
environmental systems provided (i.e., a two-gas atmosphere,
 
thermal systems, pressurization systems), as well as mission
 
expendables (ie., food and water). The operational concepts
 
envisioned a series of timed launches and rendezvous, including
 
two launches a day apart, one of which was to be an unmanned
 
rendezvous. A total of 22 Saturn IB launches, and 15 Saturn V
 
launches were called for by this schedule!
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(At the completion of the Gemini Program in January 1967,
 
Charles W. Mathews of the Johnson Space Center, the former
 
manager of the Gemini Program, was named Director of the
 
Apollo Applications Program (AAP), and the author was named
 
Mission Director, having served in this capacity on Gemini.)
 
For the next 2 years there was a great deal of "activity"
 
within the AAP, but little real progress. Many experiments
 
were assigned and some hardware delivered. Roles and missions
 
were clarified and altered, and contracts were negotiated
 
and modified. However, because of the pressures of the Apollo
 
lunar program, and because of the tragic Apollo fire at
 
KSC which cost the lives of three astronauts, the AAP
 
was continually rescheduled, replanned, and reassessed.
 
A side effect of the AS-204 fire was to delay all follow-on
 
programs in order to concentrate manpower and know-how
 
on the announced national program, Apollo.
 
(In May 1968, Mr. Harold Luskin was appointed Director
 
of AAP, succeeding Mr. Mathews. (The author had been reassigned
 
as the Apollo Mission Director in the fall of 1967.))
 
By the end of 1969, the circumlunar mission, Apollo 8,
 
was scheduled, the Saturn V rocket was proven ready for
 
flight, the Apollo Command and Service Module had been tested,
 
and an unmanned Lunar Module had flown. It was appropriate,
 
therefore, to divert some additional effort on the follow-on
 
Apollo Applications Program and full funding was released,
 
(Unfortunately, in November 1968, Mr. Luskin died
 
suddenly before the program could get fully underway.
 
The author was named to succeed Mr. Luskin at the conclusion
 
of the Apollo 8 circumlunar mission in the first week in
 
January 1969.)
 
At the same time, the remarkable success of the Saturn V
 
launch vehicle permitted serious consideration of diverting
 
Saturn V vehicles from Apollo to AAP. None of the original
 
plans for Apollo had anticipated the rapid development of
 
the Saturn V. Two unmanned lafnches, Apollo 5 and Apollo 6,
 
were followed by the manned Apollo 8 circumlunar flight.
 
As confidence rose in the prospect of achieving an early
 
lunar landing, the possibility of an early use of a Saturn V
 
for the Apollo Applications Program became a more attractive
 
option.
 
Also, as the understanding of the "wet workshop" concept
 
came more into focus, the difficulties involved in converting
 
a spent rocket stage into an orbital workshop were beginning
 
to be faced. It appeared as if a major share of the available
 
crew time would be needed just to outfit the workshop.
 
The enthusiasm for the "wet workshop" began to'diminish
 
and ground outfitting of the workshop began to receive serious
 
study. Finally in May 1969, the Directors of the Johnson
 
Space Center (then the Manned Spacecraft Center) and the
 
Marshall Space Flight Center recommended that a Saturn V
 
be used to launch a "dry workshop" into orbit. (A full
 
record of the documentation of the Skylab history tan be
 
found in Reference 24.)
 
The Program Managers from the three affected NASA Centers,
 
JSC, MSFC, and KSC,, and the Program Director met in a closed
 
door, weekend session at the Michoud Facility of NASA in
 
New Orleans to develop the plan for implementing this Saturn V
 
option. The agreed upon approach called for the launch
 
of the workshop, fully 6utfitted and including the ATM,
 
from KSC's Launch Complex 39 using the Saturn V. (This
 
required minor changes,to the Saturn to enable the two stages
 
to propel the workshop into orbit.) The following day,
 
three crewmen were to be sent' to the workshop, using the
 
smaller Saturn 1B rocket,. for, a 28-day stay.. In total,
 
three manned visits were planned, launched on 90-day intervals
 
for stays of 28, 56, and 56 days, respectively. (Fifty-six
 
days was chosen for the last mission because preliminary
 
analysis indicated that consumables., food, water, oxygen
 
and nitrogen, would limit the duration. Also, the early
 
medical opinion was that all physiological effects would
 
have stabilized in that time.) The orbital attitude and,
 
inclination were set at about 2'40 nm and 500. (The inclina­
tion was set at 500 since it would result in coverage of
 
all the United States except Alaska and was within launch
 
safety limits. The altitude was selected to minimize any
 
disturbing effects the atmosphere might have on the attitude
 
stability of the workshop. Higher altitudes were desired
 
also to extend the orbital life of the workshops, but lower
 
altitudes would result in less exposure of'photographic
 
film to the effects of radiation. The selected altitude
 
was a good compromise.) In order to meet the scheduled launch
 
date, it was decided to minimize changes from the basic
 
"wet workshop" configuration. (From time to time, devia­
tions were made from this fundamental configuration as the
 
issues became clear. However, these changes were carefully
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weighed and analyzed for effect before they were adopted.
 
For example, the workshop floor was inverted in order to
 
facilitate manufacture and ass-embly. Changes of this type
 
were made to increase the efficiency of the development
 
program. Other major changes, such as the addition of the
 
Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP), were made to
 
improve the capabilities of the program.)
 
(As these decision were being made, a major national
 
decision was made by the Department of Defense when on June 10
 
the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program was cancelled.
 
This left the NASA program as the only national space station
 
activity.)
 
The "dry workshop" concept was approved by the NASA
 
Administrator, Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, on July 18, 1969, just
 
2 days after the successful launch of the first lunar landing
 
mission, Apollo 11. The program was finally fully funded,
 
fully supported, and fully underway.
 
Detailed instructions were issued quickly, and the required
 
contractual changes were negotiated with each of the program
 
contractors. In December, a Cluster Systems Review was
 
held at MSFC to review the various systems. As a typical
 
example of how major changes were made in the program, the
 
development of the configuration of the electrical power
 
system is classic. The initial "no change" decision made
 
when the dry configuration was first described, resulted
 
in two separate electrical power systems: (1) The ATM system
 
which consisted of the ATM solar panels, the ATM power con­
ditioners, chargers, batteries, and distribution system.
 
This power was used to support the ATM and its electrical/
 
electronic components, including the attitude control system;
 
(2) The workshop solar panels provided the energy for the
 
workshop electrical system. The solar panels, power condi­
tioners, charger, battery, and regulator provided the electricity
 
for the workshop, airlock, and docking module. Each system
 
provided approximately the same level of power (3-4 KW) into
 
the independent systems. At the Cluster Systems Review,
 
a formal question was posed challenging this design (the
 
formal vehicle for question was the Review Item Discrepancy
 
(RID), which raised the question, proposed corrective action,
 
and required a written answer disposing of the issue).
 
In this case, the proposed solution was to buss the two
 
systems together to permit load sharing. The disposition
 
of this RID was to request that the contractor propose a
 
system for sharing the load., In due time, the proposal
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was made and analyzed by the NASA technical team. The agreed
 
to solution was proposed to the Level III (module level)
 
configuration control board, referred to the Level II (project
 
level) board, and finally, referred to the Level I (program
 
level) board. Here, the Program Director weighed the increased
 
cost and complexity against the increased flexibility and
 
probability of success and decided to implement the change.
 
The contractual change implementation was initiated, and
 
the design was incorporated.
 
In retrospect, this specific decision saved the Skylab
 
Program. Without the ability to share the electrical power,
 
the flight failure experienced on launch of Skylab 1 would
 
have been fatal to the program (see Mission Summary).
 
Throughout the early days of the Apollo Applications
 
Program, the program name, AAP, was felt to be uninspiring.
 
During the early phases, it was necessary to identify the
 
program with the use of the Apollo hardware and know-how.
 
But, after the program had been accepted, it was desired
 
that the program be uncoupled from the lunar program to
 
give it a purpose and visibility of its own, Consequently,
 
a list of appropriate titles was sent by the program to
 
the NASA Project Designation Committee. They selected Skylab,
 
and, thus, the Skylab Program was named. (The name Skylab
 
had been initially proposed by Col. Donald Steelman, USAF,
 
while on duty with NASA in the Apollo Applications Program
 
Office.)
 
Early in 1970, the full assessment of the modifications
 
to launch pad 34 became available. Pad 34 was old, required
 
significant refurbishment, and needed contractor support
 
for several years for the sole purpose of maintaining the
 
launch complex. Consequently, a study was undertaken to
 
design the modifications needed to Complex 39 to accommodate
 
the smaller Saturn IB. By keeping the Command Module,
 
Saturn S-IVB stage, and the Instrument Unit at the same level
 
as for a Saturn V launch, modifications were minimized and
 
resulted in the "milkstool" launch platform. Design studies
 
showed a savings of $10 to $12 million by using this approach,
 
and on May 15 it was officially adopted.
 
In the middle of 1970, a major change was made to the
 
contractor responsibilities in Skylab. Originally, the
 
MSFC role included the in-house development, fabrication,
 
and test of major modules, without contractor support.
 
The solar observatory, the docking module, the medical
 
experiments, and several smaller elements were to be developed
 
by the Center. As the program progressed, more and more
 
equipment was placed in the docking module, and the development
 
effort shifted from being predominantly structural engineering
 
and fabrication to being predominantly system engineering
 
and electrical design and fabrication. After a review of
 
the in-house capability to do all of the jobs, it was properly
 
decided to contract for the docking module. MSFC continued
 
to build and supply the structure, but it was to be shipped
 
to the Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) in Denver for the
 
cabling plumbing, and systems integration. (This represented
 
a major change in the role of the Martin organization. Pre­
viously, MMC had an integration and analysis role with all three
 
Centers and Headquarters. Now, MMC was to be responsible
 
for more than paperwork. Their responsibility now included
 
a key hardware element. In retrospect, the assignment of
 
the tasks of an integration contractor to an organization
 
without an in-line hardware responsibility was not correct.
 
The integration contractor was not really considered,
 
nor treated, as a full partner. With the assignment of
 
the docking module to MMC, .gave them an integration role
 
and a key hardware role and put them in an advantageous
 
position to carry out their integration assignment.)
 
Since the Skylab could remain in orbit for long periods
 
of time and could sustain stranded crewmen, it became possible,
 
for the first time, to consider developing a rescue capability.
 
The Skylab Director of Reliability, Quality Assurance, and
 
Safety, Mr. Haggai Cohen, proposed a study of the rescue
 
potential. As a result, in December 1970 a crew rescue
 
capability was base lined by the Program Director and approved
 
by the NASA Administrator. This limited rescue capability
 
assumed that the workshop was the "storm cellar" to which
 
the crew would retreat in the event of a problem. (In the
 
event of a workshop problem, the crew was expected to retreat
 
to the Command Module and return to Earth. Multiple failures
 
which incapacitated the CSM and the workshop could not be
 
accommodated.) The rescue vehicle was to be the next vehicle
 
in line (i.e., Skylab 3 was the rescue vehicle for the
 
Skylab 2 crew). An additional two seats were to be added
 
to the CSM if needed, and a two-man rescue crew would be
 
launched to bring back the stranded three-man crew. The
 
key requirement was, of course, that the emergency did not
 
require an immediate rescue, since up to 48 days could be
 
required from call-up to launch of the rescue craft.
 
The development of the NASA portion of the Fiscal Year
 
1972 budget made it clear that there were not enough funds
 
available for the full Apollo and Skylab programs as planned.
 
As a result, an integrated Apollo/Skylab schedule was
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developed which slowed down the Apollo schedule and, more
 
importantly, shifted Skylab until after Apollo was completed.
 
The net result was a decrease in the NASA requirements to
 
within the President's budget, although the Skylab portion
 
of the budget increased due to the delay of the launch from
 
November 1972 to April 1973. (Officially, the launch was
 
scheduled for mid-1973, but the internal schedule was April 30,
 
1973.) This was the last major schedule change for Skylab.
 
Indeed, there was no schedule change until the spring of
 
1973 when a 2-week delay was announced.
 
For the next 2 years Skylab proceeded in the traditional
 
manner for development programs. Detailed problems arose
 
from day to day. Solutions were found and the program
 
proceeded. Details of the development program can be found
 
in the Skylab Preliminary Chronology (Reference 23). However,
 
several unique items should be noted herein because of the
 
unusual circumstances or importance.
 
In the spring of 1971, a review of the proposed medical
 
experiments was held for the Deputy Administrator of NASA,
 
Dr. George M. Low. He expressed concern about the lack
 
of base line data with which to compare the in-orbit medical
 
results. At his request, a 56-day medical test was scheduled
 
in an altitude chamber at the Johnson Space Center. The
 
test was completed on September 20, 1972. Astronauts Crippen,

Thornton, and Bobko spent 56 days simulating the Skylab
 
mission. They consumed Skylab-type food and water, breathed
 
the Skylab atmosphere, and to a first approximation, dupli­
cated the 56 -day mission (without the effects of zero gravity).
 
The test showed no change in the physiological characteristics
 
of the crew, and left zero gravity as the primary variable
 
for the flight tests.
 
The medical experiments continued in the next 2 years
 
to be the most contentious element of the program. In June
 
1971, private medical conversations were base lined by the
 
Program Director after an affirmative decision by the
 
Administrator of NASA. While the ability of a patient to
 
talk privately to his doctor may seem to be fundamental
 
to the doctor/patient relationship, it was not at all accepted
 
by the news media. There was continual friction throughout

the program with the assertion by some that private conversa­
tions represented a censorship of the program. In truth,
 
the program was conducted in the open, with full disclosure
 
of all events.
 
Also in the area of medical experiments, the urine
 
collection system design was in serious contention for
 
almost a year. The original design called for urine to
 
be sampled at each urination, the sample to be dried in
 
orbit, returned to Earth., reconstituted, and analyzed.
 
Unfortunately, while this process preserved the chemical
 
constituents of the urine, the hormonal constituents were
 
lost in the process. The original medical experiment
 
objectives were not clear on whether the hormonal balance
 
was a part of the protocol. However, since these hormones
 
seemed to be key in describing many of the physiological
 
(and psychological) responses to weightlessness, it was
 
clear that all reasonable efforts should be made to recover
 
these more complex constituents. After much analysis,
 
discussion, and argument, it was concluded that since the
 
basic system destroyed the hormones, a change in the collec­
tion system was needed. In July 1971, a centrifugal separator
 
urine collection system was base lined. The new system
 
required that each crewman's urine be pooled for 24 hours
 
and a sample be taken, frozen, and be returned for analysis.
 
(This problem was very difficult to solve because the desired
 
solution crossed normal jurisdictional lines. The require­
ment was the responsibility of JSC, and the hardware implemen­
tation the responsibility of MSFC. The final solution,
 
the centrifugal collector, was the result of research and
 
development by JSC and was built by MSFC.)
 
The whole body shower issue in Skylab represents a
 
case where the author, acting on personal feelings, guessed
 
wrong. Early in 1970, it was decided that the crews would
 
desire a whole body shower for morale purposes. As a result,
 
proposals were solicited. The initial propositions were
 
complex and expensive and were rejected. The Program Director
 
challenged the in-house design groups to design a simple,
 
inexpensive shower. Finally, in mid-1971, the MSFC design
 
group proposed a simple pressure-fed whole body shower.
 
A pressurized bottle of water fed a shower head located
 
in a simple collapsible cloth shower area. The water was
 
collected at the base by a version of the Skylab vacuum
 
cleaner. The system was accepted, base lined, and built.
 
It worked in orbit, but, to the surprise of the author,
 
many of the astronauts did not feel it was required nor
 
needed. Because of the time to operate and clean up,
 
few of the crewmen thought it worth the effort. Future
 
systems should be simpler to operate.
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In mid-1971, one of the more gratifying experiences
 
in Skylab was initiated--The Skylab Student Project.
 
It began with a request by the MSFC Program Manager that
 
a way be found to encourage the participation of high school
 
students in the Skylab missions. After a brief analysis,
 
a Headquarters contract was let with the National Science
 
Teachers Association (NSTA) in Washington, DC, to conduct a
 
nationwide contest among high school students for the selection
 
of a number of experiments to be flown on Skylab. Over
 
15,000 proposals were received and evaluated by the NSTA.
 
Finally, by April, the NSTA and NASA agreed upon 25 student
 
experimenters. The enthusiasm of these young people was
 
gratifying and satisfying. The experiments were real,
 
not contrived, and some had remarkably sophisticated
 
scientific content. Each student investigator was linked
 
with a NASA scientist as an advisor. Each advisor was
 
instructed to ensure that the experiment remained the product
 
of the student, and, within the bounds of visibility, these
 
instructions were followed. It should be noted though,
 
that the teenagers selected had a wide variety of interests,
 
some who had a deep and lasting interest in science and
 
some who happened to propose good experiments but whose
 
interests changed between the initial contest and the
 
publication of the final results.
 
In January 1972, the Skylab flight crews were named
 
after several months of discussion and debate over the
 
proper composition. The elements of NASA associated most
 
closely with the realities of flight operations were most
 
conscious of the fact that Skylab was a new, technical,
 
and operational venture and as such it required flight
 
crews which were operationally and test oriented. Their
 
proposal was for a dominance of the pilot-astronaut, at
 
least until the system was mature, which might be accom­
plished by the third mission. On the other hand, the elements
 
of NASA associated with the science and experiment ambitions
 
of Skylab argued strongly for active participation and
 
in some cases for dominance by the scientist-astronauts.
 
In the end, the crews for each of the three missions were
 
composed of two from the pilot-astronaut category and one
 
from the scientist-astronaut pool. By cross training (and
 
by inclination in most cases), the flight crews became
 
very versatile; the pilots were reasonable "scientists"
 
and the scientists were capable "pilots." In retrospect,
 
the composition of the first crew was probably correct,
 
but the second and third crew could have substituted a
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scientist for a pilot. Astronaut Kerwin (medical doctor),
 
for example, helped Astronaut Conrad (pilot) deploy the
 
solar panel, and his performance probably could not have
 
been improved if he had had more pilot training and less
 
medical training. Conversely, without any intent to demean
 
their significant achievements, the third crew may have
 
had an even greater contribution if, for example, an
 
earth scientist had been added to the crew.
 
The names of the crews were announced on January 18.
 
They were Charles Conrad, Jr. (Commander), Dr. Joseph Kerwin,
 
and Paul Weitz for the first manned mission; Alan Bean (Commander),
 
Dr. Owen Garriott, and Jack Lousma for the second manned
 
mission; and Gerald Carr (Commander), Dr. Edward Gibson,
 
and William Pogue for the third and last mission. The
 
backup crews were also named at the same time.
 
The development and fabrication and test of the Skylab
 
hardware, experiments, and equipment proceeded. Several
 
times there was internal rescheduling of events, but
 
basically the schedule was maintained, with one important
 
trouble spot. The largest element, the workshop, had
 
the most experiment interfaces and was subjected to the
 
effects of many minor changes. Rather heroic efforts
 
were necessary to come close to maintaining the schedule
 
and the installation of parts, cables, experiments, and
 
equipment required tight scheduling and control. Most
 
importantly, the assembly plan had to be very flexible
 
to accommodate the relatively frantic part of the
 
development. It was very fortunate that the initial planning
 
called for the workshop to be available more than 6 months
 
prior to the KSC need date. In fact, the workshop was
 
delivered to the KSC facility about 2 weeks late--the
 
6-months schedule reserve was needed.
 
All hardware was delivered to KSC during the fall
 
and winter of 1972 as was the necessary ground support
 
equipment and test equipment. Unfortunately, it did not
 
always arrive in the precise order as the plan had called
 
for and there was some replanning necessary. As a result,
 
the prelaunch preparations fell about 2 weeks behind
 
schedule. In February 1973, a review of the progress
 
was conducted, and it was concluded that for a variety
 
of reasons, the launch date should be delayed for 2 weeks
 
from April 30 to May 14. There was considerable consi­
deration given to maintaining the April 30 date since
 
it had been held for over 2 years and it would have been
 
a significant management and technical accomplishment to
 
have been able to forecast the effort needed to prepare
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a project of the complexity of Skylab. However, a careful
 
assessment of the overtime-and extreme effort which would
 
be necessary to regain the lost time indicated that while
 
it was possible, the effort would have been too large
 
to accommodate any subsequent problem and would not have
 
permitted the careful attention which seemed needed.
 
As stated, a more cautious scheduling was adopted with
 
the launch date May 14.
 
Subsequent preparations went as planned with the
 
various tests as planned with no serious anomalies being
 
found.
 
The Countdown Demonstration Test began on April 25
 
and lasted until May 2. All final procedures were rehearsed
 
as if the test was a real launch. On May 7, the 7-day
 
countdown sequence was initiated in preparation for the
 
May 14 launch.
 
MISSION SUMMARY
 
By NASA definition, the operational phase begins a
 
few weeks before liftoff at the completion of the Countdown
 
Demonstration Test (CDDT) which occurred-on May 2. From
 
that time on any and all changes to the flight hardware,
 
ground complex, test procedures, crew check lists, or
 
flight plan required the written approval of the Program
 
Director.
 
As part of the final approval of the mission operations
 
and hardware preparations, a series of Flight Readiness
 
Reviews were held at JSC, MSFC, and KSC from April 9
 
through 12. These Center oriented reviews were in prepara­
tion for the mission Flight Readiness Review (FRR) held
 
at KSC on April 18-20. The results of preparations and
 
tests to this point were reviewed by the Associate Adminis­
trator for Manned Space Flight (Dale Myers), the three
 
MSFC Center Directors (Drs. Kraft, Petrone, and Debus),
 
the Program Director, and other NASA program officials.
 
The readiness of the flight hardware, ground systems,
 
flight crew, ground support crews, procedures, communica­
tions network, and recovery crews were reviewed and found
 
to be satisfactory.
 
One area was found to be deficient., The computer
 
program needed for operation of the mission control center
 
at Houston was not completely operational. Two important
 
subroutines were not completed. The program which was
 
to convert the ultraviolet data from the S-055 spectro­
heliometer into images of the Sun was not completed.
 
(These images were to be used for real time flight planning
 
and, while usable images were available during the first
 
mission, the principle investigator was not satisfied
 
with the program until January 1974). The other deficient
 
program was to permit the transmission of data from the
 
computers at JSC to the computers at MSFC. Because of
 
transmission line losses and data dropouts, the data could
 
not be sent real time. Instead, the data was recorded
 
on magnetic tapes and flown to Huntsville each day. Also,
 
a remote terminal of the Houston computer was installated
 
at MSFC to permit the designers to see the Houston data.
 
This program was available for use before the end of the
 
first mission.
 
It is appropriate to observe here that this is an
 
example of what can occur when the ground systems are
 
not afforded the same attention as the flight systems.
 
The software review board, chaired by the Program Director,
 
did not review and examine the ground software progress
 
regularly and systematically.
 
The final countdown began 1 week prior to launch
 
and proceeded at a relatively leisurely pace. Few problems
 
were encountered, none were of a serious nature. Ordnance
 
devices were installed; the batteries were installed and
 
activated on schedule.
 
The launch-minus-2-day meeting was held on May 12.
 
The responsible official for each element of the program,
 
workshop, Command and Service Module, recovery, network,
 
flight crew, security and public affairs, summarized the
 
final preparations and the readiness for flight. A detailed
 
weather assessment and forecast was made by NOAA. Based
 
upon these statements and the previous reviews, acceptances,
 
And studies, the Program Director assessed the mission
 
as ready for launch and he so appraised the Associate
 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight. The launch of
 
SL-1 was scheduled for 1330 on May 14, 1973.
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The launch countdown proceeded without a hitch.
 
Minor problems were resolved quickly and without impact
 
to the schedule (based upon Gemini and Apollo experience,
 
built-in periods of inactivity, i.e., "holds," were incor­
porated in the count to provide time to resolve problems.
 
For the most part, these built-in holds were not required
 
,for Skylab, but are recommended for any program in the
 
future). Propellant loading for the Saturn V began on
 
schedule at T-5 hours 30 minutes, with range safety checks
 
90 minutes later. All tests proceeded normally until
 
finally at T-0 hours 8 minutes, Skylab was switched to
 
internal power. After final systems checks, the terminal
 
automatic sequences began (at T-0 hours 3 minutes 7 seconds)
 
and the launch sequence was subsequently controlled by
 
the launch processor computer. Internal power transfer,
 
sequence verification, swing arm retraction, final checkout
 
and launch commit occurred as planned.
 
At 1730 GMT (1330 EDT) on May 14, 1973, Skylab was
 
Launched.
 
The Saturn V launch vehicle lifted off and, as the
 
tail fins of the S-lC stage cleared the top of the launch
 
tower, control shifted from the launch director at the
 
Kennedy Space Center to the flight director at the Johnson
 
Space Center.
 
At 63 seconds, as the vehicle passed through Mach 1
 
and was approaching maximum dynamic pressure, the meteoroid
 
shield which covered the cylindrical portion of the workshop
 
was ripped from the main structure. As it separated,
 
solar array number 2 was unlatched and only air pressure
 
kept it from deploying. Solar array number 1 'was fouled
 
by debris from the shield which subsequently prevented
 
that array from deploying.
 
Failure analysis identified the most probable cause
 
as a "sneak path" for aerodynamic pressure which lifted
 
the auxiliary wire tunnel into the airstream. This tunnel
 
had been assumed sealed at the aft end when the structural
 
load calculation was made. Unfortunately, a poor design
 
(omission of a cap or seal on hollow structural stringers,
 
a poor metal-to-metal seal, and unplanned venting around
 
a boot seal) resulted in unexpected air flow and a resultant
 
burst pressure at the forward lip.
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Examination of the telemetry data showed abnormal
 
vibration, a change in telemetry power, a roll rate, and
 
movement in the torsion rods attached to the shield.
 
However, the flight controllers in Houston only received
 
a TM indication that solar array 2 had deployed. This
 
anomaly was reported as it occurred and the reports were
 
monitored at KSC. However, primary attention was focused
 
on the trajectory as the Saturn continued on its flight
 
path.
 
At the completion of the second stage burn (591.1
 
secs.) the two retro rockets separated the launch vehicle
 
from the workshop. It is probable that the plume from
 
one in-line rocket impinged upon solar array number 2.
 
Vehicle motions support this theory and the forces were
 
calculated to be sufficient to swing the released array
 
to where the momentum would cause the wing to reach the
 
900 stop, and tear completed free at the hinge line. All
 
telemetry from array number 2 ceased at about 594 seconds.
 
The workshop experienced yawing motions at this time, which
 
also supports the analysis.
 
In retrospect, it was fortunate that solar array number
 
1 was fouled by the meteoroid shield debris.
 
After 599 seconds of powered flight, Skylab was injected
 
into a near perfect orbit, 435 km above the Earth.
 
After insertion, the automatic sequencer was designed
 
to cycle through the deployment and activation activities
 
to place the cluster in its orbital configuration. Reports
 
of a possible failure were beginning to be discussed and
 
the deployment was awaited to prove or disprove a malfunction
 
of some sort. The deployment sequence jettisoned the
 
refrigeration system radiator shield, maneuvered the work­
shop to a gravity gradient orientation, activated the
 
refrigeration system, and then jettisoned the large payload
 
shroud which covered the solar observatory, airlock, and
 
multiple docking module. The sequencer maneuvered the
 
vehicle to a solar inertial attitude and the solar observatory
 
was rotated 900 from along the thrust axis of the vehicle
 
to where it faced the Sun. The solar panels attached to
 
the solar observatory were deployed aid electrical power
 
was generated.
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The final automatic commands were to have deployed
 
the workshop solar arrays and the meteoroid shield. No
 
signals were received indicating these events occurred
 
and no electrical power was generated by the large panels.
 
As the workshop came into view of the Goldstone tracking
 
station, a backup command was'transmitted from Houston
 
and, while the vehicle acknowledged receipt of the command,
 
no action resulted.
 
Telephone conferences between KSC, JSC, and MSFC
 
confirmed the reports. Some or all of the meteoroid shield
 
was missing and there were indications that one solar array
 
was missing and that the other was released but did not
 
deploy. The meteoroid shield was also part of the passive
 
thermal control system. Confirming its loss, the skin
 
temperature and the internal temperature began to rise
 
at a rapid rate since now the exposed surface was subjected
 
to the full solar radiation and the temperature rose about
 
200OF higher than the design temperatures.
 
A teleconference with the technical experts at the
 
three involved NASA Centers was held and it was determined
 
that, without corrective measures, the workshop internal
 
temperatures would be unbearable. There was debate as
 
to the advisability of launching the first crew as soon
 
as possible (on time the next day) to get an on-site report
 
of the damage. However, with each minute the postulated
 
failure was further confirmed by telemetry data and analysis.
 
If the crew was launched without a method for protecting
 
the exposed workshop from the solar heat, it was concluded
 
they could accomplish few of the experiments and certainly
 
could only stay a few days since the food was stored in
 
the workshop. Also, once they were launched, it would
 
take several weeks to prepare the next vehicle for launch.
 
It was certain the vehicle could not survive that long
 
without corrective measures.
 
The launch of SL-2 scheduled for the next day was
 
postponed for 5 days while corrective measures were planned.
 
(The altitude of the Skylab orbit was chosen such that
 
the ground track repeated each 5 days. Thus, a 5-day delay
 
resulted in almost no alteration of flight dynamics.)
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A series of assignments to the NASA Centers were
 
quickly made. MSFC was to analyze the effects of the
 
temperature on insulation, seals, and hardware while JSC
 
was to examine the effects on food and medicine. A failure
 
investigation was started and all were solicited for
 
potential fixes.
 
Throughout the night of May 14, the flight controllers
 
at JSC and the engineers at MSFC worked to save the workshop
 
from catastrophe. In the solar inertial attitude (the
 
design attitude) the maximum workshop area was exposed
 
to the full solar heat and the temperature soon reached
 
a critical level. The flight team maneuvered the workshop
 
such that the small end of the vehicle (the docking port
 
on the MDA) was pointed toward the Sun and the tempera­
ture of the workshop dropped since the exposed surface
 
was now parallel to the Sun's rays. However, so were
 
the remaining solar panels and the battery power began
 
dropping. Equally serious, the coolant fluid in the
 
auxiliary cooling system (which maintained the food at
 
freezing temperatures) approached the freezing level.
 
An iterative process was begun to try to find an attitude
 
which would result in a stable temperature which was not
 
excessive and which would also provide sufficient solar
 
energy for the electrical power system. By the morning
 
of the 15th a reasonably stable attitude was found which
 
resulted in internal temperatures about 130OF and a
 
satisfactory electrical power level. It cannot be stated
 
that a stable "hands-off" attitude was ever reached, but,
 
about 14 hours after liftoff, the vehicle was under control.
 
For the next 10 days, the engineers and flight controllers
 
continually maneuvered the spacecraft to control the attitude.
 
The control was complicated by unfamiliarity with the
 
control moment gyro attitude system which required the
 
dumping of stored momentum at intervals to prevent gyro
 
momentum saturation. The design condition called for
 
a periodic update to the digital computer to correct the
 
reference attitude. An unexpectedly high drift rate on
 
the rate gyros caused the vehicle to drift and the flight
 
controllers occasionally lost reference and the vehicle
 
had to be maneuvered to determine its special reference.
 
By finding a means of monitoring the solar panel output
 
and the CMG momentum, the vehicle attitude was estimated
 
and attitude thrusting was used to keep the vehicle in
 
the proper attitude, inclined about 450 to the Sun.
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This constant and successful compromise between
 
electrical, thermal, and attitude requirements continued
 
for the first 10 days and the fact that control was not
 
lost is a tribute to the men analyzing and controlling
 
the flight. There were several "near misses" but no full
 
losses in control. However, the unusual maneuvering caused
 
a high usage of thruster attitude control gas. More than
 
two-thirds of what had been predicted as needed for the
 
entire 8 months of flight was used in those 10 days.
 
Fortunately, the system was overdesigned and margins
 
remained throughout the flight (although subsequent CMG
 
problems in the last mission resulted in a situation where
 
careful management was required.)
 
While the flight control team worked to keep the
 
workshop operable until a fix could be found, the design
 
teams looked at several potential sunshades to protect
 
the vehicle from the heat of the Sun as well as ways to
 
augment the electrical power.
 
To coordinate and direct the activities, a daily
 
teleconference was held between the Center program elements,
 
the Center Directors, and the Program Office. These
 
meetings served to keep the rapidly moving solutions
 
coordinated and as a means of exchanging information con­
cerning the fixes. Also, the progress reports formed
 
the information base for the daily press releases which
 
were issued identifying each issue, all progress, and
 
the latest problems. The NASA Administrator had instructed
 
the Program Director to be open and public at each step
 
of the way. The press releases were complete and timely
 
and appeared to demonstrate that the NASA open information
 
policy was being followed.
 
Many original ideas for shielding the workshop from
 
the Sun were initially looked at by the design teams;
 
windowshade designs, umbrella-like designs, inflatable
 
surfaces, awnings, spray-on materials, paint, and devices
 
which unrolled when pressurized (much like a party favor)
 
were examined in some detail. On the second day of the
 
mission, the development/management team decided to
 
concentrate on two designs.
 
The Johnson design team concentrated on an awning-like

device which was to be attached to the workshop by the
 
crew while they remained in the Command Module. While
 
maneuvering the CSM in close formation with the workshop,
 
and while standing in the open hatch of the CM, the
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crewman was to attach a pulley and ropes to the "bottom"
 
and "top" of the workshop using a long pole. By careful
 
maneuvering of the CM, the awning was to be draped over
 
the sun side of the workshop.
 
The Marshall design team was to concentrate on a
 
windowshade-like device which would require the crew'to
 
enter the workshop airlock and, while EVA, attach poles
 
the length of the workshop and, by ropes and pulleys,
 
pull the "shade" the length of the workshop, from "top"
 
to "bottom."
 
Simultaneously, a coordinated activity was initiated
 
to find the proper material for a sunshade. The material
 
had to be lightweight, be capable of being packed into
 
a small volume, have the proper thermal qualities, and
 
maintain its strength and properties after long exposure
 
to ultraviolet, heat, and vacuum.
 
Meanwhile, other design groups pursued independent
 
paths. At the Langley Research Center, a design and
 
fabrication group began the design of an inflatable flat
 
balloon which was to be deployed through the solar side
 
scientific airlock. (The scientific airlocks were provided
 
as a means of extending experiments outside the workshop
 
without having to depressurize the living quarters.
 
Cannisters containing the experiments were attached to
 
the 8"x8" aperture, and by proper opening of the doors,
 
the experiment could be extended into space). Once deployed,
 
the balloon was to be inflated and it would then provide
 
the needed thermal shield.
 
A separate Johnson Space Center group took a somewhat
 
similar approach and began the design of a parasol device
 
which was also to be deployed through the scientific airlock.
 
Once the telescoping rods to which the thermal material
 
was attached were fully extended, the rods were to spring
 
open, like an umbrella, and the shielding would be in
 
place.
 
Each of these later two approaches were constrained
 
to fit in a spare experiment cannister (T027) since there
 
wasn't sufficient time to build a larger container. As a
 
result of this volumetric constraint, extremely thin material
 
was necessary. (For the parasol, for example, a laminate
 
of nylon was bonded to 0.05 mm aluminized mylar).
 
The JSC parasol design group quickly demonstrated
 
the soundness of the design by the use of commercially
 
purchased fishing rods. Since this design could be
 
deployed from the interior of the workshop without EVA,
 
and since it did not require careful maneuvering of the
 
Command and Service Module, it was selected as the primary
 
JSC development while the "awning" was relegated to backup
 
status. The awning was continued since, while operationally
 
complex, it had simple design concepts and was not faced
 
with the packing problem which faced the parasol.
 
After 2 days of design effort, it was apparent that
 
more time was needed and the launch date of the manned
 
Skylab 2 was extended until May 25.
 
Maximum effort was made not to cut corners which
 
could jeopardize crew safety. Full quality control was
 
used with inspection buy-off at every step. Expedited,
 
but complete, documentation was employed. A safety analysis
 
was made and documented and all procedures were written
 
and used for training. The possibility of causing a crew
 
fatality because of an error made as the team worked around
 
the clock caused management to be extremely cautious at
 
every step.
 
While the thermal design teams wrestled with the
 
problem of producing the sunshield, the electrical power
 
teams attacked the problem of providing adequate electrical
 
power, if the workshop was ever manned. Two separate
 
time-phased approaches were decided upon, one for a near­
term solution by the first crew and a second for a far­
term solution for use on a later mission.
 
For the immediate problem, it was decided that no
 
new augmentation device could be made quickly and that
 
the fixes had to be whatever could be accomplished with
 
the hardware on hand. It was decided, therefore, to load
 
all of the hydrogen and oxygen possible in the Command
 
and Service Module (CSM). Since an earlier program decision
 
had made it possible to continue using the CSM fuel cells
 
long after docking, this power would ease the shortages
 
until the cryogenic supply was depleted. Further, it
 
was decided that the Skylab 2 crew would carry a variety
 
of tools to free the apparently stuck solar array panel.
 
A team was established to recommend the necessary tools.
 
A mockup of a stuck solar array was set up at the Marshall
 
Space Flight Center and accurate samples of the materials
 
which could be restraining the panel were made available
 
to test the tools.
 
For the long term, a variety of approaches was considered;
 
roll-out flexibile solar panels, folded panels, and modifica­
tions of the ATM panels were considered the most likely
 
candidates. The JSC design'team pursued the ATM approach
 
which used two spare ATM panels fixed to a simple structure.
 
This structure was to be launched with a-later CSM (with
 
the arrays folded). It was fitted with a docking collar
 
which would permit it to be docked to the rescue hatch
 
of the Multiple Docking Module. The power would then
 
be bussed with the main power through an existing connector
 
inside the MDA.
 
MSFC was assigned the task of designing an array
 
to be deployed by the crew while EVA. Both flexible arrays
 
and folded arrays were considered. These arrays were
 
to be bussed to the main power supply through the ATM
 
electrical system.
 
(Both of these long-term solutions were pursued
 
vigorously until the Skylab crew released the fouled solar
 
array. Since adequate power was then available, all remain­
ing activity was terminated.)
 
Meanwhile, each of the proposed thermal shield designs
 
solutions was practiced in the Marshall Space Flight Center's
 
Water Immersion Facility (WIF) to insure the crew could
 
properly deploy the mechanisms. (The WIF is a four-story
 
water tank which is used as an analog of zero gravity.
 
All equipment is made "neutrally buoyant" at the proper
 
depth. The crew is similarly ballasted and the rehearsals
 
are conducted on full-scale mockups, in space suits, using
 
flight procedures. The fidelity of the simulation is
 
fair, provided motions are slow enough to avoid the drag

forces of water.) Crewmen, including members of the primary
 
crew for Skylab 2, practiced deploying the JSC awning
 
and the MSFC twin pole thermal shield. The crew trained
 
as well on a procedure to use a hook to try to pull the
 
solar array from the restraining debris.
 
To coordinate and control the many new and unusual
 
equipments being planned for launch in the Command Module,
 
the Johnson Space Center established a special Stowage
 
Team with configuration control maintained by the JSC
 
Program Manager. This team was in charge of safety packing
 
the many large containers in the small volume of the Command
 
Module. The problem was complicated by the requirement
 
that the couch envelope not be violated in the case of
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a land landing (a normal safety constraint) but was eased
 
somewhat because the Command Module had been designed for
 
a certain degree of stowage flexibility.
 
Throughout the development of the thermal shields,
 
the material presented a problem. The material had to
 
have the proper thermal qualities (alpha/epsilon (a/e)),
 
be light and flexible, not be permanently set by packing,
 
and, equally important, be available in adequate supply
 
to provide the material needed for flight, backup, and
 
for the development tests. Nylon bonded to aluminized
 
mylar fit all of the requirements and was available in
 
sufficient (although not abundant) supply. Unfortunately,
 
to get the proper alpha/epsilon, the nylon side had to
 
be exposed to the Sun and the available data indicated
 
deterioration of the strength due to the Sun's ultraviolet
 
emissions. Tests were conducted at JSC and MSFC to esti­
mate the lifetime of the material. These tests had to
 
be accelerated (using solar simulators) to get a quick
 
estimate of the useful life and resulted in confused data.
 
The JSC awning and the MSFC shade were coated with
 
the same thermal paint as had been used on the workshop
 
to achieve the proper alpha/epsilon. The thermal and life
 
questions had, therefore, extensive test data to provide
 
the adequacy. The only serious question was the effect
 
of folded storage: would the paint stick to itself or
 
take on a permanent set? A test program was initiated
 
to settle this question.
 
The parasol, however, could not be coated with paint
 
since the added thickness would make it impossible to pack
 
the material in the cannister. The initial solution 'proposed
 
by JSC was to use the material with the mylar side toward
 
the Sun. Tests were undertaken to prove the analysis,
 
but, on the day before the launch, it was revealed that
 
the alpha/epsilon was not adequate.
 
It was decided that the JSC parasol would be flown
 
as the primary solar shield with the nylon side toward
 
the Sun. This approach was chosen since all test results
 
indicated the material would last at least 30 days and
 
the parasol could be deployed from within the workshop
 
without the necessity of an EVA. Tests on the material
 
were to be continued since once the parasol was deployed
 
and the workshop cooled down, an EVA could be planned before
 
the completion of the manned mission to deploy the twin
 
pole thermal shield. This twin pole shield was designated
 
as backup, to be used if the crew could dock but, for
 
some reason, could not enter the workshop or deploy
 
the parasol. Finally, the JSC awning was stowed onboard
 
the CSM for use in the event the crew could not dock
 
with the workshop. In that event, the awning was to
 
be installed by the crew as they stood in the open
 
CSM hatch. This would solve the thermal problem, at
 
least while the ground personnel tried to figure out
 
what to do next.
 
The Langley "flat ballon" device was not flown
 
because of the inability to predict how it would deploy
 
in zero gravity, although all of the testing on the
 
ground had been satisfactory
 
Finally, it was decided to have the crew attempt to
 
free the restrained solar array while standing in the
 
open CSM hatch before they entered the workshop. A
 
set of tools was decided upon as well. The specula-'
 
tion was that restraining debris could consist of metal
 
straps, bolts, and/or sheet metal. Shear type metal
 
cutters and a universal handling tool (a hook-like
 
device) were stowed as were long handles.
 
The stowage of the Command Module began the evening
 
prior to the liftoff of the Skylab 2 mission as the
 
various parts and equipments were flown to Florida
 
from the development agents. The last item to arrive
 
was the JSC parasol packed in its cannister which arrived
 
after midnight for the 9:00 a.m. liftoff the next day.
 
(It should be recorded that during this 10-day
 
period, the aerospace industry performance was outstanding.
 
Not only those individuals directly involved in the
 
round-the-clock activities described here, but assis­
tance was offered from all quarters. Offers of ideas,
 
designers-, materials, parts, advice, and prayers came
 
from a number of aerospace companies.
 
Ideas were also sent to NASA from many unexpected
 
quarters. School children sent suggestions, university
 
classes accepted the problem as a design project, and
 
technicians and engineers made suggestions based on
 
their personal experiences. Some ideas were not practical
 
(i.e., the school boy suggestion that Skylab be parked
 
in the shade of the Earth) but many paralleled the
 
solutions adopted.)
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At 1300 GMT (0900 EDT) on May 25, the eleventh day
 
since the launch of Skylab 1, the first crew was launched
 
from Launch Complex 39B precisely on time. The launch
 
vehicle, a Saturn 1B, per-formed properly and insertion
 
of the CSM into an orbit 156 km by 357 km occurred 10
 
minutes after liftoff. During the next 6 hours, the
 
spacecraft was maneuvered into the final 424 km by 415 km
 
rendezvous orbit. During the fifth revolution, Skylab 2
 
completed the rendezvous maneuvers and began station
 
keeping with the workshop. The crew's description of
 
the workshop's condition confirmed the hypothesis--the
 
micrometeoroid shield was gone, the number 2 solar panel
 
was torn off and gone, while solar panel number 1 was
 
only slightly deployed (Figure 11) and apparently was restrained
 
by a strap from the shield (Figure 12). The crew conducted
 
a fly-around of the workshop and transmitted 15 minutes
 
of television to the ground. (This TV proved invaluable
 
later on since it allowed,the stuck panel to be duplicated
 
on the ground, and for procedures to be developed and
 
practiced which, eventually, freed the panel from the
 
debris.)
 
Following this inspection, the Command Module was
 
"soft docked" to the Saturn workshop. (A soft dock
 
consisted of inserting the Command Module probe into
 
the workshop docking adapter. Latches on the probe engage
 
the ring but the final retraction of the probe to seal
 
it to the workshop was not executed.) A soft dock was
 
used to permit the crew to prepare themselves for an
 
extravehicular attempt at freeing the solar panel, without
 
having to station keep in formation with the workshop.
 
When all preparations were completed, the crew separated
 
the two craft and maneuvered into position. While Conrad
 
maneuvered the spacecraft, Weitz opened the hatch and
 
attempted to pull the panel loose using the ten-foot
 
pole with the hook on the end.
 
Astronaut Weitz was unable to pry the debris loose
 
or to break the restraining strap. (It was found later
 
that, in addition to the metal being wrapped around the
 
beam fairing, a nut had been wedged into the honeycomb
 
structure firmly locking the metal). As the astronaut
 
pulled on the pole, the two vehicles were drawn together
 
and the workshop attitude control system expended large
 
amounts of the control gas while the Command Module thrusted
 
away from the workshop. The unsuccessful attempts were
 
finally terminated and the crew tried to redock with
 
the workshop.
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The crew was unable to achieve a docking. Seven
 
attempts were made without success. The probe capture

latches failed to engage. Fortunately, during the develop­
ment program a failure-mode analysis had resulted in
 
the preparation of a procedure to correct this type of
 
failure (no previous failure of this type had been
 
encountered, but the procedure was developed since the
 
failure had been hypothesized). The crew again donned
 
their space suits, depressurized the spacecraft, and removed
 
the Command Module forward hatch. This allowed access
 
to the docking mechanism and the circuits controlling

the latches. By disconnecting a cable, the latches could
 
be properly reset and, finally, on the eighth attempt
 
a firm, hard dock was achieved.
 
The crew slept in the Command Module after a long
 
22-hour day.
 
On the next day, the crew prepared to enter the workshop.
 
After donning face masks, the crew entered the docking
 
module tunnel. As the crew entered each successive module,
 
the atmosphere was sampled prior to opening. No toxic
 
gasses were encountered in any module and the crew finally
 
entered the workshop where the temperature was 1300 F.
 
The humidity was low so the crew was able to enter and
 
work for short periods without particular discomfort.
 
At about 5 hours into the workday, the Skylab parasol
 
was deployed through the +Z (solar side) scientific airlock.
 
The thermal shield performed its task despite the fact
 
that one of the telescoping rods did not lock in place
 
and the sunshade was not fully extended (Figure 13).

The skin temperatures began falling immediately and within
 
an hour the vehicle was maneuvered to the solar inertial
 
attitude. The internal temperatures dropped as well and
 
stabilized at about 80OF in about a week. This temperature,

while high, was tolerable because of the low humidity
 
of the workshop. (The environmental control system removed
 
moisture from the atmosphere and, premission, had been
 
the source of controversy since the resulting atmosphere
 
was dry).
 
Following the completion of the remaining activation
 
activities, the crew established a work routine. Day-night
 
cycles corresponded to that of the flight control personnel,
 
i.e., Central Daylight Time. The crew workday consisted
 
of about 16 hours of controlled activity and 8 hours
 
of sleep. All crewmen slept at the same time.
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(No attempt will be made here to document the scientific
 
and technological investigations. Only the operational
 
activities will be discussed.)
 
A premission flight plan had been established bUt
 
it was used only to scope the times available for experi­
mentation. It was recognized that most of the observations
 
desired were transient (earth resources observations
 
depended upon, among other things, on the weather. Solar
 
observations of the dynamic and unpredictable solar processes
 
were desired). A mission planning technique had been
 
developed to take care of the changing requirements for
 
the experiments. Mission planning was complex since
 
the Skylab experiments imposed conflicting requirements
 
on the orbiting vehicle or the timeline. Medical experi­
ments were generally repetitive and, therefore, required
 
daily time blocks. Solar experiments required a solar
 
inertial attitude and were somewhat dictated by forecasts
 
of solar activity. Earth resources required local vertical
 
pointing and were time and position dependent since it
 
was planned to observe specific points on the Earth's
 
surface (the variable cloud cover complicated the planning).
 
Other experiments required night cycles, coordination
 
with rocket firings, operation with ground truth and
 
aircraft, and~pointing at stellar points.
 
The mission planning control was directed by the
 
Mission Management Team, chaired by the Program Director.
 
This group with representation from all involved NASA
 
elements, met daily and established policies and priorities
 
concerning the in-flight activities and resolved the major
 
conflicts between experiment requirements.
 
Flight planning began when the Program Scientist
 
(who reported to the Program Director) formulated a 7-day
 
schedule of flight plans, in a gross sense. At this
 
level, a flight plan consisted on a one-line bar chart
 
allocating time to classes of experiments. The Program
 
Scientist arrived at the allocation on the basis of the
 
priorities established, the experiment peculiar constraints,
 
discussions with the investigators, and a desire to maintain
 
a balanced program. For most days, more than one option
 
was developed.
 
Obviously, the Program Scientist had to have operational
 
knowledge in addition to a sensitivity and knowledge
 
of science.
 
52i
 
Detailed flight planning was conducted on a 24-hour
 
basis with three groups of flight planners--the summary
 
shift, the execute shift, and the detail shift. On any
 
specific day, the summary shift began work at midnight
 
on the plan for the day after next; i.e., on Monday morning
 
they planned Tuesday's activities. The process began
 
by using the gross plans developed by the Program Scientist
 
and expanding the plan to show the time related activities
 
of each crewman along with instructions on each experiment.
 
It was at this level that the requirements of the experi­
ments, the workshop systems, consumables, "housekeeping"
 
requirements, and network constraints were balanced and
 
compromises established. This summary plan was, in general,
 
completed at 8:00 a.m., in time to raise any issues to
 
the Mission Management Team for resolution. During the
 
day, this summary plan was transmitted to the flight
 
crew so they could read and comment on it during their
 
presleep period. From about 7-8:00 a.m. until 10-11:00 p.m.,
 
the execute team provided the ground support as the flight
 
crew performed the activities planned the-day before.
 
The evening shift, which worked from about 6:00 p.m.
 
until 2-4:00 a.m., then developed detailed instructions
 
for the crew for the execution of the summary plan.
 
These instructions included details such as camera settings,
 
film requirements, detailed and timed procedures for
 
conducting an experiment, location of equipment, and
 
other pertinent details.
 
The flight planning for the first manned mission
 
was complicated by the shortage of electrical power.
 
The solar observatory solar panels provided about 4,000
 
watts of power (the CSM fuel cells provided sufficient
 
power to keep the CSM systems active) and the systems
 
required slightly less than 3,000 watts. Thus, only
 
1kw was available for experiments. The competition for
 
the power was quite intense. The problem was further
 
compounded by the experimenters lack of faith in the
 
continuation of the mission and their understandable
 
desire to complete as many of their experiment objectives
 
as possible.
 
As stated, the Command Module fuel cells were operated
 
to provide the power necessary to keep the spacecraft
 
active so it could be used for return to Earth. It was
 
placed in a "quiescent mode" with all unneeded systems
 
turned off. About 1,000-1,200 watts of power was-needed
 
for this mode, and obviously when the cryogenic fuels
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were depleted, the solar arrays would have to supply
 
the power or the spacecraft would have to supply the
 
power or the spacecraft would have to return to Earth.
 
Levying that requirement on the solar arrays would
 
have left virtually no power for experiments. Also,
 
since a local vertical attitude reduced the power
 
generation, the earth resources passes were severely
 
limited. Cryogenics for the fuel cells were predicted
 
to be depleted on June 13.
 
Great premium was, therefore, placed upon freeing
 
the workshop solar panel from the restraining debris.
 
The problem was further complicated by the fact that
 
the hydraulic fluid in the actuator, which normally would
 
deploy the solar panel beam, was frozen.
 
Using the television pictures and the verbal description
 
provided by the crew, the Skylab ground teams developed
 
a method of cutting the restraining debris and for breaking
 
a clevis on the actuator to free the frozen hydraulic
 
unit. The method was practiced in the Marshall Center's
 
Water Immersion Facility and the detailed procedures
 
were developed. The procedures were transmitted to the
 
flight crew, and on the 15th day of the mission, Astronauts
 
Conrad and Kerwin, in an extravehicular exercise, freed
 
the wing and deployed it to the full operational position.
 
Six hours later a full 7,000 watts of power was available
 
and the experiment plans could be renewed at the pre-liftoff
 
planned level.
 
The mission was continued in a relatively nominal
 
manner and by the completion of the 28-day mission, all
 
primary objectives were successfully accomplished and,
 
considering the problems encountered, a remarkably large
 
number of the experiments were performed. The earth
 
resources experiments were reduced a larger percentage
 
than the other experiment categories because of their
 
peculiar power requirements.
 
On June 22, 1973, at 09:49:48 EDT after 28 days in
 
orbit the crew returned to Earth where they participated in
 
the required post-flight medical tests. No serious medical
 
effects were observed and all effects disappeared in
 
54 
a matter of days. There was. some concern immediately
 
upon recovery when Astronaut Kerwin exhibited some cardio­
vascular deconditioning as evidenced by his behavior
 
in the Lower Body Negative Pressure (LBNP) test. Such
 
deconditioning was not unexpected and the symptoms
 
disappeared in 7 days.
 
The original mission plan called for the launch
 
of the second crew on mission day 96 (August 17). However,
 
because of an uncertainty in the condition of the parasol
 
thermal shield material and because of excessive drift
 
in the attitude control system rate gyros, it was decided
 
to accelerate the launch to mission day 76 (July 28).
 
The second manned launch occurred on July 28, 1973,
 
at 11:10:50.5 GMT (7:10:50.5 EDT). The crew, Astronauts
 
Alan Bean, Dr. Owen Garriott, and Jack Lousma, was scheduled
 
to remain in orbit for 59 days (the original 56-day mission
 
was extended 3 days to obtain a more favorable recovery
 
location. Since Skylab had a ground track which repeated
 
every 5 days, the same location was possible on day 54
 
or day 59. The good physical condition of the Skylab 1
 
crew was used by the Program Director to extend the mission
 
to 59 days rather than shortening the mission. (It was
 
proposed that the mission be further extended to recover
 
the time lost at the beginning of Skylab 2. This request
 
was turned down by the NASA management because of medical
 
uncertainties if the crew were left in zero gravity for
 
a longer period.)
 
The Command and Service Module was inserted in a
 
154.7 km by 231.3 km orbit by the Saturn 1B. The required
 
rendezvous maneuvers were performed and at about 8 hours
 
after liftoff the station keeping with the workshop began,
 
with docking occurring about 30 minutes later. This time
 
docking went smoothly. However, during the rendezvous
 
maneuvers, a leak in one of the service module reaction
 
control system thruster valves (oxidizer) was noted.
 
The leak was noted in a forward firing thruster and,
 
as a result, the entire quad (B) was isolated and deacti­
vated. (A "quad" consisted of four thrusters, orthogonally
 
around the service module (Figure 14). By the proper
 
selection of thruster pairs, the vehicle could be accelerated
 
in any direction or rotated in any manner.)
 
Soon after orbital insertion, Astronaut Lousma experienced
 
motion sickness. Consequently, the activation activities
 
were slowed considerably. The motion sickness came as
 
a surprise since the previous crew had experienced no
 
discomfort. Previously, Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo
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astronauts had not, in general, had any problem. Minor
 
discomfort at most, had been experienced in all but one
 
previous flight. (The Soviets have reported cases of motion
 
sickness during their flights and the different experiences
 
had been a source of mystery for years.) Fortunately, motion
 
sickness had been recognized as a possibility and appropriate
 
medication was available for treatment.
 
On the sixth day of the mission, a leak was discovered
 
in a second reaction control system oxidizer line. This
 
leak was in quad D. The propulsion system was isolated
 
and inhibited. Since two of the four quads were now inopera­
tive, it became necessary to redefine control modes, entry
 
techniques, and deorbit procedures. Modifications to the
 
procedures were quickly developed in the mission simulator.
 
However, of more serious concern than the procedural
 
changes was the question of the cause of the two leaks,
 
almost simultaneously in two units. The probability of
 
two unrelated failures seemed remote and the possibility
 
of, some type of contamination in the oxidizer supply was
 
postulated. If such was the case, serious concern was
 
expressed if the remaining thrusters were used for attitude
 
control during reentry. Attitude control was, of course,
 
mandatory.
 
The Program Director elected to activate the Skylab
 
Rescue Vehicle. This called for the personnel at the launch
 
site to begin around-the-clock activities in the preparations
 
for the next launch.
 
(The preplanned rescue mode required the next in line
 
mission to be launched with only two crewmen and with a
 
specially designed rescue kit which permitted five crewmen
 
to return to Earth. After launch, a normal rendezvous was
 
to be followed by a docking at the rescue docking hatch
 
located in the multiple docking adapter. After docking,
 
the five crewmen were expected to enter the Command Module,
 
separate from the workshop, and perform a normal reentry.)
 
Simultaneously, the documentation on the failed systems
 
was examined meticulously to see if there was a clue which
 
would explain the leaks. The supply of oxidizer was analyzed
 
as well, and finally, the design engineering team examined
 
all telemetered data for more information. It took several
 
weeks to complete the failure analysis. Incredibly, the
 
two failures were found to be unrelated. The failure in
 
quad B, the first leak, was determined to have been caused
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by a particle on the seat of the oxidizer valve of the
 
positive yaw thruster in quad B. The second leak in quad D
 
was more difficult to analyze but the conclusion was
 
reached by inductive and deductive reasoning. A careful
 
analysis of temperature data led to the conclusion- that
 
the leak was in the plumbing and not in the thrusters.
 
(A complete description of the failures and the analysis
 
can be found in Reference 3.)
 
The activation of the rescue vehicle was continued
 
up to the point of loading the Command and Service Module
 
with propellants for the Reaction Control System (RCS). At
 
that time the mission was placed in a "hold" posture. The
 
mission could then be called up on short notice, if upon
 
activation of the in-orbit Command Module an additional
 
problem was found. However, based upon the failure analyses,
 
it was concluded that there was no unusual problem in reen­
tering with the leaks in the RCS system and a normal reentry
 
was planned for the end of the missions.
 
It should be noted that the in-orbit activities of
 
the Skylab 3 crew proceeded without interruption while the
 
ground analyzed the RCS leak and prepared for the potential
 
rescue. It is almost not worthy of stating that the crew
 
was interested in the findings since no one desired to use
 
the rescue mode.
 
On the ninth day of the mission, a leak was detected in
 
the primary coolant loop. The leak continued (the point
 
of the leak was never found, although both the outside and
 
the inside of the workshop was searched) until on day 27
 
the pump was turned off and the secondary loop was activated.
 
Later data showed that the back-up loop was leaking as well,
 
although the leak appeared to be small. (Immediate action
 
was started on the ground to provide a reservicing kit for
 
use on the next mission. Both JSC and MSFC began independent
 
designs of servicing kits. After a brief period, a design
 
review of both approaches was held and the best of each
 
were combined into one solution which MSFC built for launch
 
on the last Skylab mission. This was an example of the
 
technique of permitting competing solutions to be pursued
 
up to the point of selection and then combining forces to
 
produce the best combination. The focus of leadership was
 
vested in the combined configuration control board with
 
the. Program Director and the JSC and MSFC Project Managers
 
as the directing force.)
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(This coolant leak was troublesome for a number of
 
reasons, in addition to its potential effect on the cooled
 
equipments, such as batteries. The coolant system had as
 
its working fluid a low viscosity silicone ester, Coolanol 15.
 
During the development phase, the design of the system was
 
the subject of high level debate because the tubing contained
 
a number of "B" nuts in contrast to the preferred policy
 
of welding or brazing all joints. The laboratory cooling
 
system, located primarily in the Airlock Module, was a
 
derivative of the earlier Gemini technology, whereas the
 
remainder of the workshop was a product of Apollo technology.
 
Coolanol, because of the toxicity in a closed environment
 
and potential flammability questions, was considered to
 
be a dangerous working fluid if a leak occurred. A very
 
comprehensive review was held and special test procedures
 
derived to assure a leak proof system. The system was
 
"locked up" at the factory and the pressure carefully checked.
 
Unfortunately, with the temperature not being constant or
 
uniform or controlled, it was nearly impossible to determine
 
what pressure fluctuations were indicating. It should be
 
noted that the "B" nuts were not eliminated when they became
 
an issue because of the high costs and large schedule impact
 
associated with a new configuration and the assessed low
 
probability of a leak occurring in flight. The leakage
 
in both the primary and secondary systems was, therefore,
 
not only a technical and operational concern, it was the
 
result of a bad program decision.)
 
On the tenth day of the second manned mission, the
 
first of many extravehicular activities was performed to
 
deploy the MSFC twin pole thermal shield over the parasol.
 
As previously explained, the high-packing density needed
 
for the parasol precluded the addition of coatings to prevent
 
deterioration by ultraviolet radiation. Accelerated tests
 
were conducted to determine the extent of the degradation,
 
but the tests were inconclusive. After considerable debate,
 
(the developers of the parasol were convinced it would last
 
throughout the mission) the Program Director elected to
 
follow the conservative course of action and cover the
 
parasol with the new shield which had an adequate coating
 
(Figure 15). (The converse argument was that planning a
 
long and arduous EVA was not conservative. In retrospect,
 
the EVA sessions of Skylab proved to be relatively easy,
 
showing the benefit of proper preparation and training.)
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The second mission proved, again, the versatility of
 
man in that considerable unplanned and planned maintenance
 
activities were conducted. The tape recorder, for example,
 
was disassembled and repaired, circuit boards were replaced
 
in the video tape recorder, and finally, during a second
 
EVA, the drifting rate gyro package on the solar observa­
tory was bypassed and replaced by a new package inside
 
the docking adapter.
 
The crew performance in the second manned mission was
 
particularly energetic, and they worked long and hard to
 
recover the time lost at the beginning of the mission when
 
they experienced the motion sickness. As a result, the
 
experiment operations soon exceeded the planned activities.
 
Thirty-nine earth resources passes were executed and over
 
305 hours of solar viewing were accomplished. Almost all
 
experiments were performed more than the preplanned alloca­
tion of mission time. The student experiments were conducted
 
as planned, including the web-formation experiment. (The
 
crew asked for and received permission to return the two
 
spiders to Earth at the end of the mission. Unfortunately,
 
no provision had been made to feed them in orbit, and they
 
died before they could be recovered.)
 
During the premission period, a number of simple science
 
demonstrations had been developed to illustrate some basic
 
principles of physics or mechanics. For example, a series
 
of easily accomplished tasks showed the effects of surface
 
tension as a drop of water was manipulated in zero gravity.
 
Six of these activities were accomplished during this mission.
 
One intriguing demonstration was the behavior of fish in
 
zero gravity. Fish which had been hatched on Earth swam
 
in tight circles in zero gravity, while those hatched in
 
flight oriented themselves to the surface they were held
 
against. The fish were returned and it was found that the
 
second set had poorly developed otolith functions. (This
 
has led to formal experiments which were carried on the
 
Apollo/Soyuz Test Program (ASTP) to further investigate
 
the phenomena.)
 
At the completion of the mission, the workshop was
 
again deactivated and the crew reentered the Command Module
 
for the trip back to Earth. Landing occurred in the Pacific
 
Ocean at 22:19:54 GMT on September 25, 1973.
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The recovery activities on this mission were unique

in that a constantly changing recovery zone was planned
 
for each day during the second half of the mission. At
 
the completion of the first mission, Astronaut Kerwin
 
experienced some evidence of cardiovascular deconditioning,
 
as evidenced by his reaction to Lower Body Negative Pressure
 
runs. (He quickly returned to normal, and the reactions
 
of each crewman showed wide individual variation. A general
 
trend was noted in that deconditioning to some degree seemed
 
to progress for about a month, at which time no further
 
reactions followed. All effects disappeared after return
 
to a normal gravity field.) As a result of this reaction,
 
senior management permitted the second mission to progress
 
only on a week-to-week basis after the first 28 days. A
 
formal medical review was held by the Administrator to assure
 
there was no progression of deconditioning to a medically
 
unacceptable degree. (Cardiac deconditioning in zero gravity
 
can be likened to that which occurs during bed rest. Bed
 
rest studies are frequently used as an analog to zero gravity
 
exposure.) The on-board medical experiments provided the
 
data upon which the decisions were based.
 
To support the possibility of an early recovery, the
 
primary recovery ship (U.S.S. New Orleans) was standing
 
by from mission day 29 until mission day 49 in Hawaii.
 
On mission day 49 the recovery ship sailed to support a
 
daily target point. Finally, on day 59 the ship supported
 
the recovery, located just west of San Diego, California.
 
It is appropriate at this point to touch on the subject
 
of mission duration. Skylab had been planned originally
 
for missions of 28, 56, and 56 days for each of the three
 
manned periods, respectively. Twenty-eight days had been
 
selected because the Gemini Program had progressed through
 
4-, 8-, and 14-day missions. Medical personnel were
 
confident that the experiences could be extrapolated from
 
14 to 28 days and then doubled again to 56 days.
 
During the premission planning period, more and more
 
experiment requirements were added and on-orbit time was
 
quickly exceeded. As a result,, the Program Director asked
 
that the mission duration be extended. However; quite
 
properly, NASA management refused all requests until the
 
medical experiment results were available. The 28-day
 
experiences of the first mission were extrapolated to 59
 
days (from the 56 planned) only because of the peculiarities
 
of orbit mechanics which caused the primary recovery zone
 
to occur on day 54, day 59, and day 64 on a repeating 5-day
 
cycle.
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At the end of the second mission, 59 days, the stage
 
was set to extend the last mission as long as possible.
 
Eighty-four days were finally settled upon. In this case,
 
mission duration was not dictated by medical requirements.
 
The determining factor was the amount of food and consumables
 
which could be stowed in the Command Module.
 
On March 7, 1973, Dr. Lubos Kohoutek of the Munich
 
Observatory discovered the comet 1973f, commonly named Comet
 
Kohoutek. The trajectory was calculated and the perihelion
 
was predicted to occur around the Christmas season. From
 
a science standpoint, the discovery of this comet was
 
interesting since it was discovered so early in its life.
 
It was predicted to be a very bright and visible stellar
 
phenomena. The early discovery also allowed the scientific
 
community to prepare adequately for its observation. The
 
apparent brightness of the comet, combined with the timing,
 
also created a popular interest.
 
In cooperation with other observers, the National
 
Aeronautics and Space Administration established a project
 
office (at the Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt,
 
Maryland) to coordinate the NASA efforts to collect scientific
 
data on this coment. NASA sponsored observation programs
 
using ground, aircraft, balloon, and spacecraft based instruments.
 
A world-wide effort was planned.
 
It was inevitable that the instruments aboard Skylab
 
would be considered for this use since the mission was still
 
to be active during the observing period and since the Skylab
 
instruments provided a unique capability. Informal working
 
level discussions established the feasibility of the program
 
and early in the second manned mission, the proposition
 
was officially placed before the configuration control board.
 
The request covered a wide scope; the mission was to be
 
delayed to insure Skylab was manned during perihelion, extra
 
EVA's were to be conducted, experiment film and consumables
 
were to be diverted from the approved program to the new
 
comet observation, priority was to be given the comet
 
observation, new experiment hardware was to be designed
 
and built and flown, and lastly ( but perhaps most
 
importantly) the crew was to be specially trained to carry
 
out the observations.
 
At the time, the Program Director was struggling with
 
the problems of a CSM reaction control system leak (and
 
the probability of a rescue being required) a probable leak
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in the workshop primary coolant system, rate gyro
 
eccentricities, and a delayed time line because of crew
 
motion sickness. The last thing needed was a major disrup­
tion to the orderly program activities. However, due to the
 
scientific merits of the request, a study was initiated
 
to develop a Skylab viewing program for the comet.
 
At this and subsequent meetings, the Johnson Space
 
Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center conducted
 
feasibility studies and developed detailed experiments
 
which used the on-board instruments to the maximum extent
 
possible. The principal investigators were made a part
 
of the observation team and they allocated their consumables
 
to the comet observations. The JSC team also planned the
 
Command Module Stowage such that consumables, such as film,
 
could be added. (Film for the 3019, 3052, S054, S056,
 
S063, S082A, S183, 3232, T025 experiments was added, as
 
well as appropriate filters and adaptors). A plan for adding
 
food was also developed to extend the mission as many days
 
as possible (an 84-day supply plus 10-days reserve for a
 
rescue potential was made available for the last crew).
 
Water, oxygen, and nitrogen supplies were adequate, although
 
concern was beginning to be expressed about workshop attitude
 
control thruster propellant, particularly after a control
 
moment gyro became momentum saturated as a result of two
 
back-to-back earth observation passes. Loss of control
 
during a momentum dump maneuver caused an automatic switch­
over to thruster control which used 2584 lb-sec of propellant.
 
Simultaneously, the scientists of NASA searched for
 
equipment and experiments which could be added. Two experi­
ments, S201 and 3233, were approved. 3201 used the back-up
 
hardware from an Apollo experiment and was an electronographic
 
camera for observations in the far ultraviolet wave lengths.
 
S233 called for use of an operational Nikon camera (which
 
was already on board Skylab) to take calibrated photometric
 
data of the comet's coma. Considerable doubt existed whether
 
the Naval Research Laboratory (NRLV)in Washington, DC could
 
accomplish all of the modifications needed to convert 3201 from
 
a lunar instrument to a Skylab scientific airlock experiment.
 
NRL did a fine job and delivered S201 on time.
 
It is remarkable that the Skylab team undertook such
 
an ambitious program with such enthusiasm at that time since
 
the workshop was plagued with so many problems. Each day
 
brought its own problem (some actual, some imagined, some
 
exaggerated) and the management team had to transform itself
 
64­
fr6m the pragmatic tactical problems of the day in the morning

Flight Management Team meetings, to the long-range, optimistic
 
planning in the afternoon Configuration Control Board, to
 
the strategic requirements of the priority-setting flight
 
planning sessions in.the evenings. Nonetheless, preparations
 
for the observation of comet proceeded. During the unmanned
 
period between the second and third manned missions, the
 
leak in the primary and secondary cooling loops was of over­
riding technical concern. A reservicing kit had been
 
authorized, built, and tested and was ready for flight.
 
It had to be flown to the Skylab, and the crew had to install
 
it. The loss of the coolant loops would have been cata­
strophic since the batteries and electronics in the workshop/
 
airlock would have overheated and failed. This unit also
 
provided the cooling needed by the pressure suits for extra­
vehicular activities. The planned EVA's for the third manned
 
mission would have been severely curtailed, if they could
 
have been performed at all.
 
The pressure from the technical community was to launch
 
as soon as possible
 
Launch of SL-4 was possible immediately upon recovery
 
of the SL-3 crew. In fact, the possibility of launch prior
 
to separation of the SL-3 crew was seriously considered and
 
studied by the flight management team. A launch in late
 
September, however, would have missed the passage of the
 
comet with a nominal 56/60-day mission. No medical approval
 
could be secured for a longer mission until the medical team
 
could examine the crew, the medical experiment results, and
 
the time history of their return to preflight base line
 
physiological condition.
 
A complete analysis of the condition of the loops was
 
very difficult since only temperature and pressure measurements
 
were available. All calculations had to make assumptions

in order to arrive at a leak rate. The primary system pump
 
inlet pressure had, during the second mission, become danger­
ously low and the pump had been turned off to prevent damage
 
due to cavitation. All indications were that the secondary
 
system was leaking as well, but there was a reasonable chance
 
that cooling would remain active through November. (The
 
secondary loop was leaking and reached the cutoff point on
 
the last day of the last mission!)
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A compromise launch date was finally reached and recommended
 
by the Program Director. By delaying the launch until November 6,
 
the comet could be observed during perihelion during a nominal
 
56/60-day mission while at the same time, some reasonable assur­
ance existed that the coolant loop would remain serviceable.
 
At the same time, a conditional 85-day mission was planned,
 
subject to a periodic medical review of the crew physiological
 
condition after the initial 56-day period.
 
Eight days before the scheduled launch of SL-4 (13
 
days before the actual launch, see below), a most serious
 
anomaly was detected by the ground controllers as they

monitored the telemetry from the workshop. The Control
 
Moment Gyro (CMG) number 1 wheel speed indicated a drop in
 
speed from 9,123 to 9,060 rpm. Simultaneously, the current
 
in the motor winding increased as did the bearing temperature.
 
After about 60 minutes, the wheel returned to normal speed
 
as did the current and the temperature. A wheel slowdown,
 
combined with the increase in energy, indicated some bearing
 
distress. The CMG's were, of course, fundamental to the
 
control and orientation of Skylab. Without momentum control,
 
the cold gas attitude control system would soon be depleted.
 
(The sudden onset of a CMG bearing problem came as
 
a surprise to the design engineers since ground tests of
 
the CMG's had been conducted for years without failure and
 
it was assumed that the zero gravity environment would
 
be more benign. Also, in the unmanned periods, the bearings
 
were not being severely stressed since no maneuvers were
 
being performed. It was difficult to envision a bearing
 
problem which would appear and disappear so suddenly.)
 
The combination of the wheel speed problem and the
 
coolant loop leakage made it imperative that SL-4 be launched
 
as soon as practical. However, that event was delayed at
 
about the same time.
 
The Saturn IB launch vehicles had been designed in the
 
early 1960's and extensive use was made of aluminum alloys
 
which were subsequently found to be subjected to stress
 
corrosion. (Stress corrosion is a phenomena which produces
 
rapidly developing cracks when the material is subjected to
 
a corrosive environment and the surface is in tension. It
 
is a time dependent failure which can appear after long
 
periods of satisfactory behavior.) All of the structural
 
components-were analyzed (see Lessons Learned) and all
 
elements which were easily replaced were redesigned and
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fabricated of a different alloy; all elements which could
 
not be inspected were redesigned and replaced regardless
 
of the difficulty involved; and finally, all others were
 
subjected to a rigid and controlled inspection procedure.
 
During the final preparations for shipment of the final
 
S-IB stage from the Michoud, Louisiana, factory to the launch
 
site in Florida, inspection of the tail fins revealed cracks.
 
in a web section. The cracks were removed and reenforcing
 
gusset plates were installed and the fins were judged
 
satisfactory for launch. However, the incident sensitized
 
the launch team and special attention was given to the
 
regular inspections.
 
After the vehicle had been loaded with propellants
 
during the countdown demonstration test, a routine inspec­
tion of the tail fins revealed instances of stress corrosion
 
at the mounting bolt holes where the fins joined the stage.

The cracks were obviously unacceptable. Action began
 
immediately to replace all fins which had cracks with spare
 
fins. The replacement took place on the pad with the vehicle
 
on the launch platform. All bolts were removed (one fin
 
at a time), the holes inspected by dye penetrant means, all
 
suspected cracks were etched, and the failed fins replaced.
 
At the same time, a complete analysis was again instituted
 
on all stages and all components were restudied to see if
 
any suspect material was not being examined. Also, all
 
known material was reinspected.
 
(The structural and material engineers at MSFC were
 
surprised by this failure since they had previously reexamined
 
the stress corrosion potential twice and had certified to
 
the program that all suspect material was routinely inspected.
 
The fin cracks were found during a routine inspection but
 
the crack had formed under a bolt head where inspection
 
would not reveal the presence of a crack until it had
 
progressed beyond the head.)
 
Since the vehicle could not be reinspected after the
 
flight fuel load had been made, the possibility of cracks
 
forming at the fin mounting holes just prior to launch had
 
to be recognized. Structural analysis showed that a rather
 
large crack was tolerable, but, as assurance, a heavy bracket
 
was added to further distribute the flight loads.
 
I 67 
L 
The analysis revealed still another area which was
 
not on the inspection list. The S-IB was supported on the
 
launch stand hold-down arms by a ball fitting on each fin.
 
Each ball was designed to fit in a cup on the hold-down
 
and the earlier analysis had assumed they would be in
 
compression and, thus, not subject to stress corrosion.
 
The later analysis showed the tolerances on the ball and
 
socket to be such that local areas of tension could exist.
 
The ball fittings were inspected and, predictably, stress
 
corrosion cracks were found. (It should be noted that there
 
is a strong probability that previous vehicles had been
 
launched with this type of crack in the ball.) All cracked
 
balls were replaced, and a soft shim was installed to evenly
 
distribute the stresses.
 
The reinspection of known points of potential cracks
 
also revealed a series of cracks in the main longerons of
 
the aft skirt structure of the S-IVB stage. These main
 
structural members carried the full vehicle thrusts loads
 
from the S-IB stage to the S-IVB tanks. (The cracks were
 
located in such a position that they may have been a result
 
of the forging operations used to form the piece.) These
 
cracks were burnished and removed. Since the structure
 
was normally in compression and any residual manufacturing
 
or assembly stress was relieved, the fix was satisfactory.
 
Skylab was ready to begin the last manned mission.
 
On November 16, 1973, at 14:01 GMT, Astronauts Gerald Carr,
 
Dr. Edward Gibson, and William Pogue were launched to
 
rendezvous with the workshop. All plans were made for an
 
84-day mission, but care was taken to clearly state that
 
only 56 days was authorized and that extensions to 84 days
 
would be granted only if the crew and hardware condition
 
warranted continuation of the mission. Rendezvous and docking

proceeded normally and the activation period was initiated.
 
Activation was slowed somewhat by a "stomach awareness"
 
which was experienced by some crew members. Also, much
 
new equipment was launched to repair the workshop, observe
 
the comet, extend the mission and augment the experiments.
 
Properly stowing these items took longer than planned.
 
Three days after the launch, the crew reserviced the
 
coolant loop, removing that concern for the remainder of
 
the mission.
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The servicing of the coolant loop is worthy of some
 
additional discussion since it illustrates the interrela­
tionship and interdependency of the many elements of Skylab
 
and how diverse organizations can be organized into a
 
common team.
 
The leak in the coolant system was detected by the
 
MSFC ground team, examining the telemetry data. The JSC
 
flight control team, in concert with the MSFC engineers
 
analyzed the situation. The SL-3 crew searched (in vain)
 
for a leak. The JSC engineering team and the MSFC engi­
neering team designed fixes and the Skylab management team
 
selected the best components of each. The high-fidelity
 
engineering mock-up was used to perfect the design and the
 
Water Immersion Facility and one-g trainer were used to
 
develop the installation procedures. Finally, the SL-4
 
crew was able to make the necessary on-site modifications
 
to install the equipment and service the unit.
 
The SL-4 flight crew performed all of their assigned
 
experiments as planned. Several activities are worthy of
 
note.
 
I 
The observation of the Comet Kohoutek was one of the
 
foremost objectives of the last Skylab crew. When viewed
 
from the ground, thecomet was disappointing to the average
 
viewer. However, to the scientific observers, the comet
 
represented an unusual opportunity for observations from
 
space. The SL-4 crew had been specially prepared for the
 
event and their first observations were made with out-the­
window photography 6 days after they arrived and scientific
 
airlock experiments were begun 3 days later. The ATM
 
instruments were not used until near perihelion since they
 
had been designed for solar observations and the comet
 
emission levels were considerably less than those of the
 
Sun. In addition, two EVA's were performed, one just prior
 
to perihelion and one just after, December 25 and 29
 
respectively. Two experiments, T025 and 3201 were performed
 
by the crew while EVA. The crew also spent considerable
 
time observing the comet and recording what they saw. Their
 
verbal descriptions and color sketches were invaluable in
 
the analysis (Figure 16).
 
As mentioned earlier, the Control Moment Gyro number 1
 
began exhibiting signs of distress just before the launch
 
of SL-4. As the mission progressed, the same wheel showed
 
more indications of the problem as the wheel speed and
 
temperature exhibited more frequent excursions from normal.
 
Finally at 0815 GMT on the seventh day of the mission
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(November 23) a rapid rise in motor current and an accompanying

increase of bearing temperature from 210C to just under
 
9000 occurred. Simultaneously, the wheel speed pick-off
 
failed. (From the current, wheel speed was estimated to
 
be about 3,800 rpm, down from a normal 9,060 rpm.) The
 
failure occurred while the crew was asleep and while the
 
workshop was out of contact with the ground. Ground
 
controllers removed the current from the wheel when contact
 
was made and the computer automatically switched to two­
gyro control. (The possibility of losing one gyro had been
 
considered to be extremely remote but a preplanned computer
 
program had been written and stored in the memory. When
 
the CMG failed, effort was started to write a single gyro
 
control law and to program it in the event that a second
 
gyro failed. It quickly developed that such an undertaking
 
was fruitless since the problem was so complex it could
 
not be completed before the end of the mission.)
 
The loss of the CMG was a shock and a surprise to the
 
Skylab personnel, but there was reasonable confidence the
 
mission could be completed satisfactorily. The open question
 
was the demands which would be put on the cold gas thrusters
 
during maneuvers since the gas supply was limited. The
 
extravehicular activites scheduled for the day of the failure
 
were conducted and went off.as planned.
 
Still another surprise was in store for the Skylab
 
personnel. On the 19th day of the mission, Control Moment
 
Gyro number 2 began showing signs of irregular operation
 
similar to those of number 1. Ground analyses of the situation
 
led to a hypothesis that the bearing distress was due-to a
 
lack of uniformity in the in-flight lubrication system. An
 
automatic,'"slinger" system was used to provide oil to the
 
CMG bearings automatically. In zero gravity, the oil did
 
not flow in the same way it did on Earth.
 
The lack of lubrication, combined with the stress of
 
maneuvers, seemed to be the cause of the bearing failure.
 
The bearing temperature was automatically controlled by
 
a sensor and a heater located in the wheel. The heater
 
elements could be controlled by ground command and the
 
designers theorized that a tighter control of the tempera­
ture would be beneficial. The bearing temperatures were
 
controlled from the ground for the remainder of the mission.
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The control of the workshop with only two gyros operating
 
proved to be quite tricky. Earth resource passes resulted
 
in more usage of thruster gas than had been planned and
 
the Program Director cancelled several passes until a new
 
maneuver scheme could be devised. Earth resource passes
 
had been conducted from sunrise to sunset on an orbit path.
 
Thus, the maneuvers from the solar inertial attitude to
 
the local vertical attitude required maneuvers in all three
 
planes. A new plan, having the earth resource pass conducted
 
from orbit-noon to orbit-noon required a single plane maneuver
 
and, thus, used less propellant. At the same time, each
 
maneuver was optimized in the ground simulators to further
 
reduce the demands. As a result, the earth observations
 
were initiated again. (The value of excess consumables
 
was once again demonstrated. The premission predicted normal
 
usage of the nitrogen gas used for attitude maneuvers was
 
162,000 N-Sec. Of the 374,000 N-Sec. of impulse loaded on
 
board, 338,000 N-Sec. were used.)
 
The constraints imposed and the concerns over the bearing
 
distress were reflected in the activities of the flight
 
management team. Each sponsoring office requested priority
 
for their experiment and most experimenters found new objec­
tives as a result of studying the data acquired during the
 
first two missions. Also, the second crew, after getting
 
a slow start because of motion sickness., concluded the mission
 
by working at a pace which could not be maintained for long
 
periods. The SL-4 crew had determined before liftoff that
 
the proper mode of work for an 84-day mission was to establish
 
a more conservative work/rest pattern and to stick with
 
it. The paced work pattern was not understood by all the
 
investigators and they expected the crew to work for the full
 
mission duration at the level the previous crew had finished
 
their mission. The flight planning team initially tried
 
to push the flight crew and there were several verbal exchanges
 
over the communciations links before the flight scheduling
 
became routine.
 
The last major decision which the flight management
 
team and the Program Director faced was the question of
 
what condition the workshop should be placed at the end
 
of the mission. There was considerable interest in allowing
 
the workshop to continue in an active mode to see how long
 
the various systems, such as the Control Moment Gyros would
 
last. The decision was made to deactivate the workshop
 
and to leave it in a condition that future space vehicles
 
could revisit but to turn off the systems in a controlled
 
manne*r. Two days of engineering tests in the unmanned mode
 
were permitted.
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On February 8, 1973, the crew entered the Command Module,
 
separated from the workshop, and returned to Earth. At 11:17 a.m.
 
EDT, after 84 days, 1 hour, and 15 minutes of space flight,
 
the manned operational phase of Skylab was over.
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SKYLAB LESSONS LEARNED
 
A. Introduction
 
At the completion of the Skylab Program the major
 
Program Offices involved in the development and operations
 
phases were directed to document their important experiences
 
in a series of reports called "Skylab Lessons Learned."
 
Five reports were prepared, one each by the Skylab Project
 
Offices at JSC, KSC, and MSFC; one by the Saturn Project
 
Office at MSFC; and one by the Headquarters Skylab Program
 
Office.
 
Mission reports were published as they had been in
 
all previous programs (References 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
 
These reports are complete and include very detailed
 
descriptions of the hardware, the program, and the opera­
tions. Such mission reports are complete documents which
 
are useful records of the missions, but experience and
 
lessons learned ususally remain in the minds of the
 
individual concerned. For Skylab, the "Lessons Learned"
 
documents were directed to be brief summaries of the impor­
tant experiences which the various individuals involved
 
considered to be worthy of passing on to successive programs.
 
The format was prescribed to be a brief state of the lesson
 
with an amplifying comment on the background. Statements
 
were solicited from all working levels and no "management
 
screening" was done other than to assure the statement
 
was clear and that the lesson was germane. The intent
 
was to document the lesson with enough detail to permit
 
the reader to understand the lesson and the experience
 
which led to the lesson. The reader was expected to use
 
the other written records (i.e., mission reports, mission
 
summaries, review reports, etc.) if additional background
 
was required. In retrospect, the reports would be of
 
more use to readers if an individual had been associated
 
with each lesson such that if further explanation was
 
required, it could be obtained. To correct this deficiency
 
in this report, it should be noted that the lessons documented
 
herein are the personal experiences of the author. This
 
section of this paper is not a summary of the other papers,
 
but is, in fact, a complementary document to the other
 
lessons learned. Experiences which the author shared
 
may appear in other papers and there has been no attempt
 
to remove any duplication.
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The lessons documented here predominantly reflect
 
experiences gained in Skylab, but in recognition of the
 
fact that the potential readers may not have the same
 
body of experience as was expected for the original docu­
ments, some of the lessons described were not discovered
 
originally in Skylab but they were successfully used,
 
either in the same form as in previous programs or used
 
with minor modification.
 
Many of the lessons can be classified as the application
 
of common sense and, as such, should need no highlighting.
 
However, experience has shown that as the size of a project
 
increases, the more difficult it is to apply and control
 
the sensible processes. Also, it is most desirable that
 
the manager of large projects have a few simple, easily
 
understood operating principles.
 
B. Lessons Learned 
1. Lesson: The Cost of Change 
Nothing is free. The only issue to be addressed 
is the value against the cost.
 
Background:
 
Every document, change, report, study, test, analysis,
 
conference, telephone call, etc., has a cost in manpower
 
and material. All too frequently managers will delude
 
themselves into thinking an action has "no cost" or "no
 
impact" when the true assessment would be that the action
 
can be undertaken with a relatively small effort. Also,
 
decisions to change an item are frequently made without
 
a thought-out assessment of all aspects of the task and
 
with only an assessment of the visible work involved.
 
For example, when the workshop was in the final stages
 
of preparation, a number of decals (containing operating
 
instructions) were judged to be less clear than was possible.
 
When the final bill was known, each decal change cost
 
tens of thousands of dollars, all accountable. The visible
 
task, removal of the old decal, the preparation and installa­
tion of the new, was only a few dollars, as you would
 
suspect. However, good aerospace procedures were used
 
and work orders had to be prepared and processed, the work
 
had to be reviewed and inspected, the drawings had to
 
be changed, the change had to be processed, drawing lists
 
had to be modified, test procedures modified and reviewed,
 
crew checklists had to be changed, and to all this, overhead
 
costs had to be added.
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Change options, it should be remembered, may reduce
 
cost, but a price must be paid for everything.
 
2. Lesson: Plan Conservatively and Execute Boldly
 
The initial development program plan becomes the
 
measure of progress. Since research and development
 
programs are, by definition, not completely understood,
 
good management will provide adequate reserves in time,
 
resources, schedule, and performance. Once the program
 
is underway, indecision costs time and money.
 
Background:
 
In the Skylab development effort, specific management
 
attention was given to providing sufficient funding and
 
schedule flexibility. There was no universal formula
 
or criteria which was applied across-the-board, but the
 
amount of cushion was determined by an assessment of
 
the complexity of the task, the criticality of the function,
 
how the development depended upon outside elements, the
 
experience of the manager, and the degree of optimism/
 
conservatism the manager had showed in the past. For
 
critical, high-risk items with a normally optimistic
 
manager, cost estimates were as much as doubled.
 
3. Lesson: Program Variables
 
Three items can be varied in a development program ­
cost, schedule, and program content. Establish the most 
important factors. Ensure that your priority matches 
that of your management. 
Background:
 
Only two of the variables can be controlled in a
 
development program. The worst examples of program
 
management are those where cost and schedule are tightly
 
controlled and no relief is given in performance. The
 
important variable may change through a program and may
 
be different for different elements.
 
In Skylab for example, the S-192 Multispectral Scanner
 
(an earth resource experiment) had sensor performance
 
as the highest priority requirement, since it represented
 
a desirable experiment only if it operated with extremely
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sensitive sensors. Later in the development cycle when
 
the sensor performance was established, schedule was
 
primary since it was required to complete the MDA and
 
a delay would have resulted in a very costly delay in
 
the major module.
 
On the other hand, when cost rates indicated a
 
potential overrun in the workshop, premium (overtime)
 
work was reduced and a schedule adjustment was more accept­
able. Adequate schedule reserve was available in this
 
case.
 
4. Lesson: Program Reserve
 
Plan adequate reserve in resources, schedule, and
 
performance.
 
Background:
 
Since these three variables can be traded off, initial
 
plans should recognize the possibility of needing all
 
three. For example, in Skylab, the contingency launch
 
vehicle and CSM were added to the program (four sets of
 
hardware were provided for three manned missions) to ensure
 
that three missions could be accomplished even if a launch
 
failure had occurred on one of the three planned missions.
 
It was recognized, however, that in the event the program
 
costs escalated, that hardware could be terminated with
 
a resultant cost reduction. The reduction in program
 
content would not have been large.
 
A similar approach was successfully used in the Gemini
 
Program where 15 launch vehicles were planned for 12 missions.
 
As a cost avoidance measure, the three back-up vehicles
 
were cancelled.
 
5. Lesson: Program Initiation
 
Large development programs should not be started
 
until a full estimate of the resources needed is available,
 
with adequate reserves identified. The resources must
 
include manpower and time requirements as well as funds.
 
These resources must be fully committed and planned by
 
all levels of decision prior to any large scale beginning
 
of a project.
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Background:
 
Skylab was begun prior to the completion of the
 
Apollo Program and funds were requested from Congress.
 
Unfortunately, until the lunar landing was accomplished,
 
a full commitment of the resources needed to support
 
the development could not be made. The result was
 
an evolutionary development program in the early phases.
 
For example, the Airlock Module, in its original configura­
tion, was built for a June 1968 launch. The contract
 
was let in September 1966 and the 22-month development
 
period dictated the selection of Gemini hardware.
 
The Airlock was built and assembled in that configuration.
 
The final Skylab Airlock was somewhat modified from
 
that configuration, but the basic design remained.
 
Much effort could have been saved if the hardware had
 
not been built until the program was ready for full­
fledged development.
 
6. Lesson: Provide Flexibility in Planning
 
The late additions to program objectives can be
 
extremely productive and may be more important than
 
the initial detailed objectives. Prepare the program
 
plan to be able to accommodate good ideas which are
 
surfaced late in the development cycle. Be prepared
 
to accept new ideas. Have a sufficient financial
 
reserve in the late years.
 
Background:
 
Many of the detailed program objectives of Skylab
 
could only be thought of after considerable design
 
had been accomplished. For example, the addition of
 
the solar sounding rocket program permitted the solar
 
data to be calibrated directly and, thus, greatly enhanced
 
its usefulness. The ground based observation program
 
(the Skylab project funded the enhancement and use
 
of ground based solar observatories around the World)
 
gave the solar physicist the base of data needed to
 
observe the solar events as they occurred. Neither
 
of these ideas were conceived at the inception of the
 
program, but as the planning progressed, it became
 
obvious they were required.
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Numerous examples can be cited, but the general
 
tendency when program costs increase in the early years
 
is to reduce the fiscal forecast in later years since
 
"all the engineering will be complete" and "the test
 
hardware will be built early." Don't believe it. The
 
engineering will be needed until the end, and new test
 
requirements will be surfaced late as you become smarter.
 
7. Lesson: Organization
 
It is important that the roles and responsibilities
 
of the program elements be understood by all participants
 
in the development. For a large program with many dispersed
 
participants, that understanding should be written and
 
recorded.
 
Background:
 
As the Skylab Program evolved, the many organizational
 
interfaces led to some areas of overlapping responsibilities.
 
For example, the conduct of subsystem tests at a site
 
other than at the development organization led to confusion
 
as to who developed the test requirements, who formulated
 
the test procedures, who was responsible for the test,
 
who conducted the test, and who evaluated the test results.
 
The Skylab Program used Program Directives to resolve
 
and control such areas of uncertainty. This specific
 
issue was addressed in Directive 26, "Intercenter Responsi­
bilities for Support and Preparation of KSC Test and
 
Checkout Plans and Procedures."
 
8. Lesson: Use a Phase Approach to Development
 
A phased approach to hardware development (i.e.,
 
Preliminary Requirements Review, Systems Requirements
 
Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review,
 
Customer Acceptance Review, Design Certification Review,
 
and Flight Readiness Review) is a good disciplined approach
 
to hardware development and should always be followed.
 
The requirements reviews formalize the task to be done
 
by the subsystem, prior to design. The preliminary design
 
review carefully determines that the requirements can
 
be met and allows the design to be "base lined." The
 
critical design review permits a detailed examination
 
of the design and should only be conducted when virtually
 
all drawings have been released. This permits the design
 
to be placed under configuration control. The CAR formally
 
reviews the test results to ensure the design meets the
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requirements and should immediately precede shipment.
 
Finally, the FRR ensures that all open items (i.e., test
 
failures, anomalies, reviews, etc.) have been closed
 
prior to flight. Normally, the FRR is conducted just
 
prior to the final full-scale test just preceding launch,
 
the Countdown Demonstration Test, or the CDDT.
 
The documentation and support needed to conduct
 
such reviews should be delineated at the outset of the
 
program (i.e., a reliability plan should be available
 
at PRR, a hard mockup at CDR), and the paperwork should
 
be distributed to the review team at least 2 weeks prior
 
to the review. Discrepancies, questions, or changes
 
should be submitted in writing and should be closed out
 
in writing. The Review Item Discrepancy (RID) system
 
worked well.
 
Background:
 
In the interest of maintaining schedule, the documentation
 
describing some experiments was not complete at the time
 
of some reviews. This generally resulted in unsatisfactory
 
reviews and occasioned subsequent reviews, or "delta
 
reviews." In general, incomplete preparation for the
 
reviews should be avoided except when there are clear
 
gains to the program.
 
The use of RID's permits the discrepancies to be
 
identified, codified, tracked, and closed out. Thus,
 
at each subsequent review it is possible to see how previous
 
criticisms were dispositioned.
 
9. Lesson: Configuration Control Procedures
 
The phased approach to development should be complemented
 
by a progressively mature control of hardware design.
 
Initially, the hardware design is merely conceptual in
 
nature and may be described parametrically, by equations
 
or design parameters, for example. At this stage, the
 
subsystem designer should have control of his design
 
and should have little controls placed upon the details.
 
The designer should be engaged in trade studies, sensitivity
 
analyses, and design variations which will lead to the
 
next phase of hardware control, "base lining the system."

This base line permits concentration on a specific design
 
and allows detail design to begin. After a system is
 
base lined, the designer can only change the concept
 
when there is due cause and only after notifying other
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program elements to assure that each subsystem designer
 
is aware of the design of interfacing subsystems. At
 
CDR (drawing release) the detail design is complete and
 
then formal Configuration Control should be initiated.
 
At this time a rigid process should be established which
 
will ensure that a design modification is only undertaken
 
for understood cause and the full cost, schedule, and
 
interface impact is analyzed prior to initiating the
 
change.
 
Background:
 
Controlling the configuration too late in the development
 
cycle results in design instability, particularly when
 
systems interact. A seemingly minor change in, say,
 
a reaction control valve could be reflected as a major
 
change in computer software. Conversely, the applica­
tion of controls before the design has been completed, or
 
before trade studies have been made, result in costly
 
modifications.
 
It can easily be seen that subsystem maturity should
 
be timed so each subsystem is in the same state of development
 
at CDR. When one system is based upon known technology
 
and another interrelated system is advancing the state­
of-the-art, initiation of design effort and the level
 
of effort should be adjusted accordingly.
 
At the time of the failure, project personnel mentioned
 
that the shield "probably was not needed anyway." The
 
Program Director did not ask the next question, namely:
 
why test it then? The proper pursuit of the requirement
 
would have saved the cost of repeating the test and probably
 
would have saved the agony of the Skylab 1 launch failure.
 
Caution: While a review is beneficial to ensure
 
that program resources are not being expended to fulfull
 
superceded requirments, no requirement should be changed
 
without fully understanding the design implications.
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10. Lesson: Update Design Requirements
 
Review design requirements periodically to ensure
 
the hardware continues to reflect the real program needs.
 
Requirement maturity can affect not only the design,
 
but also the test verification of design as well.
 
Background:
 
Design requirements are stated early in the development

cycle and tend to be more rigid than they deserve. Design
 
requirements are frequently formulated on the basis of
 
the best information available at the time. These require­
ments should be examined at intervals to ensure that
 
they are proper.
 
Early in the Skylab Program (1967-68) a design goal
 
of 0.99+ probability of no penetration by micrometeoroids
 
was established and, based upon the environmental model
 
available at the time and with the existent puncture
 
mode analysis, the micrometeoroid shield design was
 
established (the shield'was, of course, the one which
 
failed at the launch of Skylab 1). Later data (Pegasus,
 
et al) demonstrated that the model was conservative and
 
refinements to the analysis technique showed the problem
 
to be greatly reduced.
 
No design change was made since the design was essentially
 
complete and to change the design would have been costly.
 
However, the first systems tests resulted in a failure
 
to deploy. The tests had to be modified and repeated
 
to prove the soundness of the design (the original test
 
failure resulted because the "zero gravity" design of
 
the micrometeoroid shield resulted in deformation during
 
the one-g test. Zero gravity simulation during test
 
is tricky and costly.)
 
11. Lesson: Paper Review of Designs
 
Specific design reviews which are based upon an
 
analysis of drawings can inadvertently overlook important
 
features such as operational incompatibilities.
 
Background:
 
During the early development phase of the Saturn
 
S-IB stage, data became available showing that 7079-T-652
 
and 7178-T-6 aluminum alloys were susceptible to stress
 
corrosion cracking. These materials were used extensively
 
in the stage and an intensive effort was undertaken to
 
eliminate the problem.
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A drawing analysis was made to identify all components
 
which were made with the suspect material and which were
 
subjected to residual tensile stress. (Stress corrosion
 
is, of course, a long-term material cracking which occurs
 
when the aluminum is exposed to a corrosive environment
 
while under tensile stress.) All parts which could be
 
replaced without a large cost were made of a less susceptible
 
material. Those items which were difficult to replace
 
were replaced only if they could not be inspected on
 
a periodic basis. The remaining items were required
 
to be inspected on a regular schedule.
 
The Skylab launch vehicles were built in the 1966-68
 
time frame, and special reviews were undertaken to assure
 
that all time-dependent problems were eliminated. One
 
of the reviews covered the stress corrosion of the S-IB.
 
Another drawing review was held to assure that all susceptible
 
parts were identified.
 
Skylab 4 completed the last propellant loading test
 
prior to launch when a routine inspection uncovered a
 
crack. Stress corrosion had caused a crack at a mounting
 
bolt hole. All required factors were present: time, tensile
 
stress, and a corrosive atmosphere. The unnerving factor
 
was that the crack appeared from under the head of a
 
bolt and the design inspection had not identified that
 
this point of susceptibility was not capable of "routine
 
inspection." Indeed, there was no way of inspecting
 
for a failure after the flight load of fuel was put in
 
the tanks. As a result, another design review was held.
 
All of the mounting bolts were removed and special brackets
 
were installed which carried the load over the suspect
 
part.
 
It is quite possible that previous Saturn IB vehicles
 
were launched with cracked bolt holes.
 
12. Lesson: Detailed Scheduling of Work
 
All fabrication, assembly, and checkout activities
 
should be scheduled in detail, but rescheduled activities
 
(sometimes called unscheduled work) should be even more
 
carefully controlled and scheduled.
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Background:
 
In a development program involving many elements
 
being supplied from a variety of sources, it is inevitable
 
that some components are not available when scheduled.
 
More than likely, these late components will be rescheduled
 
for weekend, third shift, or slack time installation.
 
Such off-time activities can become uncontrolled since
 
the normal flow of work is interrupted and the configuration
 
is not that originally postulated by the planning staff.
 
The situation, schedule pressure, incomplete planning, and
 
unknown configuration lends itself very well to errors
 
and mistakes. This is precisely the time not to take
 
shortcuts in planning or in documentation.
 
The workshop was particularly susceptible since
 
it had been most affected by the change from the wet
 
workshop to the dry workshop configuration and was,
 
therefore, the last module to be completely defined.
 
Items were quite late in fabrication and there were many
 
instances of off-line installation. The original installa­
tion procedure was developed assuming properly phased
 
activities. When the part was actually installed, frequently,
 
the original procedure could not be used and additional
 
time was lost while a new procedure was developed.
 
Caution: Never permit off-line installation to
 
be accomplished without a written procedure. The same
 
controls must exist for off-line work as for in-line
 
work.
 
13. Lesson: Use of Common Test Procedures
 
When a component is to be tested at a number of
 
locations (e.g., the development contractor's plant,
 
the integration contractor's plant, and the launch site),
 
decide upon a single format and approach for the conduct
 
of the test, for control and approval of waivers or fixes,
 
for configuration control, and for documentation in
 
general. Use the same basic test processes at all of
 
the best sites.
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Background:
 
Each organizational element (contractor or government)
 
has, in general, developed a "standard" method of handling
 
the routine of conducting development tests. Without
 
early management attention and control, test procedures
 
from one test site will not be transportable to the next
 
level of test integration, and much effort (dollars)
 
will be needed to rewrite the documentation.
 
For example, the MDA test procedures used to prepare
 
the module at the Martin-Denver plant were rewritten
 
when it was tested with the Airlock at the MDAC St. Louis
 
plant, and further modified when the module was shipped
 
to KSC for testing.
 
Caution: Do not minimize the seriousness of this
 
problem which cannot be simply solved by a decree.
 
Transferring test procedures between test organizations
 
is not without problems as well. The "Angry Alligator"
 
-of Gemini IX (a payload shroud on the docking target did
 
not completely separate, and the resultant partially
 
deployed configuration prevented docking) was the result
 
of the use of a procedure by technicians who were not
 
familiar with the practices and terminology of another
 
organization. The optimum method is to use a common
 
test team as well as procedures. The ATM test team followed
 
the hardware from MSFC to JSC to KSC, but even then,
 
careful planning was needed since inspection and safety
 
and documentation requirements are not the same, and common
 
practices must be adapted.
 
14. Lesson: Lack of Spares
 
It is not always economical to provide only one
 
flight aritcle without a ready spare.
 
Background:
 
As a cost avoidance measure, back-up flight units
 
were eliminated from the experiment development programs
 
in most instances. Since many of the experiments interfaced
 
directly with the major flight modules, when an experiment
 
malfunctioned during preflight test, a backup unit could
 
not be immediately substituted, thereby permitting the
 
readiness work to flow uninterrupted. Instead, the failed
 
experiment had to be removed, analyzed, repaired, reverified,
 
and reinstalled. In the meantime, the main hardware
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test sequences were stopped or work-around procedures
 
developed. The former course was, of course, unacceptable
 
while the latter course necessitated multiple planning
 
sequences and was, therefore, costly.
 
A minor variant of the hardware minimization was
 
used on many of the Skylab experiments. Frequently, two
 
articles were built, a flight article and a test article,
 
which were planned to be the backup article after undergoing
 
refurbishment. Again, failures during the testing of
 
the flight article frequently occurred prior to the
 
availability of the reworked test article, necessitating
 
costly work-arounds and delays. Minimizing the buy of
 
subsystem hardware is an effective cost avoidance measure
 
providing that careful analysis is given to the probability
 
of availability, or, if a work-around plan is acceptable
 
in the event the subsystem does not maintain schedule.
 
15. Lesson: Indicators of Schedule Status
 
Simple indicators of program progress should be
 
devised for a gross technique for judging the schedule
 
status. The progress toward major milestones is needed
 
to prevent surprise schedule slips in a major element.
 
Such slips in one element unbalance a program and require
 
costly readjustment of the detailed schedule.
 
Background:
 
Early indication of a potential slip in a major
 
milestone will permit management to use overtime or work
 
adjustment to keep all elements in balance. Program
 
management used the status of specification test documenta­
tion, drawing release status, ICD release status, qualifica­
tion test status, and other detailed reports to provide
 
an early indication of progress.
 
A gross indicator of progress can be made by examining
 
the cost/schedule plan against progress. By simply adding
 
up the number of milestones planned for the month and
 
dividing that number by the planned cost and comparing
 
it to the ratio of the milestones actually accomplished
 
and the actual cost, a simple indicator is available.
 
When the planned milestone/dollar ratio is equal to the
 
actual ratio, the program is progressing as planned.
 
If the planned ratio is greater than the actual, the
 
program is falling behind schedule or is heading toward
 
an overrun. However, the indicator is gross and must
 
be looked at monthly and cumulatively. It cannot be
 
believed implicitly, but can only be used as a warning
 
signal.
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16. Lesson: Criticality Assessment
 
Documentation levels, controls, and redundancies
 
can be determined by assigning a criticality to each
 
subsystem, experiment, or component. A component deter­
mined to be vital for crew safety (Criticality 1) requires
 
a complete set of documentation and controls. Systems
 
with this criticality are extremely costly to develop
 
and to control since the data package generally begins
 
with the pedigree of the raw material and carefully documents
 
and controls each step of the development, fabrication,
 
and test process.
 
Components which are required for primary mission
 
success (Category 2) can receive somewhat less rigid
 
treatment although in actual practice the controls on
 
Criticality 2 hardware are almost identical with Criti­
cality 1 components. Items which affect secondary objectives
 
should be placed in Category 3. Considerable relaxation
 
of documentation and control is possible for components
 
such as these. For example, qualification testing can
 
be reduced and verification by analysis is acceptable.
 
Verification by similarity (i.e., use in a comparable
 
but not identical manner) can be utilized.
 
Peripheral items, such as cameras, small experiments, and
 
crew equipment of a noncritical nature should be categorized
 
as Criticality 4. These items require only enough documenta­
tion and controls to ensure they are safe and represent
 
no hazard.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab Program made use of failure analyses
 
to categorize systems and assign criticality numbers.
 
Standard documentation and controls were determined for
 
each category. The experience, however, fell somewhat
 
short of expectation since it was difficult for a subsystem
 
engineer to accept that his component "wasn't important."
 
The tendency was to over categorize and, thus, over control
 
the development. It required management pressure to ensure
 
the proper level is assigned.
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17. Lesson: Reduced Requirements for Experiments
 
The tight, detailed, and documented procedures of
 
Skylab and Apollo do not have to be followed for space
 
experiments. Requirements can be relaxed as the flight
 
criticality decreases. Documentation levels can be
 
related to the price of failure.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab Program tried to establish levels of
 
control by criticality number. Criticality 4 was a secon­
dary mission objective item. The levels of documentation
 
and control placed upon Criticality 4 was significantly
 
less than on other items. Unfortunately, the individual
 
experiments were classified as Criticality 3 early in
 
the program, and no investigator wanted to be reclassified
 
as "secondary." The Program Director had minimal success
 
in reclassifying the already assigned experiments, but
 
*the Student Investigations and Science Demonstrations
 
were all classified in that manner, and the Criticality 4
 
controls were exericed.
 
Calling the experiments "secondary" was a psychological
 
mistake and should be avoided. Each scientist desires
 
to feel that his experiment is vital and-important.
 
Caution: Requirements can easily be reduced to
 
a level where the task cannot be accomplished.
 
18. Lesson: Subsystem Managers
 
Examine each system to ensure that the responsibility
 
for dynamic systems is not vested in organizations normally
 
responsible for static systems. Where systems cross
 
normal engineering lines (i.e., structural, machanical,
 
electrical), ensure that a subsystem manager is identified
 
who understands he is responsible for all aspects of
 
the item.
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Background:
 
The engineering responsibility for the OWS micrometeoroid
 
shield was vested in the structural group and was, therefore,
 
pursued as a structural/mechanical problem. The structural/
 
mechanical design was pursued in a normal manner, and
 
a "sneak circuit" aerodynamic load problem was overlooked.
 
(A "sneak circuit" is defined as a path for energy to
 
travel which cannot be found unless the entire system
 
is examined.) A "tsubsystem engineer" might have asked
 
the interface question which would have uncovered the
 
loads discrepancy brought about by the sneak pressure
 
path. It is clear that the normal assignment, structural
 
design, mechanical design, and loads design, did not
 
uncover the problem.
 
19. Lesson: Use of Committees
 
Do not use committees for decisions. Committees
 
are advisors and consultants.
 
Background:
 
Committees are useful agents to compile information
 
and to discuss and explore issues. Committees which
 
are addressing subjects which are controversial and upon
 
which there are diverse views, tend to arrive at compromise
 
decisions or the position of the dominant personality.
 
Committees which have simple subjects or a unanimity
 
of opinion were not necessary. A clear cut responsibility
 
for the consequences of a specific decision is frequently
 
lacking,. and, indeed, a committee cannot execute an action
 
resulting from a decision.
 
Decision makers should make maximum use of all
 
information channels prior to passing judgment. Committees
 
are useful to bring together for discussing all sides
 
of the issues and are quite useful tools to ensure that
 
all nuances of a particular path are uncovered. To ensure
 
that this occurs, committee membership should include
 
individuals who represent all aspects of the issue.
 
Responsibility for a decision must accompany the
 
authority for a decision.
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20. Lesson: Incentive Contracts
 
Incentive contracts are an effective management
 
tool to ensure a successful development. Award fee contracts
 
should be considered for R&D contracts.
 
Background:
 
Cost-plus-award-fee contracts were successfully
 
used in Skylab as an effective means of communicating
 
with and controlling major development contractors.
 
This type of contract reimburses a development contractor
 
the legitimate costs incurred for the described work
 
plus a small fixed percentage as a fixed fee from which
 
the contractor receives his profit. Over and above this
 
stipulated percentage, the government provides an additional
 
incentive fee to reward contractors for exceptional performance.
 
The amount of award fee earned during a specified period
 
is determined by a government award fee board which grades
 
the performance and selects the appropriate financial
 
reward. The amount of this fee element (the maximum percen­
tage is fixed in the contract) is arbitrarily determined
 
and is not subject to appeal or negotiation.
 
Award fee contracts are more flexible than normal
 
incentive contracts which prespecify, in the contract,
 
the incentive elements. They are easy to administer
 
and can be adapted to new circumstances as they arise.
 
Award fee contracts are written with the specific perfor­
mance requirments established periodically. For example,
 
for one period, the government may consider schedule main­
tenance as the most desirable performance. The contractor
 
is notified of the goals and his management effectiveness
 
is evaluated and, at the end of the period, a portion

of the award fee is granted, as appropriate. For the
 
next period, perhaps cost reductions will be considered
 
the most beneficial to the government and the contractor's
 
performance will be assessed with those predescribed
 
goals in mind.
 
In this manner, the customer and the contractor
 
both know the expected performance goals, and the successful
 
achievement of those goals is beneficial to both sides.
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21. Lesson: Overruns
 
A tightly-negotiated contract will result in an
 
equal probability of overrun or underrun.
 
Background:
 
The total cost of an R&D contract at the end of
 
a program will include:
 
a. the negotiated price of the original work, 
b. the incremental price of added work, 
c. the negotiated fee on (a) and (b), 
d. any incremental unplanned manpower needed to 
accomplish the work in (a) and (b), and 
e. the incremental cost of the manpower over and 
above that negotiated in (a) and (b).
 
Item (a), of course, represents the work known to
 
exist at the time the original contract was let. Item (b)
 
represents work which was not known at the time the contract
 
was let. (The more experimental the program, the larger
 
(b) will be as a percent of (a).) Item (c) represents
 
the fair return (profit) negotiated between the customer
 
and the contractor. Item (d) represents the underestimation
 
(overestimation) by the contractor of the amount of labor
 
needed to do the work described in (a) and (b). Item
 
(e) represents any escalation of labor costs. No fee
 
is paid for (d) and fee on (e) is only paid if the inflation
 
was the result of factors not under the contractor's
 
control. The total cost to the government is less if
 
the negotiator is successful in minimizing the manhours
 
and labor costs negotiated to accomplish the job. Therefore,
 
the probability of an overrun is increased.
 
This is not to be interpreted as a desire for larger
 
overruns in contracts, but it is a notice that small
 
(a few percent) overruns are not necessarily a sign of
 
bad management. Negotiations for contracts should always
 
err on the lean side.
 
Program management should assure that an adequate
 
government estimate is budgeted as contrasted with the
 
contract price.
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22. Lesson: Safety Concerns
 
A list of safety concerns should be maintained throughout
 
the program. The list should be controlled and reviewed
 
periodically on a regularly scheduled basis.
 
Background:
 
Just prior to launch the Skylab Program developed

and published a listing of each accepted risk which had
 
been accumulated during the development program. Each
 
item was discussed and a rationale for acceptance was
 
recorded. This list was reviewed by the Administrator
 
of NASA during the week prior to launch of SL-l.
 
In order to accumulate the items, it was necessary
 
to rely on the memory of the various individuals involved
 
and to search the records accumulated. Typical of the
 
'items recorded was the fact that the guidance computer

for the S-IB vehicle was not redundant. A proposed change
 
to add a redundant unit was rejected by the Program Director
 
because the unit was internally redundant, had an excellent
 
flight record, and the extensive modification would have
 
resulted in a new, untried configuration.
 
It would be better to document such decisions as
 
they were made to ensure that none was overlooked. A
 
periodic review is needed because it is possible that
 
the sum effect of risks may exceed the tolerable level.
 
It should also be reviewed at intervals by upper management

while there is still time to take action if it is needed.
 
23. Lesson: Decision Levels
 
It is very easy for decision making to gravitate
 
to the top level of management. This practice will result
 
in a slow moving program and also could lead to bad decisions
 
since one man cannot be an expert in all fields. Force
 
decisions to be made at the lowest level that has access
 
to all of the factors which bear on the decision. Identify
 
for each level of management those items which must be
 
elevated for decision and those which should be left
 
at lower levels.
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Background:
 
Skylab used the basic NASA management procedures
 
to establish controlled items. The Program Authorization
 
Document (PAD) established those items which the Program
 
Director was not free to change without higher authorization.
 
Typical items were the launch dates, total program costs,
 
program objective, and development center roles. The
 
program specification expanded on these and contained
 
requirements which were levied on the projects and which
 
could not be changed. Typical of this level of control
 
was the weight of a project, experiments and objectives,

project costs, and delivery dates. Project specifications
 
then further detailed the instructions to the prime con­
tractors and contained end item specifications, contractual
 
costs and cost rates, internal schedule milestones, and
 
system performance requirements.
 
This, of course, is not intended to detail all items
 
controlled but to illustrate the tiered approach to control
 
which was successful. It should be initiated early.
 
24. Lesson: Disposition of Discrepancies
 
Comments on the design, hardware, or tests of hardware
 
as made in the formal program reviews should be disposed

of in a formal and controlled manner. The originator
 
of the comment should be advised of the disposition and
 
should have an opportunity to comment on the resultant
 
action.
 
Background:
 
Skylab used the formal review process of successive
 
detailed studies of each project. The process started
 
with the Preliminary Requirements Reviews (PRR), Systems
 
Requirements Reviews (SRR), Preliminary Design Reviews
 
(PDR), Critical Design Reviews (CDR), Design Certification
 
Reviews (DCR), Customer Acceptance Reviews (CARR), and
 
Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR). At all but the FRR,
 
a procedure was followed wherein members of the review
 
team submitted comments by way of the Review Item
 
Discrepancy (RID) process. Each RID was approved, accepted

for further study, withdrawn, or disapproved. Unless
 
care is- taken with the study-items, the initiator of
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the RID may not be aware of the final disposition (for
 
example, study may result in ultimate disapproval) and
 
the same item will be raised at the next review. Similarly,
 
items which are disapproved most often result in the
 
initiation of some action which will accomplish the intent
 
of the RID. A rejection of the -ID without management
 
action could result in the item not being followed up
 
and/or the initiator feeling his ideas were rejected.
 
A category, "disapproved with action," should be established
 
and then the resultant action should be tracked and treated
 
as an open RID until the action is complete.
 
All RID's should be treated as open items and should
 
be identified and controlled until the action is completed.
 
25. Lesson: Provide Operational Flexibility in Design
 
A primary design criteria for all subsystems should
 
be one of providing a maximum of operational flexibility.
 
That is, subsystems and systems should not be designed
 
to operate in one primary mode but should, where possible,
 
be designed for a variety of operating modes, even if
 
efficiency must be sacrificed.
 
Background:
 
Lack of operational flexibility was designed into
 
the video tape recorder as a coat avoidance and schedule
 
maintenance decisions. The video tape recorder was a
 
"late add on" and was a minor design modification of
 
the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) recorder.
 
It was controlled by the crew and playback was commanded
 
from the ground. Thus, use of the recorder required
 
a crew member to traverse to the recorder to both turn on
 
or turn off the system, necessitating coordination which
 
should not have been required.
 
Conversely, the original workshop electrical design
 
had three independent systems: the Workshop Solar Array
 
System (SAS), the ATM Solar Array System, and the Command
 
and Service Module Fuel Cell System. Each system was
 
sized to operate the OWS, ATM, and CSM, respectively.
 
An early decision was made to bus the OWS and ATM systems
 
and later, a further decision allowed the use of the CSM
 
power to operate after docking with the workshop to provide
 
the power needed by the CSM. Because of the failure
 
of the micrometeoroid shield which caused one SAS panel
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to be torn loose, those two decisions saved Skylab.
 
The CSM powered itself and the ATM solar arrays powered
 
the workshop until the first Skylab crew released the
 
remaining SAS panel during EVA (extravehicular activity)
 
on mission day 13. Six hours later the electrical power
 
available rose from 4,000 watts to 7,000 watts.
 
26. Lesson: Provide Excess Consumables
 
Design the systems on any spacecraft for a maximum
 
of expendables and consumables. Assure that the quantities
 
of these expendable items exceed those necessary for
 
the design mission by a wide margin.
 
Background:
 
The electrical power and attitude control gas of
 
Skylab exceeded the normal mission requirements. Without
 
this excess, it would have been impossible to save the
 
program since it was the excess which permitted the unmanned
 
activities to be conducted which saved the mission.
 
As an example of the benefits which can be derived
 
from excess consumables, the question of how much hydrogen
 
and oxygen should be loaded on the CSM for the fuel cells
 
was raised in 1972. A Level 1 decision was made that
 
the CSM would be fully loaded with cryogenics and a water
 
storage tank would be provided to permit the fuel cells
 
to provide power for 10-14 days. (The water tanks stored
 
the water generated and prevented contamination of the
 
instruments.) With the failure of the workshop solar
 
array at launch, that power became mandatory until
 
Astronauts Conrad and Kerwin released the jammed array.
 
27. Lesson: Stowage Flexibility
 
The mission peculiar stowage areas should be designed
 
with a maximum of flexibility such that a wide variety
 
of sizes and shapes can be accommodated on short notice.
 
Background:
 
The items which had been planned to be launched
 
in the CSM stowage areas were changed radically at the
 
last moment. For example, the first manned mission,
 
Skylab 2, was changed completely in the 10 days between
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Skylab 1 and 2. All of the thermal shield equipments,
 
as well as the tools for releasing the restrained solar
 
wing, were stowed at the last minute. Skylab 3 and 4
 
lifted off with new experiments, augmented film supplies,
 
additional food, gyro packs, and other hardware supplies
 
which had not been planned.
 
Stowage containers should be designed to tie down
 
and restrain stowage items without major modifications.
 
28. Lesson: Trained Observers
 
Experiments should be designed to make use of the
 
judgment and flexibility of trained observers.
 
Background:
 
The solar experiments on the ATM were designed to
 
give a wide choice of action to the astronauts. As a
 
result, they were able to record flares and other dynamic
 
solar events which could not be forecast and which required

instantaneous analysis, decision, and action. On the
 
other hand, the earth resources experiments were added
 
late and were designed to have little effect on the
 
already built hardware. The result was a conscious
 
decision to design a set of experiments which used little,
 
if any, judgment on the part of the crew. The astronauts
 
were primarily operators of the experiments and were
 
not part of the experiment. As a result, the outputs
 
were not felt to be as productive as the Visual Observations
 
Program (VOP) which was added to Skylab 4 to better use
 
the capabilities of man. The ability to look, observe,
 
and decide what were the important features enhanced this
 
experiments.
 
29. Lesson: New Manufacturing Techniques
 
Be vigilant when forced to use new fabrication techniques.
 
Use soldering techniques, welding methods, painting processes,
 
and other such processes which have ample experience to
 
prove that the method is satisfactory whenever possible.
 
In particular, be careful of having manufacturer "A"
 
use manufacturer "B's" process.
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Background:
 
Every program manager has his list of horrible examples.
 
In Skylab, a typical example was encountered in the earth
 
resources control panel. Here, because of volume constraints,
 
a new soldering technique was used to increase the packing
 
density. The resulting solder joints failed in test
 
and a new design had to be made. The wire ends were
 
to be soldered to posts and the actual operation was
 
done "in the blind." As a result, a percentage of the
 
joints failed and none could be adequately inspected.
 
The technique probably would be fine, after considerable
 
experience was accumulated. But, for an operational program,
 
it was a poor choice without more experience.
 
On the other hand, during the development tests,
 
the paint on one of the major modules was found to outgas.
 
Since the paint used by another contractor was satisfactory,
 
the first contractor was directed to use the proven paint.
 
However, it was also directed that he use the procedures
 
which were developed by the other manufacturer and also
 
to contract with the first contractor for assistance
 
and help during the application. With adequate caution
 
and controls, the paint was satisfactorily applied.
 
30. Lesson: New Electronic Components
 
Avoid the use of new electronic techniques and
 
components in critical subsystems unless their use is
 
absolutely mandatory.
 
Background:
 
New electronic components (resistors, diodes,
 
transistors, switches, etc.) are developed each year.
 
Most push the state-of-the-art and contain new fabrication
 
processes. Designers of systems are eager to use them
 
since they each have advantages over more conventional
 
components. However, being new, they are untried and
 
generally have unknown characteristics and idiosyncrasies.
 
Let some other program discover the problems. Do not
 
use components which have not been previously used in
 
a similar application if it can be avoided, even at the
 
expense of size and weight.
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31. Lesson: Single Point Ground
 
A single point ground should be provided.
 
Background:
 
A single point ground requires that a copper path
 
be provided for both legs of all electrical circuits
 
joining the ground side of all components. The alternate
 
is to ground all elements to the vehicle structure, similar
 
to the circuits in an automobile. A single point ground
 
is costly in weight but it reduces electromagnetic problems
 
brought about by ground loops and inductive circuits.
 
32. Lesson: Deorbit
 
A positive means of deorbiting spacecraft and space
 
debris should be provided for all large elements.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab workshop was not equipped with a means
 
of deorbiting at the end of the mission nor was the last
 
stage of the launch vehicle (S-I Stage). As a result,
 
the S-rI Stage, the workshop, the payload shroud (four
 
elements), and assorted smaller debris were left in orbit
 
for random decay under the influence of aerodynamic decay.
 
Since the orbit was inclined at 500 to the equator, the
 
potential impact points cover all places on Earth between
 
50N and 50 S latitudes. While a large percentage of
 
the hardware could be expected to disintegrate as it
 
travelled through the atmosphere, there is always a finite
 
probability some larger parts will survive and reach
 
the Earth's surface. Thus, while the probability is
 
small, an accident is a possibility.
 
33. Lesson: Manufacturink Aids
 
It can be false economy to eliminate manufacturing

fixtures, mock-ups, and aids. Efficiency in the assembly
 
and manufacturing processes brought about by the use
 
of these devices can easily off-set the relatively small
 
costs.
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Background:
 
Early in the program, it was decided to minimize
 
these tools and to eliminate all but the most essential.
 
As the program progressed, reevaluations of the needs
 
frequently resulted in the more costly practice of adding

the unit to the plan.
 
As a typical example, without a cable and tubing
 
mock-up, all final fabrication and fitting of cables
 
and plumbing had to be done in the flight hardware.
 
Since the size of the hardware prohibited unlimited access,
 
the fabrication work and the assembly work had to be
 
interweaved.
 
Three dimensional mock-ups of the spacecraft enabled
 
wire bundles, cables, and tubing to be trimmed to fit
 
in an off-line fixture. Since work space is generally
 
at a premium in a spacecraft and since tight control
 
of access is normal, the final trimming and fitting of
 
long runs of wire and plumbing was time-consuming and
 
caused schedule slip.
 
Three consecutive programs have found that it pays
 
to add fixtures of this type since it permits parallel
 
work and the extra cost of a mock-up is quickly recovered
 
by not causing a slip in the main flow of flight hardware.
 
34. Lesson: Redundancy Design
 
When designing redundancies into systems, consider
 
the use of nonidentical approaches for backup, alternate,
 
and redundant items.
 
Background:
 
A fundamental design deficiency can exist in both
 
the prime and backup system if they are identical. For
 
example, the rate gyros in the Skylab attitude control
 
system were completely redundant systems, i.e., six rate
 
gyros were available, two in each axis. However, the
 
heater elements on all gyros were identical and had the
 
same failure mode. Thus, there was no true redundancy
 
and a separate set of gryos had to be sent up on Skylab
 
4 for an in-flight replacement.
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35. Lesson: Combined Environments
 
Be careful of combined environments. Most ground
 
tests of components and systems are to test the effect
 
of single environments (i.e., temperature, pressure,
 
vibration, etc.) although combined thermal-vaccum tests
 
are frequently encountered. The combined and synergistic
 
effects of environments must, in general, be considered
 
by analysis since combined environment test facilities
 
are expensive and rare. One space environment, zero
 
gravity, cannot be simulated except for brief periods

and must be considered by analysis.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab attitude control system used rate gryos
 
(two in each axis for a total of six) for angular rate
 
information. These rate gyros had a bellows in the float
 
chamber which contained a fluid which acted as a damper
 
to gyro motion. When exposed to vacuum, the bellows
 
expanded, as designed, and caused the damper fluid to
 
be subjected to low (zero?) pressure. During thermal
 
vacuum tests, excessive gyro drift was noted and was
 
properly attributed to gas bubbles forming at the low
 
pressure. In the one-g environment, these bubbles drifted
 
to one location and the resultant behavior (drift) of
 
the gyro was evident and constant. This drift rate was
 
then compensated for in the software. The anomaly was
 
classified as known, correctable, and acceptable.
 
However, in zero gravity, when the situation was
 
encountered, the position of the bubble was not pre­
dictable or constant and, thus, its effects could not
 
be compensated for in the software.
 
The problem existed until the replacement of the
 
gyros by the crew.
 
36. Lesson: Rapid Reaction
 
Design engineers must be conditioned to react rapidly
 
during anomalous operational situations. A full under­
standing of off-nominal modes of operation must be developed
 
prior to the beginning of an operation. Design engineers
 
who have become reliant upon large computer programs
 
for system analysis must translate that knowledge to
 
charts and tables for rapid reference to facilitate quick
 
decisions.
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Background:
 
At launch, the workshop micrometeoroid shield was
 
ripped off by the airstream. While the vehicle success­
fully reached orbit attitude, the shield was an integral
 
part of the thermal control system (Skylab used passive
 
techniques to maintain the interior temperatures at an
 
acceptable level) and the vehicle rapidly overheated.
 
The manned launch was postponed for 10 days to allow
 
time for corrective devices to be designed and built.
 
In the intervening period, conflicting demands of the
 
thermal, electrical, and attitude control systems required

rapid assessment of situations and quick responses.
 
The operational forces at Houston frequently had to take
 
action without a complete engineering team, which had
 
been organized to handle more routine situations, and had
 
to readjust its thinking and decision process to react
 
to the new, rapidly changing series of crises. It took
 
a few days to become properly oriented. Future programs
 
should prepare the engineering team to respond to quickly
 
developing situations when the normal engineering tools,
 
analysis, computation, and test are too slow. It should
 
be pointed out that despite the room for improvement,
 
the engineering/operations team did function effectively
 
enough to save the vehicle - a considerable achievement.
 
37. Lesson: Crew Checklists
 
Crew checklists used to describe operating procedures
 
should be complete but should be kept simple. Backup

procedures, redundant procedures, and trouble-shooting
 
procedures should not appear on the primary checklists
 
but, instead, should be referenced only.
 
Background:
 
Complicated checklists which detail alternate or
 
redundant processes become complicated and the crewman
 
can become confused when trying to follow the primary
 
mode. (This should not be construed to preclude simple
 
processes such as a one or two line trouble-shooting
 
scheme.)
 
38. Lesson: The Size of the Command Task
 
Spacecraft, such as Skylab, which are designed to
 
minimize flight crew systems control, require that ground
 
commands manage the vehicle performance. Therefore,
 
the sequence for the identification, generation, verifica­
tion, transmission, and recognition of the commands should
 
fully recognize the size of the task.
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Background:
 
Over 100,000 commands were sent to Skylab during
 
its-8-month active life. The full workload associated
 
with this magnitude operation was not recognized early.
 
Each individual element of the system was sized properly,
 
but the manhours necessary to operate the system was
 
not fully understood.
 
39. Lesson: Control Moment Gyros
 
Control moment gyros are excellent devices for attitude
 
stabilization of large vehicles without the requirements
 
for large quantities of expendables.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab attitude control system used momentum
 
exchange to maintain close control of the cluster orienta­
tion in the face of gravity gradient torques, venting
 
torques, aerodynamic torques, and crew disturbances.
 
Three large control moment gyros (65.8 kg momentum wheels
 
with an angular momentum of 3,000 N-M sec.) provided
 
the momentum exchange mechanism, a digital computer and
 
its associated interface unit, performed the necessary
 
calculations and navigation based upon the intelligence
 
supplied by rate gyros (three in each of three orthogonal
 
planes), five sun sensors, and a star tracker. A cold
 
gas blow-down system provided the impulse needed to
 
occasionally rebalance the system. (Avoid momentum
 
management techniques which require expendables. Magnetic
 
field momentum exchange schemes show promise.)
 
Some life-time problems complicated the final manned
 
mission but, in principle, the momentum exchange principle
 
is an effective stabilization scheme for long-duration
 
spacecraft.
 
40. Lesson: Lubrication of Rotating Machinery
 
If possible, positive lubrication methods should
 
be included in the design of long-life rotating machinery,
 
such as control moment gyros.
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Background:
 
Two of the Skylab CMG's experienced bearing anomalies
 
(temperature increases) and one (CMG #1) failed on day 194.
 
Analysis indicates that poor lubrication caused bearing
 
failure. The CMG's were designed with an automatic lubrica­
tion metering system which was chosen to minimize the
 
need for active control, to maximize bearing life, and
 
to prevent contamination by containing all oil. Life
 
tests conducted on the ground far exceeded the required
 
life.
 
In retrospect, it appears as if the forces on the
 
oil in zero gravity caused it to seek different locations
 
than in one-g where full lubrication was possible.
 
Since fluid flow in zero-g is not yet fully understood,
 
it appears prudent to design a system with positive control.
 
41. Lesson: Investigate All Failure Modes
 
Do not let concern and investigations of "probable"
 
failure modes divert attention from less likely failures.
 
Background:
 
Because of the nature of the micrometeoroid shield
 
deployment, the light and flexible design, and the diffi­
culty in simulating zero gravity deployment, there was a
 
general uneasiness with this system and its proper opera­
tion. As a result, at least three independent reviews were
 
held, all concentrating on the deployment. Questions
 
concerning whether it would stay on were answered with
 
a statement that the tight rigging would assure it behaving
 
as an integral part of the skin and that flutter analysis
 
had given the design a clean bill of health.
 
The aerodynamic design of the tunnel was not questioned.
 
42. Lesson: Designers Should View Their Product
 
White room restrictions inhibit the detail designers
 
from examining the hardware they are responsible for.
 
Access to assembly areas should be controlled, but not
 
eliminated.
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Background:
 
Skylab, like all space vehicles, was built with
 
careful control of access to keep the vehicle clean,
 
to inventory all material brought inside, and to prevent
 
interference with the assembly and checkout crews. As
 
a result, designers rarely viewed their final product
 
in the as-built condition. Perhaps such access might
 
have resulted in discovery of the design error in the
 
auxiliary tunnel.
 
43. Lesson: Vent Port Location
 
The location of vent ports on a space vehicle should
 
be carefully designed and controlled from the initial
 
design. Improperly located vents will cause contamination
 
of experiments and instruments or can obstruct the field
 
of view. Improperly designed vents will result in torques
 
on the spacecraft.
 
Background:
 
Because of the evolutionary development of Skylab,
 
vents for the environmental control system, waste manage­
ment system, urine dumps, tanks, and fuel cell water
 
were not controlled initially. The principal investiga­
tors eventually demanded that controls be established.
 
After a review, the problem was recognized as being real
 
and the designs were changed. Vents were relocated so
 
as not to be in the field of view of experiments, a storage

tank was provided for fuel cell water, urine was stored
 
in bags in the waste tank, and overboard dumps were rerouted
 
to the waste tank. These measures, taken late, were
 
more costly than necessary. The requirement was not
 
recognized early enough.
 
Nonpropulsive vents are easier to conceive than
 
to design. The major vents on the Skylab waste tank were
 
diametrically opposed orfices protected from clogging
 
by two screens which were designed such that clogging
 
of the screens would not result in a pressure differential
 
between the vents. This was a very satisfactory design.
 
104 
44. Lesson: Structural Analysis Instead of Test
 
Structural analysis in lieu of test can provide
 
adequate assurance of structural integrity for simple
 
structures. The use of weight (mass) to increase the
 
factor of safety is an effective way to decrease both
 
test and analysis verification.
 
Background:
 
The Saturn V used to place the Skylab cluster in
 
orbit had enormous weight lifting capability. This
 
capability was used judiciously to reduce design, testing,
 
and analysis costs by designing to a larger factor of
 
safety. For example, in Skylab, the payload shroud was
 
formed from one-inch thick aluminum plates. No acoustic
 
tests were made since the thickness provided the necessary
 
attenuation.
 
45. Lesson: Eliminate B-Nuts. Braze All Fluid Lines
 
All plumbing should be brazed or welded and B-nuts
 
(mechanical connections) should be used only when no
 
other solution is possible in order to minimize the number
 
of joints where leakage can occur.
 
Background:
 
Skylab used B-nut fittings extensively on the airlock
 
module coolant loop. This allowed for ease of manufacturing
 
but it was impossible to assure a complete seal. Despite
 
stringent controls during manufacture, a coolant loop

leak developed in flight. The location of the leak was
 
never discovered but it could have been internal to the
 
cabin (a trace of coolant was found in the ECS charcoal
 
absorber which was brought back for analysis).
 
46. Lesson: B-Nuts
 
Where B-nuts must be used in fluid lines, insure
 
that a known torque can be applied during assembly and
 
that the torque can be rechecked later. Design in a
 
positive lock to insure that launch vibrations do not
 
loosen the nut. Do not safety wire two movable parts
 
(e.g., nuts) together.
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Background:
 
The CSM RCS line leak probably stemmed from a B-nut
 
which was not properly installed and torqued. Subsequently,
 
checking of B-nuts on later vehicles revealed that the
 
torque was difficult to apply, was hard to measure, and
 
in many instances, was below specification value. Some
 
of the nuts could not be checked because of the location.
 
At least one instance was found where safety wire was
 
installed in such a manner as to not inhibit opening
 
of the nut.
 
47. Lesson: Fluid Lines and Cables
 
Insure that fluid lines and cables cannot inadvertently
 
be installed backwards.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab 3 CSM developed a leak in the RCS oxidizer
 
line (in the thruster'housing) because of a series of
 
misadventures which began with the installation of the
 
plumbing upside down, which prevented a good fit.
 
Cables should also have indexed connectors which
 
will prevent adjacent cables from being interchanged.
 
48. Lesson: Stress Corrosion
 
Do not use stress corrosion-susceptible material
 
in any component, the failure of which would result in
 
a Category 1 (crew safety) or Category 2 (mission success)
 
failure.
 
Background:
 
Many of the Apollo components were built with high
 
strength-to-weight ratio materials. Subsequently, these
 
materials were found to be susceptible to stress corrosion.
 
As a result, stress corrosion cracks were searched
 
for throughout the operational phase and, indeed, were
 
found on the fins of the Saturn IB vehicles. Components
 
fabricated with these materials, with the problems of
 
stresses from usage or residual fabrication stresses,
 
must be assumed to be incipient failures. Cracks can
 
appear any time after the last inspection and launch,
 
no matter how late the inspection.
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49. Lesson: Sliding Aluminum Surfaces
 
Avoid sliding aluminum surfaces. Where necessary,
 
anodize the surfaces prior to applying solid lubricant.
 
Background:
 
The aperture doors on the solar observatory were
 
closed when the instruments were not in use to prevent
 
contamination from depositing on the instruments. The
 
fiberglass doors had an aluminum tapered latch which
 
engaged a latch ramp. The aperture doors had a history

.of hanging up during flight. Flight doors were returned
 
for failure analysis which showed the latch ramps to be
 
galled. No explanation is available for the in-flight
 
failures, despite success of the 5,000 cycle qualifica­
tion tests. Misalignments due to manufacturing tolerances
 
or thermal expansions could have caused high stress loads
 
which, in turn, could cause the galling.
 
50. Lesson: Small Orifices
 
Small orifices should be avoided in fluid lines
 
since they are easily blocked by contamination.
 
Background:
 
Metering orifices are frequently used to limit the
 
flow in fluid systems such as in attitude control thrusters.
 
When these become very small (on the order of thousands
 
of inches) the likelihood of clogging is relatively great.
 
When orifices are required and cannot be eliminated,
 
microfilters.should be placed immediately upstream of
 
the orifice and chemical and acoustic cleaning should
 
be used to eliminate any loose or potentially loose particles
 
from the line.
 
During flushing operations, it should be remembered
 
that in the absence of gravity, particles which have
 
been lodged in low spots, blind tubes, corners, and the
 
like, will be free to enter the fluid flow. Also, brazing
 
flashes which may form during fabrication can break loose
 
in time due to fluid and line vibrations.
 
107
 
51. 	 Lesson: Use Fire Control Techniques When Designing
 
Cables
 
All electrical cables should be encased in noninflammable
 
cable trays with fire stops at intervals, or other fire
 
prevention techniques and practices should be used.
 
Background:
 
The Apollo firewhich took the lives of three astronauts
 
demonstrated the dev stating effects of fire in a spacecraft.
 
As a result, extensive design attention was focused upon
 
fire initiation and propagation in Skylab. All internal
 
cables were enclosed in metal cable trays to prevent
 
abrasion and wear. In addition, fire stops were located
 
at intervals to constrain fire propagation.
 
In flight, the crewmen noted a tendency to use as
 
handholds all protrusions making it important to armour
 
cables. Also, they each noted that the tendency was
 
to control the position of the upper torso as they moved
 
about, allowing the feet to follow along without control,
 
often hitting whatever equipment was along the way.
 
By the end of the mission, the Skylab 4 crew reported
 
some bending of lightweight secondary structure located
 
along frequently used paths.
 
52. 	 Lesson: Window Design
 
While single-pane windows can be designed with sufficient
 
strength to be safe, enough uncertainty exists that dual
 
windows, i.e., double glazed, should be used wherever
 
possible. The Johnson Space Center standards for window
 
design should be used.
 
Background:
 
Twelve windows were built into the workshop cluster.
 
The JSC design specifications resulted in satisfactory
 
windows throughout. Only minor and infrequent fogging
 
and condensation occurred. However, the multispectral
 
photography experiment window in the Multiple Docking
 
Adapter was a single high-quality optical pane to prevent
 
distortion. The 18"t x 23" borosilicate glass pane was
 
1.6" thick and no leaks, cracks, distortions, or problems
 
occurred. However, uncertainties as to use, potential
 
damage, unknown manifestations of fracture mechanics
 
led to the installation of a removable inner pane and
 
an external cover was also provided.
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53. Lesson: Gaseous Oxygen and Nitrogen
 
The use of gaseous oxygen and nitrogen in lieu of
 
cryogenic storage simplified the design of the life support
 
system. Gaseous storage, required for long-term storage,
 
was perfectly satisfactory.
 
Background:
 
When the dry workshop concept was adapted, cryogenic
 
storage of 02 and N2 was discarded in favor of gaseous
 
storage. The simplification permitted the use of Saturn
 
and Gemini tanks as well as simplifying the test and
 
verification program. A multiple bottle storage facility
 
was designed for ease of isolation (and to use existing
 
tanks). No micrometeorite punctures or leaks of any
 
sort were experienced.
 
54. Lesson: Caution and Warning Memory
 
The caution and warning annunciator should have
 
a memory system such that if an out-of-tolerance parameter

subsequently returns to normal, the crew can interrogate
 
the system to find the malfunction.
 
Background:
 
The original design did not have this capability
 
and it was added during the development cycle as a result
 
of an analysis, and Apollo experience that some failures
 
were intermittent and would not be found without this
 
capability. It worked well in flight.
 
55. Lesson: Adjustable Caution and Warning Parameters
 
Caution and warning parameters should be capable
 
of being adjusted in flight or of being totally inhibited
 
if desired. An indication of the warning level and of
 
the status should be provided to insure a parameter is
 
not inadvertently set outside the useful range or turned
 
off accidentally.
 
Background:
 
Earlier caution and warning systems (Gemini and
 
Apollo) had fixed parameters and could not be inhibited.
 
Malfunctioning sensors could not be removed nor could
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adjustments be made as greater understanding of the systems
 
was generated. As a result, entire parameters were cut
 
from the system to prevent false indications. The Skylab
 
C&W system was designed so that parameters could be
 
inhibited but not adjusted. No problems were encountered
 
although a number of false warnings were generated.
 
None were due to C&W malfunctions.
 
Great care must be used in the formulation since
 
it would be easy to generate a false security by improper
 
adjustment of parameter level. Both flight and ground
 
indication of the level should be provided. This adjust­
ment capability was proposed after the basic C&W system
 
design was complete. In the case of Skylab, the addition
 
of a readout capability was judged to be prohibitively
 
costly at that time.
 
56. Lesson: Waste Management Facility
 
A separate and private toilet facility, properly
 
vented, is required for long missions.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab concept for a separate waste management
 
facility was considered to be mandatory when compared
 
to the Gemini/Apollo plastic bag approach. The desira­
bility of a private compartment for toilet facilities
 
does not Seem to require much debate. There was a general
 
consensus that the Apollo bag system was acceptable for
 
short duration, exploratory missions but a separate facility
 
was required if spaceflight was to be routine. 
57. Lesson: Medical Requirements for Collection of 
Feces and Urine 
The collection of feces and urine for medical purposes
 
is a very difficult task which requires a complex and
 
costly development. The collection of the waste products
 
and the in-orbit handling and processing is very time­
consuming. The requirement for such processing should
 
receive close examination before it is implemented.
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Background:
 
* Skylab medical experiments required the collection,
 
processing, storage, and return of the astronauts' waste
 
products. The techniques needed to collect, sample,
 
freeze, and store the urine, and those needed to collect,
 
dry, and store the feces, were complex and required costly
 
development programs. The Skylab medical results were
 
positive and satisfactory. A repeat of the experiments
 
or an expansion which requires new techniques should
 
have a large gain before it is undertaken.
 
The relatively simple waste elimination process on
 
Earth is a timeconsuming and difficult process in zero
 
gravity. It is complicated further by the experiment
 
requirements.
 
58. Lesson: Software Development
 
Software development should receive the same attention
 
and rigor as hardware development. Ground software should
 
not be an exception. Milestones should be established
 
and tracked with critical attention.
 
Background:
 
Space missions are just as dependent upon timely
 
and successful development of software as upon hardware.
 
It is traditionally difficult to establish firm milestones
 
which are definable and definite, and there is, therefore,
 
generally less understanding and visibility in the status
 
and progress of this less understood element.
 
The launch of Skylab was almost delayed due to the
 
status of the mission control center software. The basic
 
programs were available but many of the auxiliary programs
 
were not operable. A major effort was made on the last
 
weeks preceding the launch to speed up the software develop­
ment, but on launch day, two programs were still inoperable.
 
The maturity of the development (i.e., the nearness
 
to completion) is difficult to assess using only the
 
traditional approach of measuring the number of hours
 
of test. One reasonable measure is the number of program
 
open anomalies or program notes, which define computing
 
situations which should be avoided.
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59. Lesson: Timing Systems
 
A single accurate, universal timing system should
 
be provided for telemetry, navigation, and experiments.
 
Background:
 
Two timing systems were provided in Skylab: the
 
laboratory time-reference system which provided onboard
 
displays and time correlation with the instruments; and
 
the solar observatory time-reference system which provided
 
computer generated timing signals for navigation and
 
control and for the solar experiments. The two systems
 
were time correlated (to a degree) by: (1) a 1-pulse­
per-second interrupt signal which loaded the computer
 
with mission timing for further transfer, one a second,
 
to the experiments; and (2) by a 24-pulse-a-second signal
 
which generated a 50 bit computer status word which was
 
ultimately telemetered to the ground.
 
While these systems were satisfactory, greater analysis
 
of some experiment data could have been made had there
 
been closer synchronization of the computer and telemetry
 
timing.
 
60. Lesson: The Need for a Teleprinter
 
A teleprinter should be provided for data transmissions.
 
The teleprinter should have the capability of reproducing
 
line drawings.
 
Background:
 
Previous space programs used voice transmission
 
for data transfer. Skylab's one-way teleprinter, which
 
allowed for alphanumeric transmissions, allowed the
 
crew to collect and read permanent hard copy messages
 
at t~eir leisure, thus increasing crew efficiency and
 
message accuracy. However, frequent instances of need
 
arose where line drawings, schematics, and sketches would
 
have simplified the messages and increased the information
 
flow and comprehension.
 
1112 
61. Lesson: Message Identification
 
A single teleprinter message identification system

should be devised to allow the crew to relate the message
 
to a task.
 
Background:
 
Messages were generally sent at night so the flight
 
crew would have timely data for the day's activities
 
upon awakening. Messages were sent sequentially and
 
the crew cut the paper into message segments. Subsequent
 
amendments or additions necessitated an identification
 
system to assure the crew had the latest instructions.
 
62. Lesson: Teleprinter Workload
 
The teleprinter should be designed for a heavy workload
 
and the system should be designed to accommodate many
 
messages and much paper. A complete traffic analysis,
 
maintenance concept, and hazard analysis should be initiated
 
prior to hardware design.
 
Background:
 
Over 300 messages, using 3,600 feet of paper were
 
sent on Skylab. During the design phase, the evolving
 
realization of the usefulness of the teleprinter necessi­
tated design changes due to the increasing stowage (use
 
forecast), the increasing fire hazard (footage of paper),

increasing reliability requirements (replaceability of
 
units), and maintenance understanding (head cleaning).
 
63. Lesson: Two-Way Color Television Requirement
 
Two-way color television should be provided for
 
all future space programs for effective data flow and
 
communications. The required bandwidth and power should
 
be made available.
 
Background:
 
Air-to-ground color television was added to Skylab

relatively late in the development cycle. As a result
 
of the design and operational compromises required by

the timing of the decision, the potential communications
 
capability was not realized.
 
During the mission, numerous occasions arose where
 
the flight crew and ground would have benefitted by seeing
 
problem situations in addition to talking about them.
 
This was particularly true in the repair of malfunctioning

equipments. A slow scan system would be acceptable.
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64. Lesson: Television Tape Recorder Requirement
 
Since ground networks cannot provide full orbit
 
communication coverage, a tape recorder for television
 
should be provided. The tape recorder should provide
 
ground and flight indication of its status and should
 
be controllable from the ground or flight. The recorder
 
should be capable of rapid dump, or the system should
 
be capable of playback at the same time real time
 
television is being transmitted. Playback should be
 
backwards so that recording will not overplay undumped
 
television previously recorded.
 
Background:
 
A tape recorder provided for 30 minutes of delayed
 
transmission. Playback was controlled from the ground,
 
but recording was controlled by the crew. This was a
 
timeconsuming function particularly when the television
 
camera station was remote from the recorder.
 
A one-to-one record/playback speed was designed in
 
Skylab. Since television could be transmitted either
 
live or through the recorder, and since transmission
 
was limited by ground network coverage, no additional
 
television time was made available and the recorder was
 
useful only in that it permitted flexibility in flight
 
planning.
 
Front-to-back playback meant that extreme care had
 
to be exercised to prevent premature erasure of previously
 
recorded video. Since playback was accomplished during
 
relatively short ground passes, television recording
 
was generally not accomplished during playback periods.
 
The segmented playback to multiple ground stations
 
(some of which did not have the capability for real time
 
retransmission of the received signal to the mission
 
control center) put a burden on the ground editing system
 
to develop an accurate, sequential product, with no gaps
 
or duplications.
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65. Lesson: Television Camera Dynamic Range
 
The television cameras must be designed with a wide
 
dynamic range to accommodate out-the-window scenes as
 
well as the relatively dimly lit interior scenes.
 
Background:
 
The Skylab cameras were adequate but not exceptional.
 
Interior lighting is always less than out-the-window
 
lighting.
 
66. Lesson: Spacecraft Lighting
 
Spacecraft lighting should be designed to give correct
 
color temperatures for television viewing, color photo­
graphy, and for everyday living.
 
Background:
 
Skylab illumination was designed for lighting for
 
everyday living. As a result, additional measures were
 
needed to assure color fidelity in all mediums. Special
 
spot lighting was provided. A standard color bar was
 
permanently located at various stations around the space­
craft. This gave the ground technicians a standard setup
 
to use to adjust the signal.
 
67. Lesson: Private Communications
 
The capability to conduct private communications
 
should be provided. Secure communications is not needed.
 
Background:
 
Circumstances arose during the missions where it
 
was important to conduct frank and open coversations
 
without full public disclosures in real time. (Para­
phrased coversations were always distributed to the press).
 
Such open discussions, particularly between the flight
 
crew and the surgeon, helped in a full understanding
 
of the in-flight activities. Skylab ground system required
 
considerable reconfiguration for such interchanges.
 
Future systems should be capable of rapid reconfiguration.
 
No scrambling of messages was provided and, while
 
obviously potentially more private, the basic purpose
 
of the private communications was met by using the
 
existing system and only requiring that all monitors
 
be shut down.
 
68. Lesson: Cummunications for Morale Purposes
 
For long missions, the crew should have regularly
 
scheduled radio communications with their families for
 
morale purposes.
 
Background:
 
Every few days, each crewman was scheduled for
 
private telecommunication with his family. By being
 
scheduled regularly, no "emergency" was implied and,
 
therefore, no inhibition was placed upon these messages.
 
69. Lesson: End-to-End Communications Tests
 
Large vehicles, such as Skylab and space stations
 
cannot have end-to-end communications tests performed
 
prior to liftoff since they are never configured to be
 
in the operating mode while on the ground. Therefore,
 
a communications test laboratory must be provided to
 
simulate the system from voice to ear.
 
Background:
 
At no time during the test and preparation of the
 
vehicles were all components available for an end-to­
end test; i.e., voice, intercom assembly, transmitter,
 
ground receiver, network, mission control center, and
 
listener. The need for a simulation facility was not
 
recognized until late in the development cycle at which
 
time a laboratory was equpped. Late identification of
 
major facility requirements strains a financial system.
 
70. Lesson: Configuration of Test Articles
 
All test items used in qualification test programs
 
should be identical in configuration to the flight test
 
article and should be fabricated and assembled with the
 
same techniques and procedures as the flight article.
 
Background:
 
Frequently, there are minor differences between
 
test specimens or between the test specimen and the flight
 
unit. This is particularly true when the test program
 
is tightly constrained by time or money and is aggra­
vated when the test articles are expended in the test.
 
As an example of the trap, the Scout program

initiated an improvement program which involved the redesign

of the nozzle of the third stage motor. After one success­
ful ground test, a second firing resulted in a burn through
 
of the nozzle. Engineering analysis concluded that a
 
new propellant had been used which invalidated the nozzle
 
test. A third test was successful and the motor was
 
judged to be qualified. On the first flight test, the
 
nozzle experienced a burn through and the stage was des­
troyed, losing the spacecraft and the mission.
 
The true message of the second test was obscured
 
and misinterpreted.
 
71. Lesson: Experiment Objectives:
 
The true objective of an experiment should be
 
identified at the time of its inception, not just the
 
data which is desired.
 
Background:
 
All too frequently, experimenters concentrate their
 
efforts on the instruments they are building and the
 
data they wish to acquire without sufficient thought
 
about the knowledge they are really after. This results
 
in the late addition of corollary activities such as
 
ground-truth programs, calibration activities, 
or
 
control experiments. Since these activities can require

facilities and equipment, the costs can become a significant

portion of the total.
 
The post-data-collection activities are generally
 
understated and poorly thought out. Data reduction and
 
analysis must be included in the experiment costs.
 
72. Lesson: Schedule Reviews
 
Schedule reviews and examinations of data to insure
 
their accomplishment.
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Background:
 
Major reviews, such as PRR's, PDR's, CDR's, etc.,
 
are normally scheduled and tracked since the accomplish­
ment is a major milestone. However, periodic and regular
 
reviews of lesser events (such as residual safety concerns,
 
program requirements, contract status, weight status)
 
can easily be forgotten. Important items should be
 
identified and scheduled so all participants are aware
 
of and are prepared to discuss them fully. In Skylab,
 
"Base line Reviews" and Configuration Control Reviews
 
were frequently used as the scheduling medium.
 
73. Lesson: Schedule Adjustments'
 
The most efficient and least costly program is
 
accomplished as expeditiously as possible with a minimum
 
of premium labor. Schedule extensions to save current
 
year resources will result in program extensions and
 
resulting cost growth. Adjustments to program content
 
should be explored before the schedule is adjusted.
 
Background:
 
Every program is eventually faced with the need
 
to reduce current expenditures of resources. Initial
 
program plans generally establish the pace of a program
 
by the facilities, support equipment, and tooling planned.
 
Variations of that pace use the tools inefficiently and
 
stretch out a program or increase the use of manpower
 
to increase the pace. Either is costly since the latter
 
requires premium labor costs or the use of too many men
 
to do a job. The former requires that tools remain idle
 
and the work to be accomplished in later years. Even
 
if efficiency and inflation costs were constant (which,
 
of course, they are not) the overhead continues at a
 
relatively constant rate.
 
Program content can frequently be adjusted to bring
 
costs in line while maintaining the schedule. Backup
 
units, spares, test program adjustments, and experiments
 
can each be examined. Caution: When reducing the program
 
content, it is necessary that the effects be analyzed
 
and minimized. For example, when reducing backup units
 
it should be recognized that the flexibility of the test
 
verification program may be reduced unless alternate
 
plans are available.
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The reduction of near term funds at the expense
 
of schedule stretch out and cost growth must be recognized
 
at the highest levels of decision. All too frequently,
 
Congressional appropriations are reduced because of today's
 
program, and then there is great surprise when the program
 
grows. When inflation effects are included, deferment
 
of costs is, indeed, inefficient.
 
74. Lesson: Crew Time
 
Crew time in orbit is a valuable commodity and should
 
not be wasted by systems (and experiment) designs which
 
consume time without a positive benefit from the presence
 
of man. Design systems which use the mental ability
 
of man use man's mechanical abilities for routine functions
 
only when it results in a significant simplication
 
of the system or experiment.
 
Background:
 
Skylab was designed for one-shift operations for
 
the three-man crew. Thus, 48 man-hours a day were available
 
for useful work. From this total, the "overhead" had
 
to be subtracted for eating, personal hygiene, recreation,
 
exercise, discussions with ground personnel, preparations
 
for experiments, EVA, housekeeping, and cleanup. The
 
time spent collecting experiment data averaged about
 
17 hours a day.
 
Many experiments wasted crew time by requiring them
 
to perform tasks which could have been easily mechanized.
 
In some instances, the use of simple timers and sequences
 
would have freed the crew- for other tasks.
 
These experiments which were designed to permit
 
crew interaction and to use the decision-making capabili­
ties of the crewmen produced some of the more meaningful
 
data. Notable were the solar experiments and the visual
 
observation program. In both programs the crew was able
 
to enhance the results of observations and analysis.
 
,119
 
COMMENTS BY SKYLAB OFFICIALS
 
A. Introduction
 
Skylab, as is any large project, was the result of
 
much hard work, inspiration, dedication and genius of many
 
men, both in Government and industry. It was the product
 
of the management and technical skills of many experienced
 
people. It was felt to be appropriate to solicit from these
 
individuals any comment which they felt appropriate and
 
wished to submit for inclusion in this paper. Accordingly,
 
a letter was sent to each senior manager, asking him to
 
submit a short summary of what he considered the most signifi­
cant lessons learned on Skylab of a technical managerial
 
nature. A short letter was requested. Most indicated that
 
the desired brevity of their replies caused them to be discrimi­
natory in their choice and that more lessons were available
 
if more space would be provided. The replies are reproduced
 
here, with comments at appropriate.
 
B. Mr. Dale D. Myers
 
Mr. Myers was the Associate Administrator for Manned
 
Space Flight at the time of Skylab. Of his observations,
 
I judge the most important to be the admonition to assign
 
responsibility and authority and allow the individual to
 
do the assigned job. This principle was followed during
 
the ten days when the stricken Skylab workshop was on the
 
brink of disaster right after launch. Mr. Myers resisted
 
"taking over" and permitted the well-trained Skylab team
 
to prove itself. He was there for counsel and guidance
 
and he was always in charge, but he understood the chain
 
of command.
 
C. Dr. Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.
 
Dr. Kraft was (and is) the Director of Johnson Space
 
Center. His comments appropriately address the major finding
 
of the Skylab mission: a space station is a practical and
 
proper tool to be exploited by our nation. In addition,
 
Dr. Kraft recognizes keeping the end use (operations) clearly
 
in focus as the program is being developed.
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The management of the flight activities suggested by
 
Dr. Kraft deserves serious attention and has been difficult
 
to initiate early in a program. In Skylab, a 6-month long
 
review was undertaken in 1972 to coordinate the flight control
 
activitiy with the design activity. For flight management,

the Flight Management Team was developed because Skylab
 
was a multidisciplined space station. Such an approach
 
is recommended in a future space station.
 
Real-time data analysis requires an early definition
 
of the operational philosophy. If an autonomous space station
 
is planned, little ground analysis is needed. Conversely,
 
if the ground is to support systems management, or if earth­
based scientists are to participate in experiments, extensive
 
real-time data analysis is needed. Real-time analysis is
 
a costly undertaking.
 
D. Mr. Leland F. Belew
 
Mr. Belew was the Skylab Program Manager at the Marshall
 
Space Flight Center. His comments concern the future uses
 
of space station and can be summarized as suggesting that
 
future programs have greater flexibility than Skylab by
 
having systems which require less development involvement
 
by the users (principal investigators) and, thus, develop
 
more versatility. As Mr. Belew points out, the. student
 
experiments were a "new" approach to involvement by the
 
investigator and could form the basis for future space station
 
experiment development. The student experiments were accommo­
dated by virtue of NASA assuming all development responsibility.
 
(This was logical, since high school students had no resources­
of their own). An alternative approach for future space
 
stations is to provide flexible accommodations and to maximize
 
the participation of the investigator in the experiment
 
development. In this way, the investigator will have all
 
responsibility for the success of his experiment and for
 
the funding and development as well.
 
E. Lt. General Thomas W. Morgan, USAF
 
Lt. General Thomas Morgan was the Skylab Program Manager
 
at the Kennedy Space Center during most of thedevelopment
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phase. Of General Morgan's many appropriate comments, I
 
believe the observation that the successful development
 
of a large program is dependent upon a clear understanding
 
of the magnitude of the undertaking and an acceptance of
 
the task at all levels. Programs with marginal support
 
and funding have traditionally suffered from overruns and
 
cancellations.
 
General Morgan's observation concerning the magnitude
 
of the effort involved in the experiment portion of Skylab
 
is particularly valid. Frequently experiments were proposed,
 
and accepted for development and flight, which did not
 
have a well thought out set of objectives or even a design.
 
The program costs could not be adequately estimated. After
 
several experiences, Skylab instituted better controls and
 
better evaluations prior to acceptance of the task.
 
General Morgan correctly states that Skylab technology
 
was conservative, as a matter of policy. For long duration
 
spacecraft, it was felt that tried and proven approaches
 
were proper.
 
F. Mr. Richard G. Smith
 
Mr. Smith, currently the Deputy Director of the.Marshall
 
Space Flight Center, was the manager of the Saturn project
 
for Skylab (and much of Apollo as well). The thoughts out­
lined closely parallel many of the lessons learned. Since
 
Mr. Smith's experiences closely parallel the author's, that
 
is not surprising. It is appropriate to emphasize the point
 
regarding systems engineering. Experience has shown that
 
the individual who truly thinks as a "systems engineer"
 
is rare indeed. The talent does not seem to be one which
 
can be taught--it must be acquired. A program manager should
 
be careful to include an excellent systems engineer on his
 
staff. Mr. Smith did not cite it as a "lesson" but his
 
observation concerning technical "checks and balances" deserves
 
highlighting. Overlapping responsibilities and interests
 
have typified NASA developments. While costly, his approach
 
does result in a higher success ratio since there are two
 
factors working for technical excellence: the check of
 
one organization on another, and the knowledge of one organi­
zation that another will be looking at their product.
 
G. Mr. Eugene F. Kranz
 
Mr. Kranz was the Director of Flight Operations for
 
Skylab and was responsible for the flight operations. The
 
point made regarding "scale effect" should be seriously
 
considered in any space station design. Adequate design
 
practices for small spacecraft may be improper for a large
 
station. The previously mentioned bussing of the electrical
 
power systems (workshop and ATM) is a good example. Using
 
the logic which was adequate for Gemini and Apollo, the
 
systems were designed as independent systems, and it was
 
only mid-way in the development cycle that the decision
 
was made to join the two.
 
Mr. Kranz' last point regarding the inclusion of opera­
tions personnel early in the development program parallels
 
the observation of Dr. Kraft and should be reemphasized.
 
The inclusion of the "user" (i.e., operations personnel)
 
must be made in the initial design. All too frequently
 
the operation is brought into the program after the initial
 
design concepts are formed, and the operational requirements
 
are changes to the design and, as such, are costly in time
 
and resources.
 
H. Dr. Walter Kapryan
 
Dr. Kapryan was Director of Launch Operations at the
 
Kennedy Space Center. The most vital lesson outlined is
 
that only flight-ready spacecraft should be shipped to the
 
launch site. In Skylab, this objective was modified in
 
some instances when the experiment integration was accomplished
 
at the factory using non-flight equipment. At KSC seemingly
 
minor changes in the experiment resulted in interface mis­
matches. Accomplishing the initial experiment integration
 
at KSC would be possible only if the spacecraft interfaces
 
were kept flexible and the experiment interfaces were simple.
 
For a space station such a design philosophy is mandatory
 
since it will be impossible to forsee all of the instruments
 
to be flown. Thus, the design must be flexible and versatile.
 
I. Captain Charles Conrad, Jr., Astronaut
 
Captain Conrad was the Commander of the first manned
 
Skylab mission. Captain Conrad also seems to believe that
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the usefulness of man in space is the primary lesson of
 
Skylab. The Skylab-2 crew which he led proved that man
 
could repair and fix hardware in space just as well as on
 
the ground. The fourth point of'Captain Conrad's comments
 
is related to data flow. The amount of data accumulated
 
on Skylab was large C3xI01 2 data bits of telemetry alone)
 
but it does not compare with the data capacity of future
 
6
systems (Shuttle will transmit 50xi0 bits/sec.). The telem­
etry data plus the recorded data plus the data recorded
 
by film was not reduced to a form suitable for analysis
 
by the principle investigators for over a year after the
 
last recovery. The data reduction task had been underesti­
mated.
 
J. Captain Alan L. Bean, Astronaut
 
Captain Bean was the Commander of the second Skylab
 
mission. His comments can be summarized as an expression
 
that the activities man is capable of on earth can also
 
be accomplished in space if the designer adequately translates
 
his design thinking to the new environment. Earlier manned
 
space flight experience with EVA, for example, led many
 
(including the author) to be extremely wary of it. as a routine
 
operational tool. Skylab proved that it is an extremely
 
useful and flexible operational mode. It does require adequate
 
hand-holds and restraints and the designer must "think in
 
zero gravity" and remember fundamental principle of force,
 
momentum and reaction. As Astronaut Bean states, proper
 
preparation in a neutral bouyancy facility is also required.
 
He also voices the difficulty in communicating from
 
space where all thoughts must be expressed by words, and
 
those words are also interpreted by uninitiated newsmen
 
who may be seeking the sensational. The ability to have
 
private communications on future space stations should be
 
included in the designs.
 
K. Col. Gerald P. Carr, Astronaut
 
Col. Gerald Carr was the Commander of the third Skylab
 
mission. He too argues that Skylab proved the case for
 
man in space. Col. Carr and his crew, among other things,
 
serviced the leaking coolant loop. Without coolant Skylab
 
would not have been able to carry on. Without a man in
 
orbit to locate the coolant line, to attach the valve for
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fluid transfer, to test the system for leaks, and to transfer
 
the coolant to the system, the equipment would have been
 
extremely complex and ponderous if it could have been designed
 
at all. Col. Carr expresses most succinctly the need for
 
considering long duration space flight as a "routine operation"
 
as contrasted with the more event-oriented missions of Mercury,
 
Gemini, and Apollo. The high-tension, heroic activities
 
of the past had to be replaced by lower key, day-to-day
 
routines with adequate time for work, thought, and relaxation.
 
L. Dr. Robert A. Parker, Astronaut
 
Dr. Parker was the Program Scientist for Skylab. He
 
argues for early inclusion of the scientific community in
 
the development, particularly in the operations development.
 
It is vital that the operations personnel (ground and flight
 
crews) understand the objectives and problems of the investi­
gators. Conversely, the investigators can better plan their
 
experiments if they know of the operational constraints.
 
To Dr. Parker's observation that science planning be
 
under a single individual, it should be added that that
 
individual must have the trust of each investigator as well
 
as the understanding and confidence of the operational personnel.
 
Such an individual is not easily found, and Skylab was fortunate
 
in having Dr. Parker.
 
Dr. Parker also recognizes the need for private communi­
cations in future programs and the desirability of excess
 
consumables.
 
M. Mr. Kenneth P. Timmons
 
Mr. Timmons was the Manager of the Martin Marietta
 
Corporation effort on the Skylab Multiple Docking Adapter.
 
Mr. Timmons observations are well founded. Orderly docu­
mentation produces an orderly program. Documentation is
 
frequently identified as being a cause of excess program
 
costs. Excess documentation, in the form of unnecessary
 
reports and paperwork is costly and should be eliminated.
 
Orderly control of a complex program requires control docu­
mentation, and a large program cannot be successfully concluded
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without the proper "paper" controls. Control documentation
 
should be planned eanly in the program. The second item
 
is one which each manager must bear in mind. Frequently,
 
the design engineers become enamored with sophisticated
 
computerized analyses and simulation (a typical load analyses
 
on the Shuttle program takes weeks to perform on the most
 
sophisticated computers) and forget to use the simplest
 
of physical and mechanical principles first.
 
N. Mr. Raymond A. Pepping
 
Mr. Pepping was the Manager of the McDonnell-Douglas
 
Astronautics Company efforts on Skylab. The control and
 
assessment of changes in a development program is always
 
difficult. The change summary package was a useful manage­
ment tool and should be considered for large programs.
 
Also, Item 5, the use of a Trade Study "bank account" made
 
it possible for the module manager to get quick studies
 
underway without a long negotiation.
 
The Airlock Module was initially under the technical
 
direction of JSC and, subsequently, the direction wa changed
 
to MSFC. This was a difficult transition and Mr. Pepping
 
advises against it in the future.
 
0. Mr. Fred Sanders
 
Mr. Sanders was the Manager of the McDonnell-Douglas
 
Astronautics Company orbital workshop project. Mr. Sanders'
 
observation concerning subsystem managers is appropriate
 
and always timely. This observation was made on Gemini,
 
Apollo, Skylab, and recently, on Shuttle. The identification
 
of subsystem managers should be given early attention.
 
The observation that decisions should be scheduled is worthy
 
of considerable attention. The NASA has recently adopted
 
the practice of preparing a "countdown" for major decisions.
 
Each and all of the steps needed for a decision are listed
 
and scheduled. Obviously such a process is not necessary
 
when the decision is one which only requires a clear cut
 
selection of an option. However, most key decisions are
 
characterized by a number of prior actions (i.e., completion
 
of studies, costing of options, identification and agreement
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by affected parties) which must precede the decision and
 
are required to insure the correct decision is made. The
 
use of a written countdown can organize the decision process.
 
P. Mr. Haggai Cohen
 
Mr. Cohen was the Director of Reliability, Quality
 
and Safety for the Skylab Program. Mr. Cohen's considerable
 
missile and space system experience has resulted in some
 
appropriate comments. For emphasis, I would highlight his
 
second observation: the more you plan ahead, the less you
 
will be surprised.
 
Q. Mr. Kenneth S. Kleinknecht
 
Mr. Kleinknecht was the Skylab Manager at the Johnson
 
Space Center. His point regarding commonality of systems
 
is worthy of considerable note. Skylab was designed by
 
different design teams, at different locations, at different
 
times. Switches were different, displays varied, methods
 
of operation were not comparable. A stronger control of
 
minor design standards should have been instituted earlier.
 
The statements concerning zero gravity should be reviewed
 
carefully by space station designers. Zero gravity can
 
be used as an aid, if properly considered. In Skylab more
 
could have been done to utilize the environment. Skylab
 
used "one-g" orientation in the workshop and little use
 
was made of walls and ceilings for storage. This was done
 
consciously to provide the crews with an orientation; however,
 
more innovative use of storage areas was possible.
 
R. Dr. George E. Mueller-

Dr. Mueller was the Associate Administrator for Manned
 
Space Flight through the Gemini and Apollo Programs. He
 
also directed the initial and formative stages of Skylab.
 
It was he who first conceived of the cluster concept and
 
gave it the initial start. The importance of providing
 
a habitat which encourages long duration space missions
 
is one which he emphasized in those early days. The Loewy-

Snaith Associates were under contract in the design phase
 
to develop comfortable living quarters. The wardroom concept,
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with separate sleep compartments was one result. Unfortunately,
 
Skylab was built more like a naval ship than a home. More
 
should be done on the next space station to encourage the
 
permanent use.
 
As can be seen from his comments, Dr. Mueller is a
 
staunch advocate and supporter of a permanent earth orbiting
 
space station. His comments concerning materials processing
 
highlight a most promising application. The Skylab materials
 
processing experiments have just begun to explore the field
 
of new processes and products formed in zero gravity. The
 
formation of large, pure crystals, the formulation of material
 
mixes not possible on earth, the separation of materials
 
with closely similar densities by electrophoresis--each
 
has the promise of great economic benefit in the future.
 
S. Mr. John H. Disher
 
Mr. Disher served as the Deputy Director of the Skylab
 
Program from its earliest inception (as Apollo Applications)
 
through the completion of the flight phase. His experiences,
 
therefore, cover all phases of program development. The
 
observation that the lessons of development are learned
 
and rehearsed is particularly appropriate and the objective
 
of the Skylab "Lessons Learned" documents is to help transmit
 
those experiences from program to program. Experience is,
 
unfortunately, a very difficult commodity to market. The
 
very difficult task of establishing proper communications
 
between interdisciplinary design groups has been of concern
 
on all large projects. The use of subsystem project managers
 
is strongly urged when the subsystems are complex with inter­
disciplinary design interfaces. The designation of a project
 
"chief engineer" with no programmatic responsibilities other
 
than design has been adopted in NASA. It is hoped that
 
an experienced engineer, unencumbered by financial, con­
tractual, or schedule responsibilities, will be able to
 
provide a top-level interdisciplinary examination of-the
 
project engineering details.
 
A word of caution concerning Mr. Disher's proposal
 
for a continuing review of design requirements: when
 
changing design requirements, extreme caution must be used
 
to insure that the stability of the design is not seriously
 
perturbed. Lack of stability in requirements means lack
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of stability in design. Schedule slips and financial over­
runs can easily result. A review of design requirements
 
on critical systems and on systems which are encountering
 
development difficulties can be fruitful. Frequently the
 
design or the design-verification tests can be simplified,
 
resulting in improvements in performance and schedule and
 
reductions in cost requirements.
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Dale 	 D.Myers 
President 
North American Aircraft Operations 
2230 East Imperial Highway "- pcy' _o t 3 
El Segundo,California. 0245 Rockwell " -- 3i: 05 
-213) 647-5695 International CEl VED 
December 4, 1975 	 ' -
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
Deputy Associate Administrator
 
for Manned Space Flight
 
National Aeronautics & Space
 
Administration
 
600 Independence Avenue, SW
 
Washington, D. C. 20546
 
Dear 	Bill: 
Responding to your request, here are some thoughts I've 
had on managerial lessons for program managers. I'm 
sure many of them sound like motherhood, but as you 
know, some of the most obvious ideas are the hardest to 
carry out. 
(1) 	 Get good, experienced, dedicated people 
-who can communicate well. 
(2) 	 Give them a clearly understood, agreed to 
set of objectives and stable funding. 
(3) 	 Give them the authority to carry out their 
part of the program, but insist on "no 
surprises". 
(4) 	 Understand program progress by asking the-
right 	que s tions. 
(5) 	 Control major changes at the top. ]on't 
-	 make changes to the objectives; only the 
means of reaching them. 
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Mr. William C. Schneider 
December 4, 1975 
Page 2 
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(6) 	 Encourage and demand team work; give awards
 
to the "stars".
 
(7) 	 Keep the balance of cost, schedule and performance. 
Attack all three, all through the program. 
(8) 	 Don't forget the Russian slogan, "The 'better' is the 
enemy of the 'good'. ' Sophisticated engineering is 
that which produces the simplest device to meet the 
requirement. 
(9) 	 Never give up! Necessity is the mother of invention, 
and the saving of Sky Lab's mission is a great 
example of what a well trained team can do in the 
face of what initially looked like insurmountable 
obstacles. 
(10) 	 Plan ahead. Stay ahead of today's problems with 
some of your time and energy, looking for the 
problems (and opportunities) which will come up in 
the future. 
Finally, be of great courage -- like a guy I know who is 
undertaking a Doctor's thesis at this stage in his career. 
Best 	of luck, 
Dale D. Myers 
President 
North American Aircraft Operations 
131 
/rt NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
 
- LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
 
A / HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058
 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR September 24, 1975 
Mr. William C. Schneider 
NASA Headquarters, Code MD 
Washington, D. C. 20546 
Dear Bill: 
Enclosed are my thoughts on the most important managerial 
or technical lessons learned from Skylab. 
Good luck on your thesis. 
Sincerely, 
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr. 
Director
 
Enclosure 
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1. Man can,work and operate for periods up to.3 months in space at 
zero gravity with no, serious physical or mental effects. 
2. The space station is an ideal platform for conducting observations 
of the Earth and for future uses of the space environment. 
3. Future activities in space involving large facilities should be 
designed for proper manned interfaces to allow appropriate use -of 
man as a trained observer, laboratory technician, experimentor 
and maintenance mechanics. 
4. Preplanned activities are extremely important to assure proper 
dividends on the investment. This includes careful attention to the 
need (or lack of need) for real time data analysis. 
5.. Managing such an activity in flight (space station) is as important 
as the inflight activity itself and should be given adequate thought and 
planning. 
6. Continuous manned space stations at varying inclinations and at 
synchronous altitudes would give this country a tremendous potential 
for technological and-economics gains. To remain pre-eminent in the 
world one must plan to conduct this kind of space activity. 
7. A whole new era of space manufacturing will begin when space 
stations and their supply become economically feasible. 
8. Space stations are obviously an integral part of the next generation 
of steps to be taken in the exploitation and exploration of space. 
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"75OCT[28 nio. 52 Marshall Space Flight Center 
RECEIVED Code EA01 
C1-7\CflDE M Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812 
O 17ctn' cnnv to----------
OCT 21 1975 ±f Co-y to _- -. . 
Mr. William C. Schneider 
NASA Headquarters 
Code MD 
Washington, D.C. 20546 
<-r - - - - - ­
2r 'e reAy for 
Dear Bill: -i. .......e- zI of
 
The lessons learned from Skylab, relative to space flight develop­
went and operations programs, that are somewhat unique and of 
particular importance to future space station activities are: 
a. Establish interface definitions (requirement) between the 
user (experimentors/PI's/commercial, etc.) and the space craft 
(space station/space lab) early. 
b. Provide a data system that eliminates or minimizes the 
involvement of intermediate processing prior to receipt by the users 
(experimentors/PI's/conmmercial, etc.). 
c. The management concept for future space station activities 
must accommodate a much broader sector of users that relate to the 
more basic national needs. Skylab forms a sound base of reference 
to more fully develop the future management concepts. As an 
example, the student experiments and earth resources instruments 
were accommodated very successfully at a relatively late date in the 
Skylab Program. 
d. Skylab provides a sound basis for planning the future activities 
of man relative to space stations. There appears to be no reasonable 
limit to what man can do in space. This was not known before Skylab. 
e. Skylab demonstrated the ability to successfully respond to 
a broad spectrum of problems and to seize upon unplanned opportunities. 
There is a tendency to continuously undersell what can be done. It is 
suggested a more optimistic approach be taken on future space station 
programs. 
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f. Maximum use of existing hardware, concepts, designs, 
facilities, equipment, etc., coupled with more analyses, as 
compared to additional testing, is a sound approach. This approach 
must be pursued to help keep development and hardware costs under 
control.. 
Much success in your pursuit of a doctor's degree in Aeronautical 
Engineering. Having survived Skylab with much success, you have 
more than earned the degree! 
Sincerely, 
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HEADQUARTERS SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS ORGANIZATION (AFSC) 
POST OFFICE BOX 92960, WORLDWAY POSTAL CENTER 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFOR14J $ 2 p : 
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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER Info Copy to J----
Mr. William C. Schneider ..........
 
NASA Headquarters
 
Code MD Rec'd inCode L_
 
Washington, DC 20546 Control Number ........
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Dear Bill Prepare reply for
 
signature of ---

I was surprised to learn that you are now back in school again. I must say
 
you have more courage than I to undertake the rigors of the academic environ­
ment again.
 
You had asked that I give you my thoughts on what I felt were the five most
 
important managerial or techhical lessons learned from Skylab about space
 
flight development and operations programs. I will certainly be happy to
 
give you my thoughts on this subject though they are not necessarily listed­
in order of priority.
 
1. I suppose the one thing in today's envi.ronment that sticks out in
 
my mind most vividly is that one should not undertake a major space effort
 
such as Skylab without adequate funding and support by both the Congress
 
and the people. Marginal or submarginal support drives many programmatic
 
decisions in a very adverse way and, in my opinion, the shuttle today is
 
suffering from this type of environment.
 
2. Once a national program such as Skylab is formulated, it should
 
have a strong management team uninhibited by local center prerogatives.
 
I felt that on Skylab many times our decisions were compromised by this
 
factor.
 
3. Management of the experiment program, I think, caught many of us
 
by surprise in that we underestimated the magnitude and complexity of this
 
effort. In a program such as Skylab where you have a large investigator/
 
experimental community vying for such things as power, space, and orbital
 
considerations, it is essential that this be closely controlled.
 
4. Many times I felt we were not bold enough in applying the latest
 
technologies in the development of our Skylab program. Since this was a
 
national effort and represented the cutting edge of our country's technology,
 
I think we could have more profitably exploited new concepts, materials,
 
and design approaches.
 
5. I suppose the final point I would make, and it was as true in
 
Skylab as it is in many of our current space programs, is the importance
 
of highly reliable electronic components in the many systems and sub­
systems that go into such a vehicle. This is where I think we need to
 
spend more of our dollars and more of our manpower resources in producing
 
highly reliable, quality hardware.
 
I hope you find the above useful in preparation of your thesis, and I am
 
looking forward to seeing you again in the near future.
 
Sincerely
 
THOMAS W. MORGAN
 
Lt General, USAF
 
Commander
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Mrx. William Schneider 
Office of Space Flight ----------
Code: M". 
NASA Headquarters ->-'-- :, 
Washington, D. C. 20546 - -. -. 
Dear Bill: -----. --
I apologize for beifig so delinquent in responding to your request for 
lessons learned on Skylab as they apply to future space stations. You 
asked that I give my opinion on the five most important managerial 
and technical lessons learned. I find boiling it down to five to be 
rather difficult, yet at the same time, when I look at the more 
important aspects, in my opinion some of them'fall into the category 
of lessons relearned. I hope they will be of benefit to you. 
1. In retrospect, I find that there has been a lack of complete 
system engineering. I feel that the agency, and in this context our 
contractors, are excellent subsystem system-engineers as compared 
to total systems engineers. We sometimes let the less than obvious 
slip by causing near catastrophies or expenses later in the program. 
Obviously, from the Skylab standpoint, the heat shield is the most 
outstanding example, but I believe in looking at the program that there 
are many cases of interaction of subsystems causing a program problem 
and later costs that could have been avoided with appropriate analyses 
at the beginning. 
-2. Skylab Program, as most programs, underestimated the 
complexity of the software required. The operational software used 
in the support equipment during the mission was basically the 
responsibility of the using organization. On the surface this sounds 
like an ideal arrangement, but in fact, the operations people of Skylab 
were also the operations people of Apollo, therefore, sufficient 
attention was given to the early development of the software and a 
crisis evolved after Apollo and through most of the Skylab mission. 
138 
a 
I believe that it is of vital importance to any program that the tools, 
whether they be software or hardware, be developed independent of 
the operating organization. This approach does two things: (1) It 
eliminates the problem of lack of attention if the operating people are 
involved in a ctLrrent program, (2) Probably more important, it 
creates the envii-onment of a check and balance where the using 
organization exercises the tools given to it and has an opportunity 
to find deficiencies, yet at the same time interact those deficiencies 
with the designer. Quite often the operations people overlook some 
subtle requirements from a technical standpoint in order to improve 
the operational position. This is not by intent, but oversight, in order 
to make the operations more efficient. 
3. If you look at the Skylab Program, it had a long evolution from 
a wet workshop, which I think never would have worked, into a very 
complex one-of-a-kind space station. I am not being critical of the 
evolution of the Skylab Program, but I think in retrospect, it is 
obviously not the way to do a low cost program. One needs to do a 
thorough job in establishing requirements of the program prior to 
initiating it. I think you can use Skylab as an example of evolution 
without being critical of it since we all understand the why and 
wherefore, but obviously programs cannot proceed this way under 
today's budgetary constraints. 
4. The Skylab Program demonstrated beyond any shadow of a 
doubt the flexibility and adaptability of man to solve problems. With 
any complex long-life hardware, you greatly benefit from the capability 
of man to do on-the-spot repairs, even though not previously planned. 
The contrary argument to man, of course, is the additional complexity 
that he adds to a system to support his life, but I think this complexity 
is far offset by what benefits he brings. 
5. This item may relate somewhat to item one, but we should 
never underestimate the importance of the small details in the success 
of the program or experiment. Each element, no matter how 
apparently insignificant it appears, more often than not is a single­
point failure in the successful operation of a t6tal system. I think that 
if we were redesigning Skylab today, we should add the capability for man, 
to enter many more subsystems than we did with the actual design. 
These details add complexity, yet add flexibility and maintainability. 
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Each one must be weighed independently to see whether it benefits 
or detracts from the operation of the system. I was once told by 
an ihdividual that I was worrying too much about the details and not 
enough about the big picture. The -only problem was that the details 
were what was killing me, not the big picture. We should not allow 
anyone to belittle the small details because they can be the governing 
factors before tha program is over. 
Bill, I hope these thoughts are of some-help to you. -I am not sure 
that they are the most outstanding lessons learned, but they are, in 
my opinion, important ones that are applicable to the space station 
and Shuttle, or any other program. Again, I would like to reiterate 
one point. I know that we always try to -organize in the most efficient 
manner to get the most cost-effective job, but failure is never cost 
effective, and we should never allow ourselves to get in a position 
where we don't have a check and balance in the system. An example 
of what I mean--I think Kappy, Ike Rigell, and launch vehicle people 
have always lookd -at us at Marshall thinking "those guys don't really 
know what they are doing and-I am going to satisfy myself that they 
have done a good job. If That attitude causes a lot of questions to be 
asked. Many are easily answered and are no problem, yet, a few 
bring to light oversights that could be catastrophic. That element of 
one group designing and another group operating gives a check and 
balance that I think should never be lost. It is a friendly competition 
that both sides enjoy and appreciate. It keeps both the designer and 
operator on their toes and more productive. 
Good luck on the thesis! 
Sincerely, 
Richard G. Smith 
Deputy Director 
SEP 2 91975 
Johnson Space Center
 
Code CA
 
Houston, TX 77058
 
Action Ccr-- to ----------

Mr. William C. Schneider I---------
NASA Headquarters -------­--
Code MD -
Washington, DC 20546 ----- -... 
Onr:~~~.-."- T . . . . 
Dear Bill: -
I thank you for the opportunity to comment on the "lessons learned" 
during Skylab and their applications to future programs. "Lessons 
learned" frequently exist only as an impression and, as such, my 
comments will range from specifics of those things that we should do 
or not do to an impression that essentially states "I do not fully 
understand--but I should try to be more aware in the future." in 
other words, in many cases, I had an impression that may or may not
 
have application to a future task. The "lessons learned" that I will
 
subsequently discuss are as follows:
 
a. Large space vehicle scale effects.
 
b. Generic versus specific task training.
 
c. Integrated systems design and operations.
 
d. Standardization and commonality.
 
e. Premission preparation operations.
 
To a great extent, the above listing has impressed me sufficiently that
 
in developing our operations concepts, establishing flight systems
 
requirements, and defining specific operating plans, I have utilized
 
the Skylab "lessons learned" quite extensively. To a great extent,
 
the application of these "lessons learned" can be seen throughout our
 
Shuttle planning.
 
a. Large space vehicle scale effects - This topic is probably the
 
most difficult to discuss because it constitutes dn impression and
 
implies that maybe we should approach future flignt systems design in a
 
different way. Prior to Skylab, all of the space vehicles NASA designed
 
were relatively small and, as such, the flight systems required unique
 
packaging and to a great extent, vehicle design, assembly, and testing
 
was done at a few locations. These spacecraft had relatively short
 
cable runs, fluid lines, and the resultant design lended itself to
 
analysis. On Skylab, for the first time, we were faced with extremely
 
long cable runs and fluid lines, considerations of different vehicle
 
dynamics and other large systems design. The designer was given
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significant latitude in the layout of components and, ingeneral, the
 
resultant design did not lend to easy analysis. During Skylab, I
 
'believe many of our problems could directly be traced to the fact that
 
we expected the flight systems to perform with the reliability that was
 
achieved during "Apollo," which was a small spacecraft. However, we
 
did not adequately consider in either the design or operations the fact
 
that this spacecraft "Skylab" was a beast of a different type. I have
 
probably explained this very poorly, so let me try to put it in fewer
 
'words. Our manned space flight, design experience prior to Skylab
 
was in the design, test, and operations of small spacecraft. Overnight
 
we moved into a spacecraft that was several orders of magnitude larger.
 
We did not adequately temper our small spacecraft experience when we
 
applied this experience to the Skylab vehicle. There are many con­
.clusions you can draw from the above. For instance, is it better to
 
develop a single thermal control system that services the entire
 
spacecraft or isitbetter to develop several thermal control systems
 
to serve areas of the spacecraft? The same question can be applied
 
against the-power generation and distribution system. When it comes to
 
testing, can we achieve reliability inlarge spacecraft design when
 
formal testing of the integrated system is either impossible or would
 
result in high test and checkout costs. How does the test and checkout
 
problem impact systems design? There are many questions oF a similar
 
nature that could come under this scale effects "lessons learned."
 
I consider this to be the major concern relative to the design of the
 
basic Orbiter and some of the larger payloads. Overall, I feel-uneasy
 
since I believe we should have learned more in this area.
 
b. Generic versus specific task training - All previous space
 
programs utilized a highly optimized training program for flight crew
 
personnel. -We took this same basic approach for all areas of flight

operations; that is,the level of training and proficiendy in all tasks
 
was set as "the highest that could be achieved." During the'Skylab

Program, the crews adequately performed many tasks for which they had
 
not been specifically trained. I believe it is possible to significantly
 
cut crew training time and costs by taking a more generalized approach
 
to training for non-time critical tasks. Inthis latter case,-I can
 
include almost all phases of flight with the exception of launch,
 
rendezvous, docking, and reentry. I believe it is practical to decrease
 
specific training in some areas of flight systems, flight dynamics, and
 
crew tasks such as EVA. As a result, I would expect that crew training
 
times will decrease bY at least 20-30 percent from previous programs,

and possibly by as much as 60-75 percent as the Orbiter and crew
 
training program matures.
 
c. Integrated systems design and operations - Inessence, the
 
"lessons learned" here is that systems -must be managed from a central
 
control position within the spacecraft. In Skylab, we essentially had
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three locations for control of power generation and distribution. There
 
should have been only one location. The same can be said for most
 
Skylab systeirs with the exception of the attitude and pointing control
 
system, and the experiments themselves. The Skylab design approach was
 
costly from a standpoint of design, checkout, procedures development,
 
crew training, and flight planning. I believe that you also felt strongly
 
about this when you made the decision to manage Spacelab mission indepen­
dent systems as an integral part of the Orbiter systems. Significant
 
cost savings can be achieved in design of future spacecraft by taking
 
the above approach. itmay be noted, however, that this approach may
 
contradict some of the conclusions from the "scale effects lessons
 
learned" described previously. Considering this "lessons Tearned"
 
and the "scale effects lessons learned," it may be worthwhile to
 
consider each system from both standpoints rather than trying to
 
establish a generalized design guideline.
 
d. Standardization and commonality - One of the more beneficial
 
aspects of the Shuttle Program involved a higher degree of standardiza­
tion in the way flight operations does its business. To a great extent,­
all consoles, displays, communication keysets, offline reports, and
 
ground procedures were standardized for Skylab. Significant standardi­
zation was achieved in methods and techniques for training (at least
 
for the flight controllers). Inessence, we eliminated a considerable
 
portion of the personal tailoring of facilities and training programs
 
to an individual's desires. As a result, I believe we obtained' the
 
confidence that an even higher degree of standardization was possible
 
and practicable for the Shuttle Program. As a result, we are base­
lining standard flight control rooms, standard console facilities,
 
standardized modular procedures, and flight plans. To do the Shuttle
 
job requires an approach as described above. The initial steps in
 
Skylab have given us the confidence that our goal is achievable during
 
ths Shuttle Program.
 
e. Premission preparation operations - This "lessons learned"
 
is probably the most valuable one derived from Skylab and itis simple
 
to define. All previous operations planning was done on an organiza­
tional basis; that is,flight planners developed their plans
 
semi-independently of systems and trajectory personnel. The systems
 
planners, indeveloping their consummablesworked semi-independently
 
of the flight planners and trajectory personnel, and so on, and so on.
 
As a result, significant disparities frequently resulted and an almost
 
endless series of coordination meetings and reviews were needed to put
 
it all together. During Skylab and, in particular, due to the overlap
 
of Apollo and terminal Skylab preparation, we needed to "put it all
 
together" on a more effective basis and with fewer personnel. We took
 
a team approach where all team elements were working under the direc­
tion of a flight director, This required a lot of agreements at lower
 
supervisory levels, cutting across organizational lines. The overall
 
effectivity of the initial planning efforts from July 1972 through
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January 1973 improved significantly. During the period between Skylab
 
missions, we collocated representatives of each of the operations
 
planning discipline and the overall planning quality and efficiency
 
further increased. The key thing is that the operations planning is a
 
job that needs an integrated approach. Trajectory, consumables, systems,
 
network, and flight planning and training personnel must be working
 
as an integrated team to be effective: The integrated team concept
 
is the very heart of the Shuttle operations phase baseline operations
 
plan. This approach is one of the techniques in reducing operations
 
manpower costs.
 
The above "lessons learned," I believe, are the most significant from
 
my viewpoint. There are many; many others; however, the process of
 
translating these "lessons learned" into an application is frequently
 
difficult. My greatest frustration is in seeing programs continue
 
down the line quite independent of recent experiences, but I guess
 
thats life. I am interested in getting your list of what you think
 
were the principle "lessons learned" during Skylab.
 
Best of luck in continuing toward your degree. Hope to see you next
 
time I am in Washington and maybe I can clarify some of the words I
 
have used above.
 
Cheers.
 
1ne Kranv
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REPLY TO 	 pCIE'"ATN OF: . LA-PLN-2/294-1 	 OT 2 2 1975 
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
NASA Headquarters
 
Mail Code: MD
 
Washington, 6. C. 20546
 
Dear Bill:
 
The attached is in answer to your request for my opinion on
 
the five most important managerial or technical lessons
 
learned from Skylab. You will note that my submissions are
 
within the bounds of those areas that affected KSC opera­
tions. Frankly, I found it quite difficult to arrive at the
 
five single most important lessons, for in general, I have
 
found that each program contributes a large number of small
 
lessons, which combined, set our course to some extent for
 
follow-on programs. Some lessons are 'learnedover and over
 
again, and although are correct in theory, are- rarely
 
resolved or implemented because of circumstances beyond our
 
control. Other lessons, esnecially in the technicai areas,
 
are readily-implemented, but new problems arise and new
 
lessons are learned. I believe it is this wealth of lessons
 
learned, resolved and implemented that constitutes our
 
reservoir of experience and knouledge in M-anned Space Flight
 
and has accounted for a large measure of our success. More
 
than ever before, we must now concentrate as diligently on
 
management lessons as we have the technical lessons in order
 
to fulfill our responsibilities with lower budgets and less
 
manpower.
 
I hope the attached will be of some assistance to you and I
 
am sure you will recognize each of these lessons from your

experience as Director of the Skylab Program.
 
Sincerely,
 
Action Copy to --------­
aprv Kn 	 In~~~~fo Copy to------------------------------------------------­
---.......
V . _-
Director of Launch Operations 	 e i
 
ec'd in C'S
 
Enclosure: 	 --- '. 
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SKYLAB LESSONS LEARNED
 
1. A lesson that was not unique to Skylab but was again
 
high-lighted in Skylab can be summarized as follows:
 
Vehicle modules that are well designed and checked out at
 
the contractor's plant and are accompanied to the Launch
 
Site by Management and Supervisory personnel that know the
 
hardware and the operations methods at the Launch Site will
 
generally result in little or no problems in meeting the
 
launch schedule.. This lesson was vividly exemplified in
 
Skylab by virtue of the diversity of modules and experiments
 
and associated contractors involved in the program. An
 
almost continuous around-the-clock effort was required in
 
one contractor's area with an associated contract overrun
 
while in another area, little difficulty was experienced in
 
maintaining the schedule. -This lesson is particularly
 
applicable to a one or two of a type vehicle program since
 
application of a learning curve is not feasible.
 
2. Experiments installation and checkout integration should
 
be performed only one time and could be more effectively
 
accomplished at the Launch Site utilizing flight hardware.
 
This function, as it was performed at the module factories,
 
was generally not satisfactory due to use of non-flight
 
hardware; late qualification testing; and failure to detect,
 
resolve and close-out certain anomalies. For numerous
 
experiments, this function was essentially repeated at KSC.
 
3. Experiments qualification testing should be completed
 
prior to installation of the flight items into the
 
spacecraft and should begin early enough to allow for
 
contingencies. Qualification testing required more time
 
than allotted and often ran in parallel with actual flight
 
hardware testing. Twenty-six percent of the total
 
experiments were removed and repaired or modified as a
 
result of design inadequacies or qualification test
 
failures.
 
4. Experiments should be designed to allow for easy
 
rekoval. Approximately 62 percent of the total experiments
 
were removed at XISC for troubleshooting, repair or
 
modification. Twenty-six percent of the total experiments
 
were removed and repaired as a result of failures detected
 
at SC and four percent were repaired in place.
 
5. operational Documentation Systems requiring participa­
tion by, or contributions from Inter- and Intra-Center
 
organizational elements and their contractors should be
 
precisely developed, coordinated and detailed in one
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document for total system availablity to all concerned, and
 
should be made binding on all concerned organizations by
 
higher level directives.
 
Several Operational Documentation Systems were developed
 
during the Apollo Program and were required to be continued
 
.for the Skyla Program, but with involvement of different
 
organizational elements from the other Centers. Some
 
systems that were only superfically defined in various
 
Inter-Center Agreements and Center Directives and for which
 
there was no single recognized system document were re­
negotiated and again only superficially documented in
 
various-agreements and directives. Implementation of these
 
systems was difficult, time consuming and created confusion
 
and a need for meetings to "straighten things out." One
 
system in particular had been thoroughly developed,
 
coordinated and documented in an officially recognized
 
handbook for Apollo and needed only minor updating for
 
Skylab. For this system there was no attempt to reinvent
 
the system for Skylab because it had worked well for Apollo
 
and implementation was accomplished for Skylab with a
 
minimum of effort and problems.
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360 SOUTH MONROE-STREET * DENVER, COLORADO 80209 - PHONE (303) 321-2224 
CHARLES CONRAD, JR. 
Vice President - Operations 	 December 11, 1975 
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
NASA Headquarters
 
Code MD
 
Washington,D.C. 20546
 
Dear 	Bill: 
It certainly was good to see you in Houston the other day. As I told you, 
I had jotted down Some thoughts and here they are: 
1. 	 Obviously, as we mentioned, the controversy regarding man's 
usefulness in space should be put to bed altogether after Skylab. 
It should remain forever at the, head of the list in-the-future 
advances of space technology. 
2. 	 The managerial/technical advances which have been made 
across all the programs in-the interfacing of complex systems 
being designed and manufactured by such a wide variety of 
different contractors. 
3. 	 Managerial/technical manner by which data was passed back and 
forth between Skylab and the ground, i.e., the procedures for 
handling storage between ground and Skylab, the development of 
the Joint Observing Programs for ATM, the use of the teleprinter, 
voice and video circuits that were available. The flight planning 
procedures, checklist, etc. These, I feel, contributed greatly 
to smooth daily operations and helped maximize the collection of 
information. 
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4. 	 It is also obvious that we designed and flew a system that in a 
relatively short period of time collected data which will take a 
relatively long period of time to evaluate. Iunderstand it will 
take possibly 8 to 10.years to evaluate the ATM data which was 
collected over 170 days of manned flight in Skylab. The Shuttle 
is capable of collecting an infinitely greater amount of data. 
We need to consider a better system for digesting as rapidly 
as possible all the data that will be returned in order to 
maximize our use of it. 
5. 	 We learned the expensive lesson of short cutting due to budget 
reasons. iore extensive test and analysis probably would 
have turned up the faulty design of the meteroid shield. I 
feel this is an area where the Shuttle is already deficient. 
Nothing earth shaking there Bill, but I hope it will help. 
Sincerely, 
Charles Conrad, Jr. 
CC:gr 
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cv- LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
~Ct,~VHOUSTON TEtSj7058 
REPLY TO 
ATTN OF: CB October 30, 1975 
i-%- CoPY to ----------
Mr. William C. Schneider 

NASA Headquarters ----------

Code MD ---------­
Washington,-DC 20546 .AC in r.:- ' -
Dear Bill: - -..r. .. " r 
I've been giving some thought to your request regarding items for the
 
preparation of your thesis, "Skylab Lessons as Applied to Future Space
 
Stations." I think I'd like to direct my reply to the five items from
 
just a crewman's point of view, rather than from a program point of view,
 
as I know you have a better idea of those than I do, I guess I'd have
 
to list them as follows:
 
I. A man in space can do anything a person on earth can do if you
 
give him a place to stand. Special restraints are frequently needed
 
to provide the body positioning.
 
2. No special tools other than those used in similar earth applica­
tions are necessary to perform maintenance tasks if the astronaut is
 
inside the space station and not in any restrictive clothing.
 
3. Scientists and astronauts can work together well and the designers
 
of the experiments should be made aware of this fact so they can take
 
advantage of this fact in the design of equipment and procedures. We
 
can obtain better scientific data if we think of the astronaut onboard
 
as a pseudo-scientist rather than as a button-pusher and design the hard­
ware accordingly.
 
4. An astronaut can do any job EVA that can be accomplished in a
 
neutral buoyancy facility. It seems that man can mentally extrapolate
 
easily what he can do in the O-g environment from what is possible in
 
the l-g environment as long as he's not encumbered by a pressure suit.
 
When the added complications of the pressure suit are added, he can ex­
trapolate partially but often overlooks important details that can only
 
be found and circumvented by actual practice of the task in neutral buoy­
-ancy.
 
5. The feedback that one normally receives in day to day face to
 
face contact with others is not present during space flight. Having
 
the public and press looking over your shoulder often has an inhibiting
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effect on both the people on the ground and inspace. There must be
 
a free exchange of ideas and.feelings between the crew in orbit and the
 
controllers on the ground to maximize mission return.
 
Hope things are going well for you. I couldn't imagine anyone that could
 
have-a more interesting or apropos doctoral thesis than the one you're
 
proposing. It's one-heck of a research effort with a lot of help.
 
Be good to yourself.
 
Alan L. ean
 
United States Astronaut
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REPLY TO 
ATTN OF: CB October 8, 1975 
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
Code MD
 
NASA Headquarters
 
Washington, DC 20546
 
Dear Bill:
 
So you're really going to go through with it! I admire your perse­
verance in pursuing a doctorate.
 
I guess the most outstanding lesson I can draw from Skylab is the
 
utility and versatility of man in space. Had the workshop been an
 
unmanned satellite we would have had to kiss the whole program good­
bye when the workshop started -shedding parts during the boost phase.
 
The efforts of all three crews to deploy.wings, restore thermal bal­
ance, reservice the coolanol loop, and maintain attitude control in
 
spite of CMG casualties, I think, support the argument quite eloquently.
 
The efforts were results of management decisions based on good technical
 
recommendations which exploited man's versatility.
 
Another managerial consideration which was pointed out in Skylab, par­
ticularly in our mission, is that the manner in which you do business
 
on a short duration mission differs significantly from that for a long
 
mission. The go-go-go, every second counts mode of operation is toler­
able for a limited period of time, but if the mission duration involves
 
setting up housekeeping and following a daily routine for longer periods,
 
then you have to relax timeline rigidity. You need to give the man some
 
time for himself and allow enough flexibility for him to exercise judg­
ment and creativity.
 
As I remember, we worried and argued long and hard over the spacing between
 
the three manned missions. It was indeed a significant managerial problem
 
balancing economic.considerations against the need for time to allow for
 
scientific feedback from one mission to its successor, I'm sure that the
 
decisions made pleased neither proponent. It appears to me that the lesson
 
here is not to allow the situation to force management into similar compro­
mises in the future.
 
It's interesting to me to note that in spite of the lessons we learned in
 
Skylab, it appears that management has legislated against inflight mainte­
nance as a design consideration for Shuttle. I certainly don't understand
 
152
 
2 
that, but I feel confideht that when the.chips are down and we are in
 
danger of terminating a mission and losing scientific data to the tune
 
of -mega-bucks, man's versatility will be exercised again.
 
Best of luck to you in your endeavor-, 'Bill.
 
Sincerely,
 
]onel]UP. arr
SMC (Ret)
 
ASA Ast onaut
 
--
AND~ 
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Action 	 Copy to--------Mr. William C. Schneider 
info COPY to
Deputy Associate Administrator 
for Space Flight 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration P-'d in C.'de m O-_L].. 
btr --------Washington, D.C. 20546 
ci-a-toe r'-'y for 
5st:sra cf---------Dear Bill: 
The following are the six managerial type lessons that I consider 
most important from my area of Skylab. 
1. First and by far the most important, was the operational confirma­
tion once again of the extreme importance of the very basic ideas of 
communications and teamwork. The development of this understanding 
is certainly aided by having everyone concerned at one location. This 
relationship gradually developed between the scientists and the engineers 
in the Apollo Program and, subsequently, again in the Skylab Program; 
maximum achievements were not realized until teamwork was developed. 
Both the operations personnel and the scientists must understand their 
respective problems and objectives and must be willing to provide that 
extra effort to aid one another. When the situation warrants, the 
engineers must be prepared to be less conservative in setting the 
systems operational limits, and when that is not enough, new methods 
of operating the hardware must be devised. The scientists must be 
willing to reexamine experiment constraints and objectives continually 
in terms of the particular mission situation. 
2. The demonstration of the usefulness and feasibility of flexible daily 
flight planning in order to meet changing circumstances, and changing 
requirements. 
3. The efficiency of organizing all science planning inputs under a 
single individual who could personally exercise the science judgments 
before making inputs to the operational side of the flight team, and 
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the corresponding efficiency of organizing the inputs to this person 
under a single representative from-each discipline area. 
4. The crowded hectic nature of the early phase of each mission 
(approaching two weeks for Skylab; approaching TBD days for 
Shuttle! ?) due to the acclimatization of the crew and the overhead 
of setting up shop and gaining proficiency in many daily tasks. 
This problem strongly suggests that only those activities which have 
bona fide requirements for early accomplishment be planned for 
the-beginn-ing of a mission. 
5. The very great usefulness to be able to talk to the flight crew in 
a free, and unstilted fashion (to call a spade a spade) - a task that 
we have repeatedly found difficult or even impossible to do over the 
"open" conn loops. This suggests that either we have got to 
change our human nature and learn to do this over an open comm 
loop or we are going to have to get routine, i. e., non-crisis oriented 
use of a "privileged" loop. 
6. The great usefulness of having "extra" supplies of consummables, 
e.g., extra film whose use is strictly speaking not planned for, 
and in a parallel sense the usefulness of tools whose use may not 
have been completely preplanned just because in both cases we can 
never really preguess the circumstances that will later arise ­
particularly on a long mission. 
I have mostly just listed these without long explanations, except 
where my pencil got carried away with itself, since you are at least 
as familiar with these as I am. Good luck. 
Best regards, 
Robert A. Parker 
NASA Astronaut 
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-AT OFFICE BOX 179 DE4VE8R COLORADO 80201 TELEPHONE (3M) 794-5211 
October 16, 1975
 
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
Code MD
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
Washington, D. C. 20546
 
Dear Bill,
 
I'm proud of you! We'll be pulling for you all
 
the way to your doctorate, and you have a lot of friends here
 
to pull for you.
 
I've listed very tersely some of my personal
 
favorite lessons from Skylab, and you know that I'll be happy
 
to elaborate on any of them you may wish further to pursue.
 
(Where I critize, don't take it personally. On your watch,
 
the program came in under budget.)
 
Sincerely your,
 
Kenneth P. Timmons
 
Program Director
 
Large Space Telescope
 
KPT/bbh
 
Enclosur6
 
10/16/75
 
SKYLAB
 
1. 	System's engineering,,as evidenced by the orderly control of tiered
 
documentation,'can result in minimum-energy control of a massive
 
program.
 
4 
I believe that Belew, for example, learned to love a system's speci­
fication which allowed him to introduce a required perturbation into
 
a "paper model." This model of the multi-contractor, multi-agency,
 
multi-module Skylab then triggered changes in subordinate documents
 
(EIS-ICD) which resulted in the modeled program and hardware responding
 
and complying.
 
2. 	In a sophisticated and regimented test environment, a return to basics
 
can be a refreshing and productive venture.
 
After weeks of data analysis and eradite discussions of a clinical
 
nature, we wiggled,cables (horrors!) and probed connector pins (treason!)
 
on a flight module, and an overwhelming problem was solved in a few
 
minutes of very basic testing and simplistic data analysis. (EREP
 
testing, KSC, April 1972.)
 
3. 	Steadfast adherence to provincial or parochial approaches can gnaw
 
away at problem dollars.
 
Test procedures for the Skylab Multiple Docking Adapter were generated
 
at Martin Marietta and used for pre-delivery checkout. These procedures
 
had to be re-written to McDonnell Douglas requirements and formats for
 
use in the combined checkout at McDonnell Douglas, then these re-written
 
procedures had to be re-written again to the Kennedy Space Center
 
requirements and formats for final checkout at KSC. Why didn't we
 
back up from the end requirement and use KSC procedures all the way?
 
The test procedures are just one example of the failure to use commonf
 
currency on a single program.
 
4. 	Neglect of adequate planning and verification for data handling,
 
processing, and reduction can push a tidal wave of program problems
 
and dollars toward the end of a program.
 
Skylab S-192 data are still being shipped around the country in search
 
of 	capable data reduction. Other examples abound.
 
5. 	A recent government study has shown an embarrassing result - a positive­
correlation between overruns and technical accomplishment. Skylab was
 
no exception if we look back at earlier estimates, but if the program
 
had remainted "wet," if the entire earth resources package had not been
 
flown, or if the student participation had not been accommodated then
 
the program probably would not have been perceived as the outstanding
 
success that it was. The program allowed growth to occur, the growth
 
increased the cost, but it will long be remembered because of the growth
 
items.
 
* 	 "Factors Affecting Project Success," by Murphy, Baker, and Fisher, 
Boston College, 1974, for NASA (GCS 18-74) D-I 15­
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Ref: 	 Letter dated 10 October 1975 requesting
 
information for preparing a thesis on
 
"Skylab Lessons as Applied to Future
 
Space Stations"
 
Dear Bill:
 
The material presented, Attachment 1, is from the Airlock Module,
 
MDAC-East experiences only. Fred Sanders indicated he is providing similar
 
information on our OWS, MDAC-West experiences.
 
The examples selected tend to take the form of solutions to specific
 
Airlock Module problems. Unfortunately, the theme of a broad lesson learned
 
which would have application to future space stations doesn't come through
 
too well in all cases. To supplement this, I have enclosed a copy of pages
 
from the Airlock Module Final Technical Report on Airlock Program "Lessons
 
Learned" which I thought would provide good background data. Maybe some of
 
these items have more appeal than those covered by Attachment 1. Inciden­
tally, Bill, we understand there is similar material from the other major
 
module MSFC contractors who participated in the Skylab program.
 
In addition, I thought it might be worth mentioning a number of areas
 
which come to mind, Bill, where more than the usual emphasis by management
 
is called for on a program of the Skylab type -- a large, fast moving, fast
 
changing, highly technical program with one or two flight articles and a
 
substantial amount of concurrency between production fabrication and major
 
development and, of course, where the available resources do not support
 
doing everything you would like to do. I thought you might work some of
 
these items, Attachment 2, into your general theme. They are all along the
 
lines of achieving and maintaining the ability to respond rapidly to the
 
dynamic, changing situation and at the same time endeavoring to avoid the
 
pitfalls which might arise from moving rapidly.
 
Best wishes in the preparation of your thesis.
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1. Communication of Potential Changes:
 
A change summary package was transmitted to the NASA Program 'Office that
 
consisted of the following categories.
 
o Authorized Program
 
o Considered Authorized 0IG.zv 
o Potential Changes OPpoo, -PAGx 42 
o Cancelled/Disapproved Changes QqA.44!; 
o Identified Documentation Changes
 
In addition to providing NASA with a weekly update of dollar value and
 
schedule, this summary also provided a list of potential changes that were
 
collected from the various Skylab meetings. Itwas by this list that many changes
 
were flushed to the top so that NASA Management could provide authorization or
 
disapproval in a more efficient manner.
 
2. Expedited Airlock Closeout Procedure:
 
In lieu of processing the closeout activity by mail, an Open House activity
 
was employed which proved to be less time consuming and more efficient. The actual
 
Open House activity took one week and approximately 32 bidder groups (about 67
 
people) surveyed and bid on equipment. By the time the lowest priority bidders
 
arrived, the items selected by the high priority bidders was already identified via
 
the computer list. This prevented duplicate bids and resulting confusion.
 
The use of NASA 811 Form identified items to be made available for Open House
 
display, as scrap or other agency use. This identified items for the Open House
 
and was much less time consuming than the DD540 series screening process.
 
An Open House Plan was prepared and equipment was staged inone location.
 
Equipment descriptions were given to NASA-MSFC, and they, inturn, sent notices
 
etc. to POD, NASA Centers, NASA Contractors, and GSA Agencies. Bidder priorities
 
were assigned to each bidder. A computer program was developed (very low cost)
 
to assist MSFC and GSA intheir priority screening. This computer program also
 
permitted sorting by bidder, by part number, etc. The total computer cost was
 
under $900.
 
3. Airlock Shipments to KSC:
 
When the first Airlock was delivered to KSC and the remote site planning

books were reviewed, itbecame obvious that a large number of parts ranging from
 
raw material and pan stock items to components and equipment were involved. It
 
became apparent that these parts, together with the anticipated configuration

changes, would require close attention.
 
The first listing was put together manually and work started on a Direct
 
Access Computer program (DAC). The 'resulting computer listing was sent to MSFC
 
and KSC and MDAC-E people at KSC so that common data on parts needed, date
 
.shipped, or expected ship date was available to all parties at all times. This
 
was rapidly expanded to permit our people at KSC to show hardware receipts and
 
reference their test and work planning sheets by each part. 159
 
Attachment 1
 
Page'2 of 3
 
Shortly after, a nearly identical system was established between our people
 
at KSC and Huntington Beach to reflect similar information on the OWS. MDAC-E
 
helped, inthis by providing programming help and obtaining output data for distri­
bution.
 
4. Keep Interfaces Simple:
 
Complex multi-module 'pacecraft which have physical and functional interfaces
 
-should be configured and contracted to minimize these interfaces.
 
InSkylab, the interface between the Apollo Telescope Mount and the Deployment
 
Assembly was a very simple 4 bolt structural attachment. The electrical interface
 
was-the simple routing of wire bundles and location of connector. The coordination
 
between the Marshall Space Flight Center and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics-East
 
to firm up these interfaces was smooth and quickly accomplished. On the other hand,
 
the interface between the Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA) and the Airlock was compli­
cated by interfaces inthe structure, functional gas and fluid systems; and opera­
tive electrical systems.- These were more difficult to get resolved.
 
Recognizing that these interfaces would be more difficult to resolve between
 
two companies, MSFC organized their program office to have the Airlock and the MDA
 
under the same project manager. This management technique of putting complex
 
interfacing modules under the same manager minimizes conflicting requirements and
 
directions and allows changes to be handled at a lower level of change board.
 
Interface requirements should be established and documented in advance of firm
 
system design release to minimize the redesign required when the interface require­
ments are coordinated and baselined after-the-fact.
 
o 	ICD's should show only the information required to control the
 
interface requirements.
 
o 	Electrical interface control specifications should be established
 
for end-to-end definition of all power, control or signal lines
 
crossing a module interface. Function description at intermediate
 
connectors should be omitted.
 
o 	Electrical power quality requirements should be defined as early in
 
the program as possible to permit orderly and economical systems
 
development.
 
5. Quick Implementation of Trade Studies:
 
A quick method to initiate industry participation in inter-module optimization
 
study activity without the hassle of contractual hang-ups was needed in the early
 
formative stages. This was instituted by the Airlock NASA management by negotiating
 
into the initial contract, a pool of money that could be spent only on authorization
 
of 	a .study by the NASA project manager. The amount allocated to each study was
 
agreed to by the NASA Manager and his counterpart in industry. Strict accounting
 
of 	the utilization of these funds was maintained and reported to the NASA so that
 
itcould be monitored.
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This "bank account" method of managing the study activity of an evolving
 
program was felt to be extremely efficient in:
 
o 	rapidly getting study results
 
o 	minimizing the contractual paper flow and/or in-scope/out-of-scope
 
hassles that often, accompany these type of activities.
 
6. In-flight Maintenance:
 
In-flight maintenance and hardware replacement proved to be much easier than
 
anticipated; therefore, where feasible, provisions should be made for in-flight
 
repair and/or replacement of components.
 
7. Don't Change Contracting Center:
 
A reassignment of the responsibility for a major hardware item between NASA
 
Centers during the period of performance of an on-going program should be avoided,
 
if possible. The advent of a new cast of players who did not have the opportunity
 
of participating in the decisions leading to the existing configuration and whose
 
mode of operation is based on a different organizational structure with somewhat
 
different requirements and operating procedures is a trying experience for the
 
people involved. A significant amount of time and energy must be devoted to the
 
familiarization of the new people with the specification, the hardware, and the
 
history of how the configuration was developed.
 
Human nature being what it is, plus the natural inclination of Homo sapiens
 
to distrust those things which they have not personally been involved in,leads
 
to a considerable amount of 'second guessing' and.the subsequent need of data to
 
substantiate the prior decisions. Program objectives are often viewed differently

by the new blood which can cause a de-emphasis of some things and an added emphasis
 
to others.
 
All of these lead to a loss of headway, inefficient operation and, ingeneral,­
add to the overall program cost as well as often impacting the schedule.
 
Some examples of the problems which can arise are:
 
o 	Loss of the established rapport and trust built up between the
 
involved parties.
 
o 	Disruption of program continuity
 
o 	 Different requirements 
o 	 Different procedures 
o 	The 'not invented here' syndrome.
 
o 	Different philosophies; different ideas.
 
o 	New people not part of the program history; a reluctance to be
 
responsible for 'that other guy's' decisions/mistakes. 
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Areas of High Emphasis by Management
 
on Skylab Type Programs
 
Motivate team members to surface issues promptly so as to address the matter
 
well before it develops into a crisis, yet allow the technical people time
 
and the opportunity to solve the surfaced.problem.
 
Force close monitoring of major technical problems so as to select the proper
 
moment for yielding to a hew design concept or giving up on making the old
 
concept work.
 
Press for solidifying the design and establishing a configuration which can be
 
manufactured to balance the inherent tendency toward seeking technical
 
excellence.
 
Force.close communication and cooperation and emphasis on the highest priority
 
areas (as the conflicts between late engineering drawing release and behind
 
schedule manufacturing increase) through the guidance of a task force made up
 
of representatives from engineering, planning and scheduling, and manufacturing;
 
don't rely on the functional system for normal operation.
 
Recognize at the onset that a higher than usual amount of special attention and
 
people dedicated to expediting will be required with a program of this type in
 
order to keep activities moving well.
 
Devise review'teams to dig out or uncover questions or issues that somehow were
 
dismissed or overlooked and were never fully resolved.
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5301 Boise Avenue Huntington Beach, CA 92647 (714 896-3311 
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PECEIVED 
'Vz-,DEM. 
October 17, 1975
 
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
NASA Headquarters
 
Code MD
 
Washington, D.C. 20546
 
Dear Bill:
 
In response to your request for five managerial and technical lessons
 
learned from Skylab, I am enclosing a list.
 
Good luck on your doctoral program. It's good to see one of our Skylab
 
boys moving up into higher strata intellectual neighborhoods.
 
Sincerely,)
 
Fred Sanders
 
Enclosure
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MCDONELL 16OUGLS 
C~fl OP~yO 
MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM SKYLAB
 
1. 	The Skylab meteoroid shield failure investigation revealed the need for
 
- assuring that even structural subsystems be approached as a total manage­
ment problem. Wetreated it as a structural element rather than an 
operational subsystem. I believe the results would have been better if
 
we had a company-wide subsystem manager assigned to it similar to the
 
way we had approached the solar arrays, waste management and other sub­
systems.
 
2. 	NASA to contractor interfaces were at the module contract level. For
 
example, the Orbital Workshop was managed by an MSFC program manager who
 
interfaced with the contractor program manager. This was complicated by

:the fact that MSFC had the development responsibility while JSC had the 
operational responsibility. This sometimes made the decision making 
process at the module level too cumbersome. A NASA urogram manager in 
charge of a prime contract must have support from all elements of NASA 
as well as clearly defined interfaces with other modules to nermit 
timely decision making. This strong centralized management must also 
exist within the contractor organization to make the whole system 
effective. 
3. 	Experiment hardware furnished by the scientific community often lacks
 
even such rudimentary configuration controls as part numbers. In addition
 
their one-of-a-kind nature causes the hardware to travel extensively.
 
Since they also tend to be GFE to a module contractor, they are caught
 
up in the cumbersome GFE authorization procedures of installation/removal/
 
rework/release. This could be improved if experiment developers would
 
team with an aerospace manufacturer to instill configuration discipline.
 
In addition, GFE handling procedures should be streamlined.
 
4. 	NASA and contractors often placed too much emphasis on hardware and soft­
ware and overlooked the effect that a late decision could have. Both
 
NASA and the contractor should have a schedule for decisions and should
 
track it in the same fashion as drawings and parts.
 
5. 	Most large programs suffer from an overabundance of "stoppers" and a lack 
of "starters". We need to increase the number of people who can say yes, 
and decrease the number of people who can say no.through strong centralized 
management on both sides. 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
'.1 4WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
RFPLY TO 
ATTN OF: MQ OCT 3 1 1975 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: MD/Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight
 
FROM: MQ/Director, OSF Reliability, Quality and Safety
 
SUBJECT: Skylab Lessons Learned
 
Per your request, the following are my first reactions to
 
significant lessons learned.
 
1. Importance of including design margins for unexpected
 
contingencies.
 
Demonstrated by ability to get out of meteor shield
 
problem with a whole group of design margins which made it
 
possible. For example:
 
a. RCS fuel - which let us complete mission in spite
 
of orientation-control usage before we got the heat shield out.
 
b. Breathing gases - which gave us enough margin to 
purge volume after overheat and still have enough for extended 
crew visit missions. 
c. Electrical power - which gave us enough to survive
 
with only ATM solar panels at first and then enough to do
 
entire mission with only one of two solar wings on OWS.
 
2. Adequate contingency planning.
 
Had looked carefully at many "what if" situations
 
that actually occhrred. When these situations occurred (as
 
the following examples show), we were ready for them:
 
a. Loss of one CMG - We knew in general terms that
 
we could do this and had a background of ground simulation to
 
fall back on. It's true we spent some RCS fuel before we
 
learned how to fly on only two CMG's but, nevertheless, were
 
reasonably prepared to do this.
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b. Similarly, we planned redundancy on the rate gyro
 
package in each axis because of expected lit& limitations. We
 
then ran into the gyro heater and drift problems which turned
 
out to be a common failure mode in each. Only because of our
 
contingency planning did we have the time to come up with a
 
spare package that we could fly up and install.
 
3. Wisdom of providing for rescue if all else fails.
 
Even though we went to great pains to provide redun­
dancies and contingency planning, we realized that'combinations
 
of failures or simply ones we had not been smart enough to
 
anticipate, might do us in. As a result, we searched for a
 
reasonable rescue scheme which we baselined and then found
 
that it really was a most important contributor to mission
 
success. This occurred when we ran into what appeared to be
 
a common mode failure in the CSM RCS jets. At this point,
 
having the ability to initiate a rescue mission (which we did)
 
bought us time to further evaluate the failurds and determine
 
that they were not, in fact, common mode failures.
 
4. In-flight maintenance.
 
The wisdom of being able to repair malfunctioning
 
hardware in flight was demonstrated repeatedly through the
 
Skylab missions. This included'the provisioning of spares
 
originally along with tool kits and test instruments to do
 
the job.- More significant, however, was the resupply capa­
bility of revisit flights to bring up tools and spares to
 
repair what subsequently malfunctioned. This resulted in
 
numerous experiments and basic Skylab system malfunctions which
 
-were repaired and then utilized. This salvaged a great deal of
 
the mission as a result. Future space station missions should
 
plan for in-flight repair and resupply as a matter of course.
 
5. Adaptability of the crew member.
 
The presence of a crew member's judgment and decision­
making capability repeatedly demonstrated the value of having
 
men on a long-duration space mission. They were used for
 
damage assessment, on-the-spot procedure writers, worked under
 
all kinds of adverse conditions (extreme heat, prolonged EVA,
 
weightlessness, etc.), taking advantage of targets of
 
opportunity (solar flares, Comet Kohoutek)and vastly enriching
 
the data return because of their skilled presence.
 
Hope this is of value to you.
 
HgL hen
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e m 	 2500 COLORADO AVENUE * SANTA MONICA. CALIFORNIA 90406Develaopn-'ent TELEPHONE (213) 829-7511Corporation 
January 5, 1976 
Mr. 	William C. Schneider
 
11801 Clintwood Place
 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20902
 
Dear Bill:
 
May 	I say first how pleased I am that you are pursuing your
 
doctorate and assure you that I will do everything I can to
 
help you achieve that goal.
 
On the subject of the five most important lessons derived
 
from Skylab, I offer the following:
 
1. 	Man is capable of living in a zero-G environment
 
indefinitely.
 
a) Health may be maintained by proper diet and
 
exercise.
 
b) Happiness may be nurtured through interesting
 
and recreational activities.
 
c) Interpersonal relations (psychological stability)
 
may be maintained by the proper space environment
 
and by suitable communication with the ground.
 
The importance of this verification is hard to over
 
emphasize. It opens the way to permanent manned
 
space stations and establishes the basis for manned
 
flight to-the planets.
 
2. 	-Spacecraft can be developed to maintain very precise
 
pointing accuracy, even with men moving freely about
 
the craft-

This is of extreme importance in 'the ability to use
 
manned space platforms for astronomical and terres­
trial observations as well as those processes which
 
require a minimal acceleration environment.
 
3. 	 It is possible to build and operate a reuseable space
 
station with the resulting economy of use as well as
 
the ability to add additional capabilities to the
 
assembly with each flight.
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4. Processing materials in space is feasible and yields
 
materials' different than those that can be produced
 
on earth. The exploitation and utilization of this
 
capability may, in the long run, prove to be one of
 
the most direct economic benefits from space flight.
 
5. 	It is possible to maintain and resupply space stations/
 
vehicles. This is the heart of economic development
 
of space activities and is basic to the successful
 
implementation of all the above.
 
With that, let me urge you to move out and finish your thesis.
 
If there is anything I can do to help, please call on me.
 
Sincerely,
 
./?u ller 
Chairman and President
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NASA Johnson Space Center
 
Houston, TX 77058
 
January 5, 1976
 
Mr. William C. Schneider 
Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
Rational Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
Washington, DC .20546
 
Dear Bill: 
In answer to your request for a listing of the five most important
 
managerial or technical lessons learned from Skylab about space flight
 
development and operations programs, I submit the following:
 
1. In the design .and development of multimodule systems, extreme 
care- should be- exercised to assure that systems such as environmental 
control, electrical power, propulsion, and communications are similar 
from the operational standpoint. That is, the systems should be 
designed compatible to the extent that they can be interconnected, as
 
required, and a common or uniform operation and control procedure can,
 
be used by the crew in order to reduce the complexity of training and
 
the potential for operational errors due to multiple procedures.
 
2. Zero-g is an aid to manned space flight activities rather than
 
an encumbrance as long as systems and components are designed for
 
accessibility. Quoting Alan Bean, Commander of Skylab II, "If man can
 
do it on the ground,,he can-do it in space with the same tools."
 
3. It is mandatory to have a system such as a television uplink
 
vith onboard hard copy capability to provide for transmittal of infor­
mation, instructions, and -procedures from the ground during low activity
 
periods, thus unburdening the flight crew from copying complex messages.
 
4. The program flight control organization must be the final authority
 
for establishing onboard integrated procedures, inflight constraints,
 
and sequence of flight activities where there is an interaction between
 
spacecraft and experiment operations.
 
5. All experiment/science hardware should be tested both as a sub­
system in accordance with experiment/science requirements and finally
 
at the integrated system level to assure the equipment operation, accuracy,
 
and validity of the data as well as to verify that there is no electro­
mechanical interference.
 
My apologies for being late with these remarks. I hope they will serve
 
your purpose and good luck on your thesis.
 
Sincerely,
 
Ken S~fle 169
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Director of Flight Operations
 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (1' 
1 WASHINGTON, DC. 20546 
REPLY TO 
AT1N OF! MT September 22, 1975 
Mr. William C. Schneider
 
Deputy Associate Administrator
 
for Space Flight
 
NASA Headquarters
 
Washington, D. C. 20546
 
Dear Bill:
 
In your letter of September 15, 1975, you invited my
 
thoughts as to what were several of the most important
 
managerial or technical lessons learned from Skylab about
 
space flight development and operations programs. My
 
thoughts on this follow: For the most part, these are
 
not new lessons, but lessons learned in different cir­
cumstances and surroundings. The fact that they are not
 
new is of course a lesson in itself - we must continually
 
strive to benefit from past experiences and structure our
 
management so that past related experience can be brought
 
to bear on current problems.
 
First, I would point to a lesson from our meteoroid shield
 
failure:
 
That lesson relates to the importance of interdiscipli­
nary communication among designers. The shield failure was
 
traced to an "aerodynamic sneak circuit" wherein the
 
structure design and fabrication inadvertently provided a
 
path for air from a high pressure region on the vehicle to
 
travel to a critical load area. -The aerodynamicists, load
 
engineers, and structural designers had not adequately
 
cross-communicated in their reviews of the integrated
 
system during.design-and during reviews of the completed
 
hardware after fabrication. The lesson is the continued
 
necessity for integrated cross-discipline reviews of
 
designs and hardware led by an overall system oriented
 
"chief engineer."
 
On the subject of the meteoroid shield, another lesson
 
comes to mind and that is the need for continued hard review
 
of design requirements. In retrospect, the requirement that
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led to the provision of a meteoroid shield was questionable.
 
The shield was required in order to meet the arbitrary
 
numerical design goal with the limited environmental knowl­
edge then existing. Certainly with the-benefit of hindsight,
 
however, the shield was not necessary.
 
A second lesson "relearned" relates to the importance of
 
judicious design margins and provision for contingencies.
 
The Skylab electrical power system had a substantial margin
 
in power available for basic housekeeping and experiment
 
requirements. As a result of this margin, it was possible
 
to operate the Skylab, with judicious power management, at
 
full effectiveness in spite of loss of one complete solar
 
wing following the meteoroid shield failure. Had we not
 
had these power margins in the basic system design, the
 
loss of the one solar wing would have greatly reduced or
 
completely negated our mission capabilities.
 
Conversely, it is important to plan for maximum utilization
 
of contingent capability. This was illustrated by Skylab
 
weight management. Early in Skylab, a weight design margin
 
and contingency of about 30 percent was provided. As the
 
system matured, it became evident that the experiment com­
plement and expendables provisions could be substantially
 
augmented within the limit weights. This was done and as
 
a result, mission duration and content of the experiment
 
program were increased substantially at no increase in
 
program cost. Specifically, it was possible to increase
 
the final mission duration by 50 percent.
 
Another lesson relearned relates to the benefits of non­
identical system redundancy. The pros and cons of identical
 
and non-identical redundant systems have, of course, been
 
argued for years and the merits of the argument on both
 
sides, depend on the particulars. However, in the case of
 
Skylab, the merits of non-identical redundancy were
 
evident in the electrical power system.
 
The electrical power systems on the ATM and OWS, although
 
both solar cell-battery systems, were quite different in
 
their implementation. Failures occurred in both systems,
 
but the failures were complementary to each other so that
 
total system capability was not reduced to the extent it
 
would have been with identical systems of either design.
 
Conversely, the risks of identical redundancy were evident
 
in the multiple failures of the control gyros for the
 
attitude control systqm. Had it not been possible for the
 
crew to repair the g~o problems in flight, the mission
 
would have been prematurely terminated.
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I hope these thoughts will be helpful to you; I believe
 
your treatise will be a most valuable addition to the art
 
and science of complex technical program management.
 
Sincerely,
 
Un H. Disher
 
Enclosures
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AXIOMS
 
Introduction
 
This section represents Lessons Learned at the most
 
gross level. In retrospect they represent the accumulation
 
of experiences without specific background and are, instead,
 
a composite set of attitudes and approaches which have been
 
used with some success. Other managers may have other approaches
 
which, likewise, have been used with some success.
 
These axioms, just as for Lessons Learned, are presented

for the consideration of the reader so that the applicable
 
axiom can be used or adapted for the peculiar problem being
 
addressed.
 
1. 	No one knows more about what you are doing than you.
 
2. 	No expert is so knowledgeable about everything
 
that you can't question his opinions.
 
3. 	A question unasked is an answer not given.
 
4. 	When you think you understand the problem, ask
 
at least one more question.
 
5. 	Always keep a devil's advocate somewhere on your
 
staff to insure that alternate approaches are explored.
 
6. 	There is no such thing as a change which doesn't
 
have an impact onthe program somewhere.
 
7. 	Close configuration control of development applied
 
too early inhibits design decisions and, therefore,
 
delays schedule. Configuration control applied
 
too late permits unnecessary design optimization
 
and, therefore, results in cost overruns.
 
8. 	The more complex a system is, the more important
 
it is to appoint a systems manager with responsibility
 
for all aspects.
 
9. 	Mechanical systems, levers, gears, cams, etc. can
 
be as troublesome as complex new electronic develop­
ments--sometimes more troublesome since there
 
is a tendency to pay less attention to well-understood
 
mechanical principles.
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10. The key to an orderly program is careful and orderly
 
documentation.
 
11. 	 Documentation is very costly.
 
12. 	 Constantly review documentation processes to insure
 
that the paperwork is accomplishing a necessary
 
task.
 
13. 	 Be careful when one organization plans the work
 
of another.
 
14. 	 A good contract is more important than an early
 
contract. Be wary of letter contracts with poor
 
definition. Insure a well thought out statement
 
of work.
 
15. 	 Wherever possible, an incentive feature should
 
be incorporated into development contracts since
 
such features insure the contractor knows what
 
the customer thinks fs important as well as informs
 
him as to how well the customer thinks he is performing.
 
Besides, it gets the attention of the contractor's
 
top management.
 
16. 	 Award fee contracts provide great flexibility since
 
the customer can specify what the most important
 
feature is for each upcoming quarter of a year.
 
17. 	 Avoid complex incentive clauses in contracts.
 
Incentives should be easily understood and readily
 
translatable to the workforce.
 
18. 	 Level of effort contracts are easy to administer
 
but are inefficient in that they tend to continue
 
a workforce after the job has been completed.
 
19. 	 Responsibility for a decision must accompany the
 
authority for a decision.
 
Conclusion
 
The fundamental conclusion of the Skylab Program has
 
not been addressed in this paper, but it is basic to the
 
issues which have been discussed. Skylab has shown the
 
worth and benefits which the Nation and the World will derive
 
from a manned, long-duration, earth orbital space station.
 
A space-based observation post has proven to. be a practical
 
method of providing services to the Earth's population in
 
a variety of ways--Landsat, Intelsat, ATS, OAO and 0SO
 
are just a few of the better known unmanned spacecraft currently
 
serving mankind. Skylab showed that a multidisciplined
 
spacecraft can practically serve the same purposes. Skylab
 
demonstrated conclusively the value of the presence of man
 
to modify, correct, change, repair, maintain, and add to
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experiments and sensors. Reference 5 contains numerous
 
examples of the flight crew contributions as a scientific
 
observer, an operator, and as an engineer/technician. The
 
value of integrating man into the experiments can be illus­
trated by contrasting the solar observations with the earth
 
resource observations. The former set of instruments were
 
designed such that the trained observer could and did monitor
 
the solar activities to choose the areas of most interest
 
and the instrument of most value. As a result, the data
 
collected was enhanced and improved. In contrast, the earth
 
resource experiments were designed to minimize the impact
 
of the Skylab systems (they were a late addition to the
 
program) and, as a consequence, the flight crew had little
 
control over the data collection, and their involvement
 
was little more than to turn the instrument on and off.
 
As a result, the data was not enhanced and probably could
 
have been better collected by an unmanned satellite. (Before
 
an erroneous conclusion is reached, it should be emphasized
 
that the presence of the manned operator simplified the
 
instruments since no computer or command system was required
 
and the crew could service the cameras and tape recorders.
 
Also, the crew repaired the instruments when they malfunctioned.)
 
The possibility of material processing in zero gravity
 
has just begun to be explored. The Skylab experiments
 
showed clearly that certain processes benefit from the absence
 
of the forces of gravity (and convection). The growth of
 
crystals, the formulation of metal combinations, the separ­
ation of serums, and vaccines are activities which will be
 
conducted in the space stations of the future.
 
The development and operation of such a facility will
 
be a large and complex undertaking. The lessons learned
 
in Skylab should be directly applicable. Specifically,
 
the experiences with the control moment gyros should improve
 
the design of the attitude control system; the findings
 
on habitability and living should enable the designer to
 
develop a more efficient space base; the successes achieved
 
with.extravehicular activities should permit the planners
 
to use that capability without reservation (but with proper
 
precaution); the manner in which the flight crews enhanced
 
the data from the solar instruments should encourage the
 
integration of man into the design of the sensors and instru­
ments of the future; and the repair and maintenance of the
 
systems that was accomplished should reduce the cost of
 
instruments and experiments since redundancies and assurances
 
can be reduced.
 
It is also hoped that the experiences documented herein
 
will assist in the management of what will be a diversified
 
development. The experiences in testing components at a
 
number of sites dictate the use of a common test procedure
 
in the future; the early definition of the criticality of
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a subsystem and, thus, the identification of the proper degree

of control and documentation should result in lower costs;
 
the design oversights which may have been detected if the
 
designers had been exposed more directly to their product
 
should encourage engineers to become more physically familiar
 
with the hardware they design; and finally, the results
 
of Skylab should dictate that space stations of the future
 
be designed to be flexible and multipurposed.
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ACRONYMS
 
AM - Airlock Module; also Amplitude Modulation
 
APCS - Attitude and Pointing Control System
 
ATM - Apollo Telescope Mount
 
BMMD - Body Mass Measurement Device
 
CM - Command Module
 
CMC - Command Module Computer
 
CMG - Control Moment Gyro
 
CSM - Command and Service Module
 
DA - Deployment Assembly
 
DAC - Data Acquisition Camera
 
db - Decibel
 
DCS - Digital'Command System
 
ECS - Environmental Control System
 
EEG - Electroencephalogram
 
EPS - Electrical Power System
 
EREP - Earth Resources Experiment Package 
ESS - Experiment Support System
 
EVA - Extravehicular Activity
 
FAS - Fixed Airlock Shroud
 
FM - Frequency Modulation
 
GMT - Greenwich Mean Time
 
GSFC - Goddard Space Flight Center 
HCO - Harvard College Observatory
 
HHMU - Hand Held Maneuvering Unit 
IU - Instrument Unit 
IVA - Intravehicular Activity 
JSC - Johnson Space Center 
KSC - Kennedy Space Center
 
LO - Liftoff
 
LSU - Life Support Umbilical
 
LV - Launch Vehicle
 
MCC - Mission Control Center
 
MDA - Multiple Docking Adapter
 
MSFC - Marshall Space Flight Center
 
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
NRL - Naval Research Laboratory
 
OMSF - Office of Manned Space Flight
 
OWS - Orbital Workshop
 
PCM - Pulse Code Modulation
 
PI - Principal Investigator
 
PS - Payload Shroud
 
RPM - Revolutions Per Minute
 
S-IC - First Stage of the Saturn V Launch Vehicle
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S-II - Second Stage of the Saturn V Launch.Vehicle 
S-IVB - Third Stage of the Saturn V Launch Vehicle 
S-IB - First Stage of the Saturn IB Launch Vehicle 
S-IVB - Second Stage of the Saturn IB Launch Vehicle 
SAL - Scientific Airlock 
SAS - Solar Array System 
S/C - Spacecraft 
SL - Skylab 
SM - Service Module 
STDN - Spacecraft Tracking and Data Network 
TACS - Thruster Attitude Control"System 
TCS - Thermal Control System 
TM - Telemetry 
TV - Television 
UV - Ultraviolet 
VHF - Very High Frequency 
APPENDIX 1 - Hardware Description
 
The Skylab cluster was made up of four major units
 
which were launched by a two-stage Saturn V rocket. The
 
cluster consisted of the Orbital Workshop (OWS) (figure
 
3), Airlock Module (AM) (figure 4), Multiple Docking Adapter
 
(MDA) (figure 5), Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) (figure
 
6), and related support structures and thermal and meteoroid
 
shielding. The instrument unit, mounted on the forward
 
end of the OWS, served as the guidance package for the launch
 
vehicle. An Apollo Command and Service Module (CSM), in
 
which three astronauts were launched by a Saturn IB rocket,
 
rendezvoused and docked at the MDA. The entire cluster
 
in orbit, including the CSM, was sometimes called the Or­
bital Assembly (OA) (figure 2).
 
The Skylab cluster was 36 meters (118.5 feet) long
 
and weighed 90,607 kilograms (199,750 pounds). The total
 
work space in the OWS, AM, MDA, and CSM was 347 cubic meters
 
(12,398 cubic feet).
 
In the launch configuration (figure 17) the Skylab
 
workshop elements were mounted directly above.the second
 
stage. An 11,794 kilogram (26,000 pound) Payload Shroud
 
(figure 7) covered the ATM, MDA, and AM during the launch
 
phase. The ATM was forward of the MDA until the cluster
 
reached orbit and the shroud was jettisoned. The ATM was then
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moved by a deployment mechanism 90 degrees to one side.
 
This exposed the docking port on the forward end of the
 
-MDA to which the CSM docked. (A port on the side of the
 
MDA could be used, if necessary, for rescue purposes.)
 
Orbital Wqrkshop
 
ASafurn IB second stage (S-IVB) was modified and out­
fitted on the ground as living and working quarters for
 
threeastronauts. It contained the majority of the expendable
 
storage, served as a structural support for a large solar
 
array, and carried the cold gas storage and thrusters for
 
the attitude control system. The stage's liquid hydrogen
 
tank served as a 292 cubic meter (10,426 cubic foot) space
 
laboratory. The OWS weighed 35,380 kilograms (78,000 pounds).
 
The S-IVB converted for Skylab had no engine or pro­
pulsive hardware other than the attitude contol thrusters.
 
A reusable access hatch replaced an existing manhole in
 
the forward tank dome. (A personnel hatch was also added
 
to the side of the stage to permit workmen and technicians
 
easy access during the checkout and prelaunch phase. This
 
side hatch was sealed before launch.)
 
Aluminum open-grid floors and ceilings were installed
 
in the tank to divide it into a two-story "space cabin."
 
An aluminum foil, fire retardant liner was placed on the
 
inside tank surfaces and a meteoroid shield on the exterior.
 
Two solar arrays were mounted on the outside.
 
Crew quarters (figure 18) were at the aft end of the
 
tank. A ceiling grid separated the quarters from the labora­
tory area in the forward end. Solid partitions divided the
 
crew quarters into a sleep compartment, wardroom, waste
 
management compartment and an experiment compartment. Lighting
 
fixtures were mounted on the crew quarters' ceiling. The
 
waste management compartment was sealed separately with
 
walls and doors to retain odors and loose particles in the
 
weightless environment. Crew quarters also contained five
 
radiant heaters. Three radiant heaters were in the forward
 
compartment.
 
The wardroom had about 9.3 square meters (100 square
 
feet) of area; the waste management compartment had 2.8
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square meters (30 square feet) of floor space; the sleep
 
compartment about 6.5 square meters (70 square feet); and
 
the experiment area about 16.7 square meters (180 square
 
feet).
 
The workshop's thermal control and ventilation system
 
gave the astronauts a habitable environment with a temperature
 
ranging from 15.6 to 32.20C (60 to 900F). A two-gas (oxygen
 
and nitrogen) atmosphere was used with internal pressure
 
kept at 3.45 N/cm2 (five psi). Fans circulated the atmosphere.
 
Solar arrays on the OWS (figure 19) and ATM provided
 
electrical power for the cluster.- The systems were cross­
linked for flexibility in handling peak loads and for counter­
ing failures. The electrical power distribution system
 
connected OWS areas with power sources in the AM and the
 
solar cell assembly. Light fixtures had individual controls,
 
and portable lights were used for illumination as needed.
 
(One solar array on the OWS was torn loose during ascent
 
to orbit and the interconnected systems saved the mission
 
from immediate failure.) The meteoroid shield was intended
 
to decrease the probability of hazardous punctures of the
 
OWS. A 0.06-centimeter (0.025-inch) aluminum sheet was
 
to be held against the OWS outside, surface during launch.
 
Once in orbit, this shield was to be deployed by swinglinks
 
(powered by torsion bars) and held 5 inches from the wall.
 
(At 63 seconds in the flight, this shield was torn off-­
see Mission Summary.) Another shield was a fixed 'double
 
wall aluminum alloy covering the Thruster Attitude Control
 
Subsystem (TACS) cold gas spheres on the aft end of the
 
OWS.
 
Water and food for Skylab's operational lifetime was
 
stored inside the OWS, the water in tanks in the forward
 
experiments area and the food in compartments and freezers
 
in that area and in the wardroom.
 
The wardrbom had a window 0.46 meters (18 inches) in
 
diameter in the middle of its wall. The window, double­
paned and heated to prevent fogging, faced the sunlit side
 
of the Earth during the mission.
 
The liquid oxygen tank of the S-IVB stage was converted
 
into a waste container. An airlock was installed in top
 
of the common bulkhead. The trash disposal section of the
 
tank had 62.5 cubic meters (2,233 cubic feet) of space and
 
the liquid dump area had 7.4 cubic meters (264 cubic feet).
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Twenty-three spheres containing cold gaseous nitrogen
 
for the TACS and pneumatics were mounted on the aft end
 
of the OWS. These were protected by a thermal shield around
 
the OWS circumference at the aft end and by the aft meteoroid
 
shield. The radiator for life support system (LSS) refriger­
ators and freezers were mounted aft of the TACS spheres
 
and shield. Two attitude control thrusters of three nozzles
 
each were on the aft end on opposite sides of the OWS.
 
Two "wings" of the solar panels were originally folded
 
against the OWS on opposite sides for launch. Once in orbit,
 
the arrays were to deploy to expose almost 219 square meters
 
(2,355 square feet) of solar cells to the Sun's rays--enough
 
to produce as much as 10,500 watts of power at 550C (1310 F).
 
('The launch problem caused one array to be torn loose and
 
the other to be held in the undeployed position--see Mission
 
Summary.)
 
Forward Compartment
 
The forward compartment (figures 20 and 21) occupied
 
the greater part of the habitation area. It was separated
 
from the crew quarters by an 8-inch beam structure with
 
an aluminum grid on each side. The forward,compartment
 
is divided into three main sections--the experiments area,
 
the stowage ring, and the dome.
 
The main items in the dome section include the entry
 
hatch and the ventilation control system mixing chamber
 
and ducts.
 
The stowage ring (figure 22) was at the point where
 
the cylindrical forward experiments area joined the dome.
 
Mounted on the ring were ten water tanks, each having a
 
usable capacity of about 272 kilograms (600 pounds) of water.
 
A portable water tank was also available in the forward
 
compartment. Also on the stowage ring were 25 lockers con­
taining supplies needed throughout the OWS.
 
The forward experiments area contained food lockers
 
and freezers, two Scientific Airlocks, and various items
 
of equipment for performing a number of experiments: the
 
ultraviolet panorama experiment; the body mass measurement
 
device; contamination measurement equipment; photographic
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equipment; astronaut maneuvering equipment; EVA suits; film
 
vault and scientific instruments.
 
Two Scientific Airlocks (SALs) were located in the forward
 
compartment (figure 23). These SALs provide a method of
 
deploying experiments through the wall of the OWS with depres­
surization.
 
Crew Compartment
 
The crew compartment was separated into four basic
 
areas: a wardroom, waste management compartment, sleep
 
compartment, and an experiment compartment.
 
The wardroom (figuire 24) occupied about one quarter
 
of the space int the area of the crew compartment. It
 
provided faciliC:ies for food preparation and serving, earth
 
observations,.and crew relaxation.
 
The wardroom had a window, double-paned and heated
 
to prevent fogging. The room had four general illumination
 
light fixtures.and emergency egress openings in the floor
 
and ceiling.
 
The wardroom had 58 stowage lockers, a food chiller
 
and -two food freezers, containing food, tissues and wipes,
 
medical kits, off-duty equipment, clothing modules, towels,
 
flight data files, trash bags and scientific equipment.
 
The food management table was located near the center of
 
the room.
 
The astronauts had three storage lockers available
 
for temporary storage of cans of food, one compartment for
 
storage of snacks and beverages, and a six-well empty food
 
can disposal unit.
 
Off-duty equipment was stowed in a corner cabinet.
 
On the door was a tape player and tape cassettes. The
 
cabinet contained headsets, microphones, batteries, playing
 
cards, 36 paperback books, a dartboard and velcro-tipped
 
darts, balls, exercising equipment and binoculars.
 
The Waste Management Compartment (WMC) (figure 25)
 
was a rectangular room between the wardroom and the sleep
 
compartment. It contained fecal and urine collection equip­
ment, waste processing and urine management facilities,
 
personal hygiene facilities, crewman restraint provisions
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and privacy and contamination control accommodations. Waste
 
management and personal hygiene equipment and supplies were
 
stored in the WMC.
 
The WMC had 15 stowage compartments, a urine holding
 
compartment, a fecal/urine collector (toilet), a waste
 
processor module, a urine freezer, a handwasher, food re­
straints and overhead handrails, sample return containers,
 
a vacuum cleaner and four mirrors.
 
Three Individual Personal Hygiene Modules (IPHM) were
 
stored in the WMC, containing shaving and dental equipment
 
and supplies, soap, emollient, swabs, hair-groom brush and
 
cream, nail clippers, deodorant and expectorant collectors.
 
Each kit occupied a separate locker. In the same row of
 
lockers was one with washcloths and towels.
 
The fecal/urine collector was mounted on'the. WMC wall.
 
The collector, analogous to a toilet seat, was mounted in
 
such a position that the weightless user appeared to be
 
sitting on the wall facing the floor.
 
Waste processing and urine management facilities included
 
a waste processing chamber, urine holding compartment and
 
urine freezer. In support of the medical experiments, three
 
insulated urine sample return containers were stowed in
 
the OWS forward compartment until transferred into the CM
 
for return to Earth. Specimen containers were bag assemblies
 
that were strapped to CM lockers for the trip to Earth.
 
The sleep compartment (figure 26) was roughly triangular
 
and was subdivided into three individual private rooms.
 
The compartment provides noise abatement and light baffling
 
provisions, sleep restraints, personal and mission equipment
 
and supplies, individually controlled lighting and emergency
 
egress provisions.
 
Each of the areas in the sleep compartment held a sleep
 
restraint, a sleeping-bag type arrangement into which the
 
astronaut enclosed himself to keep from floating about the
 
area.
 
The sleep compartment had light baffles on the ceiling
 
and overhead privacy curtains. -The areas were separated
 
by hard walls and fabric doors.
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The experiment compartment (figure 27) occupied about
 
half of the crew's living and working section. This section
 
was the experiments area and OWS control center. It had
 
trash disposal facilities and mission and experiment equip­
ment stowage facilities. It was lighted by general illumi­
nation fixtures which could be supplemented by portable
 
lights if needed.
 
Major items of equipment in the experiments compartment
 
included the trash disposal airlock, a rotating litter chair,
 
lower body negative pressure devide; and ergometer, metabolic
 
analyzer and the experiment support system (ESS).
 
Waste Tank
 
A "trash dump" was carried oh Skylab. The S-IVB liquid
 
oxygen tank was modified to serve as a-storage container
 
for solid trash and a dump-ing facility for.waste liquids.
 
It had a total volume of 80 cubic-.meters (2,826 cubic feet).
 
The waste tank (figure 28) was divided into compartments
 
by screen enclosures, the largest of which was for trash
 
disp6sal. Uncontained waste liquids entered the liquid
 
dump compartment at three points. The unconfined liquid
 
rapidly evaporated or solidified and then sublimated so
 
that it could be vented overboard as a gas. The tank was
 
vented to space through two nonpropulsive vents.
 
Multiple Docking Adapter
 
The Multiple Docking Adapter, or MDA, provided a perma­
nent interface with the Airlock Module and a docking interface
 
with the Command and Service Modules (CSM). The MDA permitted

the transfer of personnel, equipment, power, and electrical
 
signals between the docked module, the AM, and the workshop.
 
The MDA general configuration consisted of a forward
 
conical OWS cylinder, provided a shroud'around the aft portion
 
of the AM and structural mounting for the AM and MDA modules
 
the ATM Deployment Assembly and the Skylab oxygen supply
 
tanks. It supported the payload shroud, the ATM, AM, and
 
MDA during boost.
 
The truss assemblies attached the AM to the FAS and
 
provided exterior mounting 9!$ructures for battery, electronic,
 
thermal, and experiment equipment.
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Some of the basic functions provided to Skylab by the
 
AM were: (1) Oxygen and nitrogen storage for atmosphere
 
supply, (2) Thermal control for Skylab atmosphere, (3) Puri­
fication of Skylab atmosphere, (4) OWS/AM electrical power
 
control and distribution, (5) Lock, hatch and support for
 
extravehicular activity, (6) Instrumentation for real time
 
and delayed data transmission, (7) Caution and Warning displays
 
and tones, (8) Command link with ground network, (9) Ranging
 
link for CSM rendezvous, (10) Tracking lights, (11) Teleprinter,
 
(12) Experiment support, and (13) Equipment stowage.
 
Structural Transition Section
 
The STS was at the forward end of the airlock tunnel
 
and was physically secured to the MDA. It provided the
 
structural transition from the MDA to the airlock tunnel
 
and its trusses. It is constructed as a welded aluminum
 
cylinder of stressed skin in a semimonocoque configuration.
 
Four double pane glass viewing ports, one in each quadrant,
 
were provided for visibility.
 
Airlock Tunnel Assembly
 
The AM tunnel assembly provided the passageway from
 
the MDA/STS to the OWS. It was constructed of aluminum
 
and was cylindrical in shape. The tunnel was divided into
 
three compartments by two internal bulkheads equipped with
 
hatches. The forward hatch lead to the STS via the forward
 
tunnel, and the aft hatch to the OWS through the tunnel
 
extensions. The center compartment included a crew hatch
 
for EVA. It was the same hatch originally designed for
 
the Gemini spacecraft and was roughly trapezoidal in shape
 
and curved to match the wall of the AM. It had internal
 
and external hatch handles and a window and was kept closed
 
and sealed by 12 latches. When unlatched, the hatch swung
 
outward.
 
The two AM internal hatches are quite similar in appear­
ance and function. Both are circular and both swing outward
 
from the lock compartment. Each has a hatch opening of
 
120.1 centimeters (47.3 inches) in diameter. Each hatch
 
has a bulkhead and a cylindrical structure. The MDA has
 
a primary axial docking port at the forward end and a backup
 
or rescue port.
 
'197
 
In orbit the MDA functioned as a major experiment
 
control center for Solar observations; metals and materials
 
processing; and the Earth resources experiments. The MDA
 
was positioned with either the +Z axis pointing earthward
 
to provide an orientation for the Earth Resources Experiment
 
Package (EREP) or with the -Z axis pointed toward the Sun
 
for solar observations.
 
The Apollo Telescope Mount was operated by the astro­
nauts from the Control and Display (C&D) console in the
 
MDA (figure 29). There the crew actively controlled the
 
telescopes.
 
The "Materials Processing in Space" facility (figure
 
30) was mounted in the module and provided a furnace or
 
vacuum work chamber with an electron beam generating device.
 
The external surface of the MDA (figure 31) is covered
 
by a radiator/meteroid shield structure that stands 7.6
 
centimeters (3 inches) from the pressure skin.
 
The docking system was a means of connecting and dis­
connecting the CSM/MDA during a mission and of providing
 
for intravehicular transfer between the two modules. Docking
 
was achieved by maneuvering the CSM close enough to the
 
MDA so that the extended probe engaged the drogue on the
 
MDA (figure 32). When the probe engaged the drogue through
 
the capture latches, the probe retract system was activated
 
to pull the MDA and CSM together. Upon retraction, the
 
MDA tunnel ring activated 12 automatic latches and effected
 
a pressure seal between the modules.
 
Airlock Module
 
The Airlock Module (AM) (figure 33) was the structural
 
assembly between the OWS and the MDA.
 
The Structural Transition Section (STS) connected the
 
tunnel assembly to the MDA structure. The tunnel had hatches
 
at each end to form an airlock to permit the astronauts
 
to perform extravehicular activities without depressurizing
 
the complete spacecraft. Egress to space was through a
 
hatch on the side of the AM. A flexible extension connected
 
the tunnel assembly to the OWS to continue the passageway
 
while isolating structural loads from the OWS forward dome.
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The Fixed Airlock Shroud (FAS) which was a continuation
 
of the window, 21.6 centimeters (8.5 inches) in diameter
 
with a stainless steel grid shield, pressure equalization
 
valve, stiffeners and nine latches. The latches are the
 
same type used on the EVA hatch.
 
Fixed Airlock Shroud
 
The Fixed Airlock Shroud (FAS) (figure 34) was a cylin­
drical structure that joined with the IU and extended forward
 
to surround the AM aftercompartment and about two-thirds
 
of the lock compartment. It served as a structural support
 
for the ATM, AM, MDA and Payload Shroud (PS) and supported
 
the mounts for oxygen tanks.
 
Also carried on the FAS were two discone antennas which
 
were deployed away from the OA once in orbit. The antennas
 
were stowed for launch in the +Y+Z and -Y+Z quadrants halfway
 
between the trusses. Pivot/attach points were on the inside
 
of the FAS wall. Each antenna was in two sections. The
 
sections were folded together at a rotary joint which rested
 
against the AM. In orbit the antennas were deployed--one
 
at 45 degrees from -Z toward -Y and the other at 45 degrees
 
from -Z toward +Y.
 
Truss Assemblies
 
The four AM truss assemblies located outside provided
 
the longitudinal support for the AM between the FAS and
 
STS. They provided mounting support for experiments, con­
sumable containers and other hardware. The four trusses
 
are located symmetrically around the tunnel assembly. A
 
single point on each truss attached the assembly to the
 
FAS. Truss 1 is at +Y; truss 2 is at -Z; truss 3 at -Y,
 
and truss 4 at tZ.
 
Apollo Telescope Mount
 
The Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) accommodated a variety
 
of telescopic instruments for the solar investigations.
 
The ATM also had a solar array which generated about half
 
of Skylab's electrical power, and the ATM structure housed
 
primary stabilization and attitude control components for
 
the total spacecraft.
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The operational ATM (figure 35) system consisted of
 
five major hardware elements: The cylindrical experiment
 
canister (figure35) which housed the solar astronomy experi­
ments; the Attitude Pointing and Control System; the solar
 
array wings; the Control and Display (C&D) console which
 
was in the MDA and which provided the capability for astro­
naut operational control and monitoring; and the rack as­
sembly, a large octagonally-shaped structural frame which
 
surrounded the canister and provided structural attachment
 
points for the solar and thermal shields, outrigger assemblies,
 
solar arrays, Deployment Assembly, experiment pointing control­
roll positioning mechanism and numerous subsystem components.
 
The experiments canister consisted of the Spar, the
 
MDA and Sun-end canister halves, and the canister girth
 
ring.
 
The spar (figure 36) was a cruciform structure con­
strueted of three 1-inch thick insulation covered aluminum
 
plates which provided structural support of the experiments
 
and experiment pointing control components (fine Sun sensor,
 
rate gyros, etc.). Girdling the center of the spar was
 
a girth ring which provided the structural interface between
 
the experiments canister and the rack mounted experiment
 
pointing control-roll positioning mechanism. The girth
 
ring provided attach points for the canister halves which
 
enclosed the spar mounted experiments to provide a contami­
nation-free environment for the experiments.
 
The MDA end canister half included four film retrieval
 
doors which are used for in-orbit experiment film retrieval
 
and replacement. The Sun-end canister half contained two
 
film retrieval doors and ten aperture doors on the Sun-end
 
bulkhead. These aperture doors covered the fine Sun sensor
 
and experiment apertures during nonoperating periods to
 
prevent optical contamination. (The experiments canister
 
included the EPCS gyros and an active thermal control system
 
to provide a stable thermal environment for the experiments.)
 
Mounted on the ATM were major elements of Skylab's
 
Attitude and Pointing Control System (APCS) that provided
 
three-axis attitude stabilization and maneuvering capability
 
for the orbiting vehicle. It also provided the capability
 
of pointing experiments at desired locations, such as the
 
Sun, the Earth, and other targets of interest.
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The APCS is comprised of the Instrument Unit/Thruster
 
Attitude Control Subsystem (IU/TACS), Control Moment Gyros
 
Subsystem/Thruster Attitude Control Subsystem (CMGS/TACS)
 
and Experiment Pointing Control System (EPCS).
 
The EPCS maintained fine attitude pointing and control
 
about two axis for the ATM instrument package. The third
 
axis (roll) was controlled from the C&D console. The ATM
 
instrument package could be manually pointed to any desired
 
location on the solar disk or its outer perimeter.
 
Vehicle attitude information was derived from strapdown
 
reference computations in the ATM Digital Computer using
 
rate gyro information, and, during orbital daytime only,
 
Sun sensors. The ATMDC processed the sensor signals to
 
generate the CMB gimbal rate commands. The astronaut had
 
the capability of manually controlling the CMGS through
 
his keyboard on the ATM C&D console.
 
Control Moment Gyros
 
Three double-gimbaled CMGS hardmounted at 90 degree
 
angles to the ATM actuated the system. (A CMG is basically
 
a spinning wheel that provides the forces required for
 
vehicle control.)
 
The ATM (CMG) consisted of an induction-motor-drive
 
constant-momentum rotor, gimbal supported to provide two
 
degrees of freedom. Associated with each CMG was an Electronics
 
Assembly for positioning the gimbals and controlling the
 
gimbal rates, and an Inverter Assembly for providing power.
 
Each CMG has an angular momentum storage capability of 2,300
 
foot-pound-seconds.
 
The EPCS provided fine pointing control and stability
 
for the ATM experiments, further isolating them from any
 
disturbance torques from the Skylab assembly. This system
 
provided control to within 2.5 arc seconds for periods up
 
to 15 minutes, utilizing fine pointing Sun sensors for attitude
 
reference. 'The experiment package could be offset pointed
 
within a +24 arc min square centered on the solar disc.
 
It could also be rotated to any desired roll orientation
 
through +120 degrees.
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To help maintain stability and alignment for the scientific
 
instruments, a thermal control loop was incorporated within
 
the skin of the experiment canister to circulate liquid
 
coolant. This active thermal control system was self con­
tained within the canister. The water/methanol cooling
 
fluid transfers heat absorbed from cold plates to radiators
 
on the exterior side of the experiment canister, where it
 
radiated into space. The active coolant systems maintained
 
an average temperature within the canister of approximately
 
120C (530 F). Each experiment also had its own thermal control
 
heaters, designed to maintain its temperatures within about
 
+0.60C (lOF).
 
As part of the ATM control and displays, two selectable
 
video presentations were available to the astronaut conducting
 
the experiments. Pictures of the Sun were displayed in
 
various wavelengths from several of the solar instruments;
 
thus a crewman onboard the spacecraft was able to assure
 
proper identification and tracking of solar events of interest
 
and point the instruments with a high degree of accuracy
 
or spatial resolution (1 arc second corresponds to about
 
700 kilometers (434 statute miles) on the solar disk).
 
The ATM solar array consisted of four individual wing
 
assemblies which were stowed in a folded configuration during
 
launch and deployed in orbit at 900 to each other.
 
The solar cell panels were made up of a framework of
 
rectangular aluminum tubing mounting solar cell modules.
 
The four outboard panels of each wing mounted 20 modules.
 
The inboard panel mounted 10 modules on the outboard portion
 
of the panel.
 
The ATM was mounted on the ATM Deployment Assembly
 
(DA) which provided in-orbit structural support between
 
the ATM and the Fixed Airlock Shroud (FAS) and deployed
 
the ATM upon reaching orbit.
 
Payload Shroud
 
The Payload Shroud (PS) was a smooth structure which
 
surrounded and protected the ATM, MDA, AM, and associated
 
hardware during the launch and climb-out phase of the mission.
 
The principal requirement was to provide an aerodynamic
 
and environmental protection cover for Skylab elements and
 
structural support to the ATM during the prelaunch and launch
 
phases. Once in orbit, the PS was split into four sections
 
or quadrants by pyrotechnic devices and jettisoned. The
 
four shroud sections were joined with "shear" rivets and
 
-latching link mechanisms.
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The total PS was 6.5 meters (21.7 feet) in diameter
 
at the aft end (interface locking ring), 16.8 meters (56
 
feet) long and weighed 11,794 kilograms (26,000 pounds).
 
Command Service Module
 
The Skylab Command and Service Module was basically
 
the same CSM (J-type) used during the Apollo Program.
 
Numerous modifications and certain deletions had been made
 
to accommodate the unique mission requirements of the Skylab
 
missions.
 
CSM 116, 117, and 118 were flown on SL-2, SL-3, and
 
SL-4 respectively. CSM 119 was available as backup or
 
rescue vehicle if it had been needed.
 
Major modifications included the addition of a 12-tank
 
reaction control system (RCS) propellant storage module,
 
with a total of 680 kilograms (1,500 pounds) of propellants
 
to more than double the former RCS propellant capacity,
 
expansion of the spacecraft's thermal control system, addi­
tion of a 50-gallon water tank to eliminate water dumps,
 
addition of three 500-ampere-hour descent batteries, deletion
 
of one of the vehicle's three fuel cells, and deletion of
 
two of the four service propulsion system (SPS) propellant
 
tanks and one of the two helium tanks.
 
Command Module
 
The Command Module (figure 37) transported three crew­
men and between 453-680 kilograms (1,100-1,500 pounds) of
 
stowed equipment to and from Skylab, served as the primary
 
communications vehicle and command station for the SWS,
 
provided backup attitude control, and had the capability
 
of being reactivated after 56 days of semidormancy in space.
 
The CSM guidance and navigation system was powered
 
down and the command module computer was maintained on
 
standby during orbit activities.
 
At launch, the CSM cabin atmosphere contained 60
 
percent oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen. Lithium hydroxide
 
(LiOH) cartridges were changed after 12 hours of use or
 
if CM carbon dioxide partial pressure exceeded 5.5 mm mercury
 
pressure.
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LiOH cartridge replacements were stored in the MDA and
 
deployed in the CM. The LiOH system was operative only
 
during CSM use and during molecular sieve bakeout deacti­
vation.
 
The CSM fuel cells remained on hydrogen-oxygen cryogenic
 
supply for approximately 13 days or until the supply was
 
depleted. Residual hydrogen was vented to space and excess
 
oxygen was vented through the cluster or vented overboard.
 
Entry and post landing batteries (A and B) were turned
 
on five minutes prior to an SPS burn and turned off immediately
 
after completion of the burn. The batteries were charged
 
immediately after docking.
 
The Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter, or SLA, was a
 
large truncated cone which connected the CSM and second
 
stage of the launch vehicle. For Skylab flights SL-2,
 
SL-3, and SL-4 the adapter contained only a stabilizing
 
structure to brace the outer shell.
 
Service Module
 
The Service Module was a cylindrical structure which
 
served as a storehouse of critical subsystems and supplies.
 
It remained attached to the Command Module from launch until
 
just before Earth atmosphere entry. Its main propulsion
 
engine was used to perform rendezvous maneuvers and the
 
deorbit burns for return to Earth.
 
Saturn V
 
Saturn V vehicle AS-513 was designated SL-l for the
 
first Skylab launch. The S-IC and S-II stages of the launch
 
vehicle were essentially the same as those used in the lunar
 
landing missions. From the S-Il stage forward, the vehicle
 
was considerably different. The Apollo launch vehicle had
 
an S-IVB stage, IU, SLA, LM, SCM, and LES. On the SL-l,
 
the S-IVB was replaced by the Orbital Workshop (OWS).
 
Forward of the OWS was the IU, AM, MDA, and ATM; all except
 
the IU were enclosed in the PS. The LES was not required
 
since SL-1 was not manned. Total weight of the SL-l launch
 
vehicle and payload was approximately 2,822,300 kilograms
 
(6,222,000 pounds). Height of the total assembly was 101.71
 
meters (333.7 feet). Payload capability was near 90,720
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kilograms (200,000 pounds). The S-IC and S-II propulsive
 
stages of the launch vehicle were each 10.06 meters (33
 
feet) in diameter.. The S-IC was 42.06 meters (138 feet)
 
long and the S-II was 24.84 meters (81.5 feet) long.
 
Several major changes were made to meet requirements
 
of the Skylab mission. The boost acceleration limit was
 
increased to 4.7 g for Skylab. (On Apollo missions the
 
limit was set at 4 g because those vehicles were manned.
 
Since the SL-1 mission was unmanned, the restriction on
 
"g-force was not as stringent.)
 
The S-IC engine cutoff sequence for Apollo missions
 
was center engine first and then the outboard engines.
 
On SL-l the center engine was cut off first, followed by
 
cutoff of two opposing outboard engines and then the remaining
 
two outboard engines. The 1-2- cutoff sequence was programmed
 
to gradually reduce slowdown instead of initiating it suddenly.
 
Cutting off all four outboard engines at once would have
 
subjected the ATM to a dynamic load that could have caused
 
problems.
 
On Apollo missions, the terminal stage (last to provide
 
propulsion) was the S-IVB; on SL-l it was the S-II. There­
fore, a number of changes had to be made to the S-II. First,
 
provisions were made for S-II engines to be cut off by
 
guidance signal instead of by propellant depletion. This
 
enabled cutoff precisely at the desired velocity. Also,
 
provisions were made to separate the S-II from the Skylab
 
payload in such a manner as to preclude recontact.
 
The IU provided the initial payload attitude control
 
signals and events-sequencing to enable systems activation
 
and checkout functions. These included: jettison payload
 
shroud; initiate ATM deployment; acquire solar inertial
 
attitude; activate the Attitude and Pointing Control System
 
(APCS); and transfer attitude control to the ATM.
 
Changing the launch azimuth from 72-100 degrees on
 
Apollo missions to 40.88 degrees for Skylab made it manda­
tory to revise vehicle maneuvers at liftoff. On Apollo
 
launches, the launch azimuth was slightly north of due east.
 
A yaw maneuver caused the vehicle's boattail to move toward
 
the launch tower in a direction slightly west of due north.
 
This aimed the vehicle slightly east of south, causing it
 
to move away from the tower as it rose. On the SL-l launch,
 
a yaw maneuver alone would move the boattail northwest and
 
aim the vehicle southeast, which would not result in sufficient
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clearance of the tower for safety. Therefore, a pitch maneuver
 
was combined with the yaw to cause the boattail to move
 
directly northward toward the tower, aiming the rising vehicle
 
southward away from the tower.
 
The Emergency Detection System (EDS) on Apollo launches
 
was on a closed loop, providing abort capability and retention
 
of telemetry of critical functions. On SL-1 the EDS was
 
on an open loop which eliminated the abort feature by retained
 
.critical functions on telemetry. On SL-l, the only abort
 
command possible was by the range safety officer. He could
 
have destroyed the unxanned vehicle if it presented a hazard
 
to inhabited areas.
 
Saturn IB
 
The SA-206, 207, and 208 launch vehicles which carried
 
the three Skylab crews into orbit and rendezvous with the
 
Skylab cluster were basic Saturn IB vehicles with modifi­
cations to update them to the SA-205 configuration. (SA­
206, 207, and 208 were originally configured for unmanned
 
flight.)
 
Each of the three Saturn IB vehicles consi'sted of the
 
S-IB and S-IVB, (first and second propulsive stages, respec­
tively) the instrument unit (IU) and the payload.
 
The SL-2 launch vehicle, SA-206, was made up of the
 
S-IB-6, S-IVB-206, S-IU-206, and CSM-116. The SL-3 launch
 
vehicle, SA-207, consisted of the S-IB-7, S-IVB-207, S-IU­
207, and CSM-117. The SL-4 launch vehicle, SA-208i con­
sisted of the S-IB-8, S-IVB-208, S-IU-208, and CSM 118.
 
Each launch vehicle with payload stacked was 68.3
 
meters (224 feet) tall and weighed about 589,680 kilograms
 
(1,300,000 pounds). The payload capability for the launch
 
vehicle was 16,012 kilograms (35,300 pounds) for SA-206,
 
16,507 kilograms (35,400 pounds) for SA-207, and 16,239
 
kilograms (35,800 pounds) for SA-208.
 
Each Saturn IB was launched from Launch Complex (LC)
 
39 at KSC. LC-39 was normally used for launching the larger
 
Saturn V vehicle. The Saturn IB rested on a 39 meter (127
 
foot) tall pedestal on the launch platform. (The pedestal
 
held the vehicle at the proper height above the platform
 
to use existing tower swingarms with fueling, power and
 
instrumentation facilties.)
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Most of the changes made to the Saturn IB were a part
 
of the continuing effort to improve the vehicle. Some
 
changes, however, were necessary to support the Skylab Program.
 
A number of changes eliminated single-point electrical failures
 
and provided redundancy. Engine thrust was uprated to improve
 
the payload capability. Other changes improved the vehicle's
 
reliability by eliminating possible problems, such as leaks
 
and corrosion. One change provided a means of dumping residual
 
fuel through the J-2 engine of the second stage. Other
 
changes added sensors to collect needed data.
 
Engine cutoff circuits in both propulsive stages were
 
redesigned to eliminate inadvertent engine cutoff. Two
 
vibration sensors and one pressure measurement device were
 
added for evaluation of possible longitudinal oscillations
 
("Pogo") and load responses if such should occur in flight.
 
Eac'h of the eight H-1 engines was uprated from 889,600
 
Newtons (200,000 pounds) to 911,840 Newtons (205,000 pounds)
 
thrust to. increase the payload capability. Total stage
 
thrust was increased from 7,116,800 Newtons (1,600,000 pounds)
 
to 7,294,720 Newtons (1,640,000.pounds).
 
The capability was added to deorbit the S-IVB/IU stages
 
of SL-2, SL-3., and SL-4 by dumping residual propellants
 
through the J-2 engine to alter the vehicle's trajectory.
 
By controlling the vehicle's attitude and the time and duration
 
of the dump, the S-IVB/IU was impacted in the ocean. The
 
maneuver was commanded in real time after considering vehicle
 
trajectory, condition, and capability. Sending the spent
 
stage into the ocean eliminated the hazard of space debris
 
impacting a populated land area.
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APPENDIX II
 
Skylab Experiments
 
The Skylab experiment program consisted of more than
 
270 scientific and technical investigations representing
 
virtually every field that has been recognized as being
 
able to benefit from operations in near-earth orbit. The
 
instruments, sensors and other equipment for conducting
 
these experiments and investigations were located in various
 
parts of Skylab, some inside and some outside.
 
The experiment program was developed through the joint
 
cooperation of engineers and scientists from both foreign
 
and dosmetic educational institutions, private industry,
 
and Government agencies. Included were 19 experiments pro­
posed by high school students. The 54 items of experiment
 
hardware included available off-the-shelf equipment whenever
 
practicable to reduce costs. On the other hand, sophisticated
 
hardware not used before on manned spacecraft was developed
 
when required to meet certain experiment objectives.
 
The major experiment areas were:
 
Life Sciences - 19 experiments to support some 28 investi­
gations dealing with the effects on men and animals of long
 
duration in the space environment.
 
Solar Physics - Nine solar instruments to provide un­
precedented observations for 45 investigations of solar
 
phenomena.
 
Earth Observations - Six remote sensing instruments
 
to support more than 140 individual investigations for the
 
study of the Earth from space.
 
Astrophysics - 14 instruments to make observations
 
to support 24 studies of the solar system and'beyond.
 
Material Science - The properties of orbital weight­
lessness were exploited to investigate the advantages of
 
materials processing in space - 18 experiments.
 
Engineering and Technology - To advance the knowledge
 
for design and operation of future space systems - 13
 
experiments.
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Student Experiments - 19 investigations.
 
A basic set of biomedical data had been collected as
 
a safety monitoring procedure on all the manned flights
 
of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. The parameters
 
recorded have been heart and respiration rates, body tempera­
tures, and blood pressure. These were supplemented by a
 
variety of pre and postflight measurements of such factors
 
as exercise capability, cardiovascular stress response,
 
hematological-biomedical changes, immunology studies, and
 
microbiological evaluations. In the Gemini program, medical
 
experiments of limited scope were conducted in flight to
 
investigate the time course of the changes which had been
 
noticed on previous missions.
 
The following physiological effects of spaceflight
 
on man have been observed: Loss of body weight; a small
 
and inconsistent loss in bone calcium and muscle mass; and
 
generally a reduction in orthostatic tolerance upon return
 
to Earth.
 
These effects completely reversed themselves within
 
a few days after return to Earth and showed no consistent
 
relations to flight duration. However, some concern remained
 
that continued effects in extended missions could signifi­
cantly reduce man's effectiveness in space and increase
 
the danger of re-adapting to the gravity conditions on Earth.
 
The Skylab biomedical program consisted of:
 
- The actual stay of nine men in space, with the 
associated operational medical monitoring and the observations 
of crew performance in a wide variety of scientific and 
operational tasks. 
- The biology experiments designed to study funda­
mental biological processes affected by the space environment. 
- The biotechnology experiments directed toward 
advancing the effectiveness of man-machine systems in space 
operations and improving the technology of space-borne bio­
instrumentation. 
Mineral Balance (M071)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to collect data
 
for a predictive understanding of the effects of spaceflight
 
on the muscle and skeletal systems by measuring the day-to­
day gains or losses of pertinent biochemical constituents.
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The data collected in support of MOT1 was: Daily
 
body weight, accurate food intake (quantity and composition),
 
accurate fluid intake, volume of 24-hour urine output,
 
samples of pooled 24-hour urine output, determine the mass,
 
process, and store all feces and vomitus, if any (all col­
lected and processed inflight for return and postflight
 
analysis) and preflight, inflight and postflight blood samples
 
taken for analysis.
 
Urine was analyzed for calcium, phosphorus, magnesium,
 
sodium, potassium, chlorine, nitrogen, urea, hydroxproline
 
and creatinine. Feces were analyzed for calcium, sodium,
 
phosphorus, magnesium, potassium and nitrogen. Blood was
 
analyzed for calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, alkaline
 
phosphotase, sodium, potassium, total protein, glucose,
 
hydroxyproline, oreatinine, chloride and electrophoretic
 
pattern.
 
Principle investigator was G. D. Whedon, M.D., National
 
Institutes of Health, and L..Lutnak, M.D., Cornell University.
 
Bio-Assay of Body Fluids (M073)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to assess the effect
 
of space flight on endocrine-metabolic functions including
 
fluid and electrolyte control mechanisms.
 
•The data collected in support of M073 were: Daily
 
body weight, accurate food intake (quantity and composition),
 
accurate fluid intake, volume of a 24-hour urine output,
 
samples of pooled 24-hour urine output (collected and processed
 
inflight for return and postflight analysis), and preflight,
 
inflight and postflight blood samples taken for analysis.
 
Urine was analyzed for sodium, potassium, .aldosterone,
 
epinephrine, antidiurectic hormones (ADH), urine osmolality,
 
hydrocortisone, total body water and total and fractional
 
Ketosteroids. Blood was analyzed for renin, sodium, potas­
sium,.chloride, plasma osmolality, extracellular fluid volume
 
(ECF), parathyroid hormone, thyrocalcitonin, throxine,
 
adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), hydrocortisone and total
 
body water.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Carolyn S. Leach, Johnson
 
Space Center.
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Specimen Mass Measurement (MOM7)
 
The primary purpose of this experiment was to demon­
strate the capability of accurately weighing 50 to 1,000
 
gm masses in a null gravity environment. The secondary
 
purpose was to provide a means of accurately determining
 
the mass of feces, vomitus and food residue generated in
 
flight. These mass measurements provided data for M071
 
and M073 experiments.
 
The Specimen Mass Measurement Device was a device that
 
utilized the inertial property of mass in lieu of a gravity

field to determine mass. Basically, the SMMD consisted
 
of a spring mounted tray. The oscillatory period of the
 
spring was a function of the amount of mass on the tray.
 
The spring's period was measured electro-optically, and.
 
this measurement was electronically converted to a direct
 
mass read out onboard.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. William E. Thornton,
 
Johnson Space Center, and coinvestigator was Col. John W.
 
Ord, Medical Corps, USAF Hospital, Clark Air Force Base,
 
Phillippine Islands.
 
Bone Mineral Measurement (M078)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to assess the effects
 
of the space flight environment on the occurrence and degree
 
of bone mineral changes.
 
The data collected are preflight and postflight gamma
 
ray scans of the heel bone and right radius of the forearm.
 
Comparison of these gamma ray scans give a comparison of
 
bone density (a measure of bone calcification) before and
 
after flight. The experiment was conducted preflight and
 
postflight only.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. J. M. Vogel, U.S. Public
 
Health Service, San Francisco, California, and coinvestigator
 
was Dr. John R. Cameron, the University of Wisconsin Medical
 
Center.
 
Lower Body Negative Pressure (M092)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to provide information
 
concerning the time course of cardiovascular adaptation

during flight, and to provide inflight data for predicting
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the degree of orthostatic intolerance and impairment of
 
physical capacity to be expected upon return to Earth environ­
ment.
 
The data collected in support of M092 were blood pressure,
 
heart rate, body temperature, vectorcardiogram, Lower Body
 
Negative Pressure Device (LBNPD) pressure, leg volume changes,
 
and body weight.
 
The LBNPD consisted of a cylinder which enclosed the
 
lower half of the subject. A diaphragm formed an air seal
 
around the subject's waist. Provisions were made to lower
 
the pressure in the cylinder thus exposing the lower body
 
to a series of negative pressures. This negative pressure
 
simulated the effects of the normal hydrostatic pressure
 
of the blood in the cardiovascular tree, or a person standing
 
erect on a one-g field.
 
Two Leg Volume Plethysmographs (one for each leg) were
 
required. (These devices were capacitance gauges for measuring
 
the expansion of the legs on exposure to the LBNPD vacuum.
 
The amount of expansion is a measure of the amount of blood
 
pooling in,the legs.)
 
The Blood Pressure Assembly consisted of a pressure
 
cuff affixed around the upper arm, a microphone to pick
 
up the Korotkoff's sounds, and signal conditioners. These
 
interfaced with a programming unit to cycle the pressure
 
cuff automatically, the electronic circuitry for blood
 
pressure decisions and displays, and calibration circuitry
 
in the Experiment Support System (ESS).
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Robert L. Johnson, Johnson
 
Space Center, and coinvestigator was Col. John W. Ord, Medical
 
Corps, Clark Air Force Base.
 
Vectorcardiogram (M093)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to measure the
 
vector cardiographic (VCG) potentials of each astronaut
 
during the preflight, inflight, and postflight periods so
 
that flight-induced changes in heart function can be
 
detected.
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The VCG was also used to determine crewmen heart rates
 
during the M092 and MI71 experiments.
 
The data collected in support of M093 was a readable
 
VCG taken at regular intervals throughout the mission while
 
the crewmen were at rest and before, duringi and after
 
specific exercise periods.
 
The VCG system consisted of an eight-electrode input
 
harness, a Frank Lead Network, calibration and timing circuits,
 
and three ECG signal conditioner channels. The VCG system

presented three normalized, amplified ECG signals and an
 
analog heart rate signal to the spacecraft telemetry system.
 
A bicycle ergometer (part of the M171 system) was used to
 
provide a specific exercise profile with which to compare
 
the VCG data.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Newton W. Allebach,
 
USN Aerospace Medical Institute, Pensacola, Florida, and
 
coinvestigator was Dr. Raphael F. Smith, School of Medicine,
 
Vanderbilt University.
 
Cytogenetic Studies of the Blood (Mll)
 
The objectives of this experiment were to make pre­
flight and postflight determinations of chromosone aberration
 
frequencies in the peripheral blood leukocytes of the Skylab
 
flight crewmen and to provide "in vitro" radiation dosimetry.
 
Another objective was to acquire data that would add to
 
the findings of other Skylab cytologic and metabolic experi­
ments to determine the genetic consequences of long duration
 
space travel on man.
 
Periodic blood samples were taken before and after
 
the flight, beginning 1 month before and ending 3 weeks
 
after recovery. The leukocytes were placed in a short
 
terminal culture. During the first cycle mitotic activity
 
in the "in vitro" cultures, standard chromosome preparations
 
of the Leukocytes will be prepared.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Lillian H. Lockhart
 
of the University of Texas Medical Branch. Coinvestigator
 
was P. Carolyn Gooch of Brown and Root-Northrop.
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Man's Immunity - In Vitro Aspects (Mll2)
 
The objective of this experiment was to assay changes
 
in humoral and cellular immunity as reflected by the concen­
trations of plasma and blood cell proteins, blastoid transfor­
mations and synthesis of ribonucleic (RNA) and desoxyribonucleic
 
(DNA) acids by the lumphocytes.
 
The experiment obtained preflight baselines (21, 7,
 
and 1 days before launch), indications of normal metabolism,
 
from the crewmen and a ground control group composed of
 
three men physically similar to the crewmen. Inflight blood
 
samples were taken four times from each crewman during the
 
SL-2 mission and eight times from each crewman during the
 
SL-3 and SL-4 missions. Seven days and 21 days after recovery,
 
samples were taken from each crewman. Information was compared
 
with preflight baselines, inflight profiles and with data
 
from the control group to detect any significant deviations.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Stephen E. Ritzmann,
 
and coinvestigator was Dr. William C. Levin, both of the
 
University of Texas Medical Branch.
 
Blood Volume and Red Cell Life Span (M113)
 
The objective of this experiment was to determine the
 
effect of earth orbital missions on the plasma volume and
 
the red blood cell populations with particular attention
 
paid to the changes in red cell mass, red cell destruction
 
rate, red cell life span, and red cell production rate.
 
This experiment had four parts; in each, a different
 
radioisotope tracer was injected into crewmen's veins and
 
into a control group.
 
The site of red blood cell (RBC) production in the
 
mature adult is the marrow of membranous bones (e.g.,
 
sternum and vertebrae) with the rate of production dependent
 
on metabolic demands and the current red cell population.
 
The rate of RBC production was measured quantitatively by
 
injection of a known quantity of a radioactive iron tracer
 
into crew members.
 
Since the rate of RBC production acts with RBC loss
 
to increase or decrease the total RBC mass present at a
 
given time, any changes in the rates of RBC production and
 
destruction will be necessarily reflected in the red cell
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mass. Changes in red cell mass were measured and analyzed
 
in the flight crew members by injection of radioactive
 
chromium (in the form of sodium chromate) tagged red cells.
 
To determine the selective age dependent erthrocyte
 
destruction and mean red cell life span, carbon-fourteen
 
labelled glycine was injected into a superficial arm vein
 
of each crew member and control subject.
 
Finally, plasma volume changes were measured by adding
 
a known amount of radioiodinated human serum albumin to
 
each crew member's blood.
 
Blood samples were frozen and returned to Earth for
 
postflight analysis.
 
Blood samples of each crewman were taken preflight
 
(21, 20, 14, 7, and 1 days before launch), inflight (four
 
times for SL-2, eight times for SL-3), and postflight (re­
covery day 1, 3, 7, 14, and 21 days after recovery).
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Phillip C. Johnson, Jr.,
 
Baylor University College of Medicine.
 
Red Blood Cell Metabolism (MI14)
 
The objective of this experiment was to determine if
 
any metabolic and/or membrane changes occur in the human
 
red blood cell as a result of exposure to the space flight
 
environment.
 
This experiment assessed the influence of the space
 
flight environment on the metabolic processes which support
 
crewmen's erythrocytes. The experiment was designed to
 
complement Experiment M113.
 
Blood samples of each crewman were taken preflight
 
(21, 7, and 1 days before launch), inflight (four times
 
during SL-2, eight times during SL-3), and postflight (re­
covery day 1 and 14 days after recovery).
 
Blood was analyzed for methemoglobin, glyceraldehyde­
6-phosphate dehydrogenase, phophglyceric acid kinase, reduced
 
gluthathione, adenosine triphosphate, glutathione reductase,
 
lipid peroxide levels, acetylocholinestecase, phosphofructo­
kinase-2, 3-diphosphoglycerate, and hexokinase.
 
BLood samples were frozen and returned to Earth for
 
postflight analysis.
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Principal investigator was Dr. Charles E. Mengel,
 
University of Missouri School of Medicine.
 
Special Hemotologic Effect (Mll5)
 
The primary objective of this experiment was to examine
 
critical physiochemical blood parameters relative to the
 
maintenance of a stable state of equilibrium between certain
 
blood elements and to evaluate the effects of spaceflight
 
on these parameters. A secondary objective was to provide
 
essential data on blood which assisted in interpreting other
 
hematology/immunology experiments.
 
Blood studies made on Gemini and Apollo astronauts
 
have shown that changes in red cell mass, blood constituents
 
and in the fluid and electrolyte balance can be expected
 
as a result of the space environment.
 
Blood samples of each crewman were taken preflight
 
(21, 14, 7, and 1 day before launch), inflight (four times
 
on SL-2, eight times on SL-3), and postflight (recovery
 
day 1, 3, 7, 14, and 21 days after recovery).
 
Blood was analyzed for sodium, potassium, single cell
 
hemoglobin, red blood cell hemoglobin, RNA, protein distri­
bution, hemoglobin characterization, electrophoretic mobility,
 
red blood cell age profile, red blood cell electrolyte distri­
bution, membrane and cellular ultrastructure, acid and osmotic
 
fragility, critical volume, volume distribution, red blood
 
cell count, white blood cell count, differential white cell
 
count, micro hematocrit, platelet count, hemoglobin, and
 
reticulocyte count.
 
Blood samples were frozen and returned to Earth for
 
postflight analysis.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Stephen L. Kimsey, Johnson
 
Space Center. Coinvestigator was Dr. Craig L. Fischer, Eisenhower
 
Memorial Hospital.
 
Human Vestibular Function (M131)
 
The purpose of this experiment was threefold: To test
 
the crew's susceptibility to motion.sickness in the Skylab
 
environment; to acquire data fundamental to an understanding
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of the functions of human gravity receptors in the prolonged
 
absence of gravity; and to test for changes to the sensitivity
 
of the semicircular canals.
 
The data collected in support of M131 werei Threshold
 
perception of rotation; motion sickness symptoms caused
 
by out-of-plane head motions while being rotated; and the
 
ability of crewman to determine his orientation with respect
 
to spacecraft reference points with visual cues. Data were
 
collected before, during, and after flight.
 
The inflight equipment used for M131 included:
 
Rotating Little Chair (RLC) - This chair was a framed
 
seating device which was convertible for operation in either
 
rotating or tilt litter mode.
 
Drive Motor for Chair Rotation - This motor had the 
capability of rotating the seated subject within the limits 
of 1 to 30 rpm and with an accuracy of + 1%. 
Control Console - The consoletcontained mode selector,
 
speed selector, tachometer, indicators, timers, and other ,
 
devices for control and a response matrix for coding a subject's
 
response to the rotational tests.
 
Otolith Test Goggle - This device was used to measure 
the visual space orientation in two dimensions. It provided 
the visual target for the oculogyrol illusion test. 
Custom Bite Boards - The bite boards were used to hold
 
the otolith test goggle precisely and comfortably in position
 
over the observer's eyes.
 
Reference Sphere and Magnetic Pointer/Readout Device -

These devices were used for measuring spatial localization
 
using nonvisual clues. A magnetic pointer was held against
 
the sphere and moved by the subject to determine the subject's
 
judgments of his orientation. The position was measured
 
by the three-dimensional readout device.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Ashton Graybiel, and
 
coinvestigator was Dr. Earl Miller, both of Naval Aerospace
 
Medical Research Laboratories, Pensacola, Florida.
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Sleep Monitoring (.M133)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate objec­
tively the quantity and quality of inflight sleep through
 
an analysis of electroencephalographic (EEG) and electro­
oculographic (EOG) activity.
 
It had been demonstrated that disrupted patterns of
 
sleep were associated with modifications in performance
 
capabilities. Therefore, objective investigative data
 
regarding sleep in the space environment is of practical
 
significance in terms of learning more of man's capabilities
 
and limitations in the performance of space missions.
 
The data collected in support of M133 were: Preflight
 
baseline EEG and EOG data on a crewman for 3 consecu­
tive nights of sleep;- periodical inflight EEG and EOG data
 
throughout a crewman's sleep period; and postflight sleep
 
EEG's and EOG's on approximately 1, 3, and 5 days after
 
recovery.
 
The M133 equipment consisted of a wholly self-contained
 
device which recorded the EEG and EOG on magnetic tape and
 
also provided telemetry data in near real time. Electrodes
 
were incorporated into a fitted cap that crewmen wore during
 
sleep periods to detect the EEG and EOG signals. The cap
 
also fitted with accelerometers to detect head movement
 
to keep this movement from influencing the sleep-stage deter­
mination systems.
 
The EEG and EOG tapes were returned at the conclusion
 
of the mission for postflight analysis.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. J. D. Frost, Jr., Baylor
 
School of Medicine, Houston, Texas.
 
Time and Motion Study (M151)
 
The purpose of M151 was to study the adaptation of
 
man in prolonged periods of zero gravity by comparing,
 
through use of time and motion determination, identical
 
activities performed by -astronauts during ground-based
 
training and inflight.
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The only inflight data required for this experiment
 
was to have the crew photograph themselves as they performed
 
flight-planned activities required of them during execution
 
of the Skylab missions. Films made by the crewmen were
 
returned and analyzed postflight. These data were compared
 
to baseline data taken during crew training.
 
Flight-planned tasks selected for analysis satisfied
 
the following functional objectives:
 
To study the locomotion of crewmen as they trans­
lated in the zero gravity environment with and without "loads."
 
To study the fine and gross motor activities of
 
crewmen in performing operations with and without the use
 
of restraints.
 
To study crewmen performing tasks which required
 
visual, tactile, auditory feedback or combinations thereof.
 
To study IVA and EVA activities.
 
- To study repeated activities performed early, 
middle, and late in the missions which showed adaptation 
to the zero gravity environment. 
Principal investigator was Joseph F. Kubis, Ph. D.,
 
of Fordham University, and coinvestigator was Edward J.
 
McLaughlin, Ph. D., of NASA Office of Manned Space Flight.
 
Metabolic Activity (M1TI)
 
The primary purpose of this experiment was to determine
 
if man's metabolic effectiveness in doing mechanical work
 
was progressively altered by exposure to the space environ­
ment. The secondary purpose was to evaluate the bicycle
 
ergometer as an exerciser for long duration missions.
 
The data collected in support of M171 were: ergometer
 
workrate, ergometer rpm, oxygen uptake, carbon dioxide out­
put, minute volume, vital capacity, respiratory quotient,
 
heart rate, blood pressure, vectorcardiogram, body weight,
 
body temperature, and Skylab environmental parameters.
 
A metabolic analyzer was used to measure oxygen uptake,
 
carbon-dioxide output, and minute volume. These determi­
nations were made through the use of a spirometer and mass
 
spectrometer.
 
228 
The bicycle ergometer was used to provide a calibrated
 
workload.
 
Principal investigator was E. L. Michel, and coinvesti­
gator was Dr. J. A. Rummel, both of the Johnson Space Center.
 
Body Mass Measurement (M172)
 
The Body Mass Measurement experiment demonstrated body
 
mass measurement in a null gravity environment, validated
 
theoretical behavior of this method, and supported those
 
medical experiments for which body mass measurements were
 
a requirement.
 
The data collected in support of M172 were: Preflight

calibration of BMMD And measurement of known masses up to
 
100 kilograms (220 pounds) three times during each Skylab
 
mission. The BMMD was also used for daily determination
 
of the crewmen's weight.
 
The self-contained instrument consisted of a spring/

flexure pivot mounted chair, the method of operation being
 
similar to that for the Small Mass Measurement (MO74).
 
A photo optical pickup was mounted beneath the chair to
 
determine zero crossing, and its output was timed and con­
verted to a direct mass readout.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. W. E. Thornton of the
 
Johnson Space Center.
 
Effect of Zero G on Single Human Cells (S015)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to determine the
 
effect of zero gravity on living human cells in a tissue
 
culture. The data collected in support of S015 were:
 
Time lapse cinematographic films of inflight tissue culture
 
growth and crew logs. Also, the tissue cultures were
 
returned for postflight analysis.
 
The flight hardware for Ekperiment S015 consisted of
 
a microscope-camera assembly and a growth curve module
 
subsystem, both enclosed in a single hermetically sealed
 
package.
 
A separate specimen chamber for each microscope pro­
vided temperature controlled environments in which to grow
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the cell cultures. Each chamber had its own independent
 
media exchange to provide fresh nutrients to the cultures
 
twice each day.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. P. 0. Montgomery, and
 
coinvestigator was Dr. J.. Paul, both Dallas (Texas) County
 
Hospital; Dr. P. Kruse, Jr., Noble Foundation, and Dr. L.
 
Hayflick, Stanford University.
 
Circadian Rhythm - Pocket Mice (S071)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if
 
the daily physiological rhythms of mammals were altered
 
in space flight. If the rhythms are changed or affected,
 
the indication would be that physiological rhythms are
 
timed by some factor not found in space. Changed or affected
 
rhythms alter the basic control of metabolism. It is impor­
tant that normal biological rhythms in man be maintained
 
for his well being and effectiveness during spaceflight.
 
If normal physiological rhythms are maintained, the con­
clusion can be made that spaceflight does not impose bio­
rhythm restriction and that man can work in space without
 
degrading his performance due to bio-rhythm disturbance.
 
The experiment consisted of six pocket mice placed
 
in a completely dark cage having 150C (600 F) temperature,
 
relative humidity of 60%, and an atmospheric pressure
 
equivalent to sea level.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Robert G. Lindberg
 
of Northrop Corporate Laboratories.
 
(This experiment failed on launch and, therefore, no
 
data were obtained.)
 
Circadian Rhythm - Vinegar Gnat (SO72)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if
 
the daily emerging cycle of the vinegar gnat (drosophila)
 
pupae was altered during space flight.
 
Extensive experiments have shown that even though gnats
 
in the pupal stage develop at different rates depending
 
on temperature, they will not emerge from the pupae as adult
 
gnats until some kind of internal signal is given off.
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This triggering signal is somehow timed to occur at an
 
exactly fixed time delay after a flash of light, and it
 
occurs at the same daily interval thereafter, regardless
 
of the temperature.
 
The experiment was to have measured the emergence
 
times of four groups at 200C (680F) to find out whether
 
spaceflight conditions change the mechanism which kept
 
the rhythm constant despite changes in temperatures.
 
Principal investigator was Colin S. Pittendrigh of
 
Stanford University.
 
(This experiment also failed at launch and, thus, no
 
data were obtained.)
 
Solar Physics
 
The Sun is one of the most widely studied objects in
 
the sky but much about it remains a mystery. Such questions
 
as the origin of solar flares, the development and decay
 
of active regions, and the temperature characteristics of
 
the corona remain; Until recently it was possible to observe
 
solar emissions only at wavelengths which could penetrate
 
the Earth's atmosphere--visible and radio emission. Vital
 
ultraviolet and X-ray regions of the solar spectrum are
 
cut off from earth-bound viewing. Also, the daytime atmos­
pheric scattering of visible light causes the sky to be
 
much brighter than the solar corona. Thus, rare solar
 
eclipses are the only opportunities to view the extended
 
solar corona.
 
The Sun is the ultimate source of all energy on the
 
Earth, and all terrestrial life depends on it. The Sun
 
is also the nearest star. An understanding of the stars
 
depends on an understanding of the Sun. The Sun is an
 
astrophysical laboratory close at hand. By using the Sun,
 
studies can be made of atomic, nuclear and plasma physics,
 
aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, and magneto-hydrodynamics.
 
A better understanding of the following solar physics
 
problems was awaiting use of the instruments in space to
 
study the Sun:
 
How is the corona heated?
 
What is the nature of the atmospheric structural
 
detail?
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What do coronal streamers look like in space?
 
What is the relationship between these streamers and
 
surface features?
 
What are solar flares?
 
How do active regions evolve?
 
Several instruments studied a region of the solar
 
atmosphere (chromosphere). This region is from about 800
 
to 9,650 kilometers (500 to 6,000 miles) above the Sun's
 
surface. Temperature in this region increases from about
 
5,000 to 1,000,0000C. The much higher temperatures of the
 
chromosphere give rise to the ultraviolet radiation. UV
 
radiation was studied in terms of particular emission
 
features at specified wavelengths. These studies revealed
 
the types of atoms present in this region under various
 
phases of solar activity and have shed light on the mecha­
nism which supplies the heat to this region. Three different
 
UV detector experiments are on the ATM, and an additional
 
UV detector was aboard for operation through an airlock.
 
The solar corona begins about 9,650 kilometers (6,-000
 
miles) above the surface and continues far into space.
 
The density of matter in the corona is quite low, but tem­
peratures vary from almost a million degrees in quiet regions
 
to tens of millions of degrees in certain regions during
 
solar flares. These high temperatures cause the ions and
 
electrons in the corona to radiate X rays. X-ray telescopes
 
on Skylab were equipped with cameras to photograph the
 
X-ray corona of the Sun.
 
Because the corona is so large and hot, many free
 
electrons are available to scatter the white visible light
 
radiated from the surface of the Sun. This scattered light
 
is very much weaker than the radiation from the solar surface.
 
A coronagraph is an instrument capable of studying the faint
 
corona without viewing the bright solar surface. Since
 
the intensity of scattered light is a measure of the electron
 
density in the corona, photographs take out to 4.8 kilometers
 
(3,000,000 miles) from the surface provided the first look
 
at the corona over an extended period.
 
Experiment 3020, X-ray/UV Solar Photography, was one
 
experiment planned to be conducted using an airlock in the
 
sunlit side of the OWS. All other solar physics experiments
 
were mounted in the ATM.
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X-ray/Ultraviolet Solar Photography (S020)
 
The objective of S020 was to record on photographic
 
film the detailed energy spectrum of X-ray and ultraviolet
 
radiation from normal and explosive areas in the solar
 
atmosphere.
 
The 10 to 200 angstrom region of the solar spectrum
 
is rich in emission lines of highly ionized atoms. Many
 
of these emission lines are weak and require instruments
 
of high sensitivity for their observation. S020 took
 
observations by taking advantage of the long exposure times
 
and film return capability of the Skylab spacecraft.
 
The S020 experiment was planned for long exposure
 
photography through the solar side scientific airlock.
 
This airlock was used to deploy the parasol sun shield and
 
was, therefore, not available for scientific data to the
 
PI; mounting hardware was designed to attach the experiment
 
externally during EVA to permit pictures of the Sun in that
 
spectrum to be obtained. The hardware was flown up to the
 
workshop by the third crew and was used during three EVA's
 
during their mission.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Richard Tousey, U.S.
 
Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC.
 
White Light Coronagraph (S052)
 
The White Light Coronagraph was designed to obtain
 
photographs of the solar corona out to 3 million miles
 
(6 solar radii) in visible light. These photographs, taken
 
twice daily or at rates up to one every 13 seconds during
 
periods of high limb activity, provided new information
 
related to the rapidly moving matter, sometimes travelling
 
at relativistic speeds, which is transported outward from
 
the Sun due to solar events occurring at the solar limb.
 
Systematic changes, to the extent that the corona was
 
apparent over several solar rotations, allowed correlations
 
to be made with surface features as they moved into proper
 
position on the limb of the Sun. (Earth-based coronagraphs
 
are hampered because Earth sky brightness is much greater
 
than the corona and prevents acquisition of detailed corona
 
information).
 
The experiment was approximately 3 meters (10 feet)
 
long, 0.46 meters (1.5 feet) in diameter, and weighed 142
 
kilograms (314 pounds). It included an externally mounted
 
disk system to occult (block) the brilliant solar surface
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which allowed viewing of the faint corona radiation. The
 
experiment data were presented on the TV system, which was
 
displayed on the C&D video monitors or transmitted by
 
telemetry to ground or recorded on film.
 
One loaded film camera, which contained 35mm film for
 
approximately 8,000 data frames was placed in the experiment
 
prior to launch, and three replacement film cameras were
 
stored in the MDA. Film retrieval and replacement was
 
accomplished by astronaut EVA from the center work station
 
with exposed film being returned to Earth by CM for evaluation.
 
As part of the activities associated with the observation
 
of the Comet Kohoutek, an additional film magazine was stowed
 
in the Skylab 4 Command Module. This magazine was used
 
during the last mission and doubled the scientific output
 
from this experiment on that mission.
 
Dr. Robert MacQueen of the High Altitude Observatory,
 
Boulder, Colorado, was principal investigator.
 
X-ray Spectrographic Telescope (S054)
 
The X-ray Spectrographic Telescope took sequential
 
photographs of X-ray producing events (flares and active
 
regions) for determining corona temperatures and energetic
 
particle densities. This information was correlated with
 
similar data from other experiments.
 
The X-ray telescope consisted of two concentric mirrors
 
of highly polished metal alloy to intercept the X-radiation
 
and focus it at grazing incidence. Filters of beryllium,
 
aluminized mylar and other materials with varying thickness
 
selected the X-ray wavelength band to be photographed.
 
A transmission grating was used in conjunction with the
 
filters to obtain information on the spectral features of
 
the X-ray emission.
 
The telescope weighed more than 136 kilograms (300
 
pounds) and was 3 meters (10 feet) long and almost meter
 
(1.5 feet) in diameter.
 
A small 7.6 centimeter (3 inch) grazing incidence in­
strument placed in the unused central portion of the larger
 
telescope was used to provide a "live" picture of the Sun
 
in X rays for the astronaut to view. This aid complemented
 
the H-alpha images in TV and assisted the astronauts in
 
getting the best possible data from the ATM.
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Dr. Riccardo Giacconi, American Science and Engineering
 
Corporation, was the principal investigator.
 
UV Scanning Polychromator Spectroheliometer (S055)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to observe temporal
 
changes in the ultraviolet (EUV) radiation emitted by several
 
types of solar regions. The EUV region of the solar spectrum
 
is generated in the chromosphere and lower corona. The
 
instrument operated photoelectrically and required no film.
 
All data were recorded electronically. The instrument was
 
capable of accurately measuring the strength of certain
 
emission features of elements with high time resolution
 
in various stages of ionization. It observed seven emis­
sion lines in the wavelength region from 300 to 1,350 angstroms.

Simultaneous observations of chromospheric and coronal layers
 
of flares were obtained, and the energy radiated in selected
 
emission lines in the EUV region was measured.
 
Radiation from the Sun entered the instrument and was
 
reflected by a mirror which was movable along both axes.
 
The mirror was adjusted to place the desired square segment
 
of the solar surface on the spectrometer grating. The rest
 
of the light was reflected back and out of the instrument.
 
The radiation was-broken up into its spectral components
 
and the EUV portion was received by seven detectors. The
 
eighth detector was a zero order position and, hence, saw
 
light at all wavelengths. The zero order detector indicated
 
whether or not the solar disk was being viewed.
 
The instrument was 3 meters (10 feet) long and 0.6
 
by 0.6 meters (2 by 2 feet) in cross section. It weighed
 
156.5 kilograms (345 pounds).
 
Dr. E. M. ,Reeves of Harvard College Observatory was
 
principal investigator.
 
X-ray Event Analyzer/D-ray Telescope (S056)
 
The objective of the S056 experiment was to gather
 
solar radiation data in the X-ray region of the solar spec­
trum which provided information regarding physical processes
 
occurring within the solar atmosphere, with special emphasis
 
on data of active solar phenomena such as solar flares.
 
This information will lead to an increased knowledge of
 
the influence of the Sun's magnetic field on flare development
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and a more definite understanding of the relationships
 
between Sun spots and solar flare formation. The experi­
ment consisted of two separate and independently operated
 
instruments, the X-ray Event Analyzer (X-REA) and the X­
ray Telescope (X-RT) which obtained complementary X-ray
 
data.
 
The X-ray Event Analyzer provided spectral data (photon
 
intensity as a function of wavelength) in 10 bands from
 
2 to 20 angstroms. These spectral data served two purposes:
 
(1) Their real time in orbit display on the C&D console
 
gave the astronaut solar X-ray and microwave flux informa­
tion necessary for pointing and operating the X-RT; and
 
(2) their analysis provided detailed flare temperature,
 
density and chemical abundance information.
 
The X-RT recorded solar images in the form of X-ray
 
filtergrams (images viewed in narrow wavelength intervals)
 
in five band widths from 5 to 33 angstroms and one band
 
width in visible light. The filtergrams provided temporal
 
(time oriented) and spectral (position oriented) variations
 
of the spectral data in flare regions.
 
The X-REA consisted of two gas filled proportional
 
counters, pulse height analyzers, and associated electronics
 
components. The proportional counters produced linear out­
puts proportional to the solar energy levels detected.
 
The pulse height analyzer sorted the proportional counter
 
outputs, with respect to amplitude, into six energy levels
 
in one output channel and four energy levels in the other.
 
These data were then transmitted via telemetry to the Earth
 
and/or displayed on the counter or activity history plotter
 
of the ATM Control and Display Console for real time in­
oribt astronaut information display.
 
The X-RT consisted of a telescope using glancing inci­
dent optics to obtain solar images on photographic film.
 
Film retrieval and replacement was accomplished by EVA with
 
three replacement film canisters, each containing film for
 
about 7,200 data frames, stored in the MDA. Exposed film
 
canisters were returned to Earth in the CM for data evalua­
tion. (A fourth canister was flown to the workshop on
 
SL-4 for comet observation.)
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Operation of the X-RT camera and the X-REA was by the
 
astronaut at the ATM Control and Display Console. The level
 
of X-RT operation depended upon solar activity with the
 
astronaut selecting patrol mode with a quiet Sun or active
 
modes with an active Sun which required more photographs
 
per unit of time. The astronaut was capable of acquiring
 
targets to photograph using experiment pointing control
 
of the ATM canister which was provided from the C&D Console.
 
James E. Milligan of the Marshall Space Flight Center
 
was principal,investigator.
 
XUV Spectrograph/Spectroheliograph (S082)
 
These experiments sequentially photographed the Sun
 
over long periods required for proper studies in selected
 
ultraviolet wavelengths. Resulting pictures (spectro­
heliograms) showed specific emission features greatly enhanced
 
over photographs of the solar disk in white light. Therefore,
 
the Sun appears quite "blotchy" with much of the emission
 
confined to active regions. The spectroheliograph ("A"
 
instrument) covered the wavelength region from 150 to 650
 
angstroms (EUV regions). The spectrograph ("B" instrument)
 
took data highly resolved into wavelengths in the middle
 
and near ultraviolet region. This instrument could be
 
pointed anywhere on the solar disk to obtain detailed emission
 
characteristics of a region only 1,600 kilometers (1,000
 
miles) wide.
 
The astronaut took photographs of the Sun with the
 
spectroheliograph. He selected the wavelength range to
 
be studied and the exposure time. The "B" instrument was
 
used to take spectra at various portions of the limb or
 
solar disk. The astronauts selected the mode of operation
 
and the wavelength region to be eovered. The XUV monitor
 
provided a display of 150-650 angstrom activity and gave
 
an indication of XUV images being taken photographically
 
by the "Al' instrument.
 
The "B" instrument consisted of a mirror and entrance
 
slit which selected portions of the solar disk or limb to
 
be viewed. A set of two gratings spread the UV region from
 
970 to 3,940 angstroms onto photographic film. An XUV
 
monitor allowed the Sun to be viewed by the astronauts on
 
TV in the XUV regions. The instrument weighed-169 kilograms
 
(373 pounds).
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Dr. Richard Tousey of the Naval Research Laboratory
 
was principal investigator.
 
H-Alpha Telescopes
 
The H-Alpha Telescopes provided the primary means for
 
the boresight pointing of the ATM experiment package. There
 
are two telescopes sensitive to the red hydrogen alpha lights
 
of the Sun in the H-Alpha package. One was equipped with
 
a beam splitter for simultaneous photographic and television
 
pictures. The other telescope was operated in the TV mode
 
only. Both telescopes were equipped with a Fabry-Perot
 
filter to make precise observations at the desired wavelength.
 
A zoom capability allowed specific portions of the solar
 
disk to be viewed in detail. These telescopes took TV and
 
photographic pictures of the solar disk showing flare activities
 
as tremendously enlarged H-Alpha emission sources, which
 
are the primary mode of classifying the size of a flare
 
region.
 
The H-Alpha telescope was one of the "eyes" of the
 
astronaut. Active regions were followed as they traversed
 
the solar disk. When flares were observed, the amount of
 
H-Alpha emission was correlated with emission intensities
 
in other energy regions.
 
One telescope weighed 86 kilograms (190 pounds) and
 
was 2.7 meters (9 feet) long and approximately 0.3 meters
 
(1 foot) in diameter. The second telescope which was not
 
used for photographic purposes was 1.5 meters (5 feet) long,
 
0.3 meters (1 foot) in diameter and weighed 50 kilograms
 
(110 pounds).
 
Dr. E. M. Reeves of Harvard College Observatory was
 
the principal investigator.
 
Earth Observations
 
Remote sensing of the Earth from orbital altitudes
 
has the potential of yielding information which is of
 
fundamental importance for effective use and conservation
 
of natural resources in both underdeveloped and technologically
 
advanced nations.
 
Photography from orbital altitudes in the visible and
 
near-infrared spectral regions has already proven to be
 
invaluable for standard synoptic mapping of geographic
 
features over large areas. Systematic use of multispectral
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remote sensing techniques over an extensive wavelength region
 
has the potential of greatly extending the scope of this
 
capability to include mapping of terrestrial resources and
 
land uses on a global scale. Resources amenable to study
 
are: crop and forestry cover; health state of vegetation;
 
types of soil; distribution of snow pack; surface or near­
surface mineral deposits; sea-surface temperatures; and
 
the location of likely feeding areas for fish. Comprehensive
 
surveys of such resources will help cope with developing
 
world-wide problems of such accelerating urgency as food
 
supplies, mineral shortages, energy needs, environment
 
pollution and expanding patterns of human settlements.
 
Many of the environmental features requiring study
 
are in remote regions of the Earth and are highly variable
 
in time. Space Systems can offer the following distinct
 
advantages over conventional aircraft: a broad field of
 
view afforded by the increased altitude; periodic coverage
 
of the same area; and coverage of areas otherwise not easily
 
accessible.
 
The earth resources program objectives are to gather
 
natural and cultural resource data and to monitor environ­
mental and ecological relationships. Major areas of applica­
tion are agriculture, forestry, hydrology, geology, oceanography,
 
geography, meteorology and ecology. Some of the specific
 
applications in these areas are:
 
Agriculture/forestry: Improve planning and marketing
 
with current crop census and yield estimates; increase yield
 
by determining soil characteristics and optimizing water
 
management; and reduce losses by early identification of
 
disease, infestation, etc.
 
Oceanography: Improve fishing productivity by locating
 
cold water upwellings, biologically rich areas, optimum
 
thermal conditions; improve ship routing by measurement
 
of sea state, detection of navigation hazards, and monitoring
 
of sea ice; and improve development of continental shelves
 
by mapping submarine topography and locating oil seeps.
 
Hydrology: Inventory of water sources for optimum
 
water management; identify new sources of fresh water; monitor
 
health and other characteristics of lakes; identify, monitor
 
and evaluate pollution; and predict and assess flood damage.
 
Geology: Identify geologic features related to mineral
 
resources such as faults, folds and later changes in rock
 
beds; and monitor dynamic features such as volcanic eruptions,
 
landslides and coastal and rivers dimentation changes.
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Geography: Inventory and classify man's activities
 
through production of thematic maps; and understand physical
 
geography to improve rural and urban development.
 
Currently, earth resources data are being collected
 
by ocean ships and buoys, sounding rockets, aircraft flights
 
and spacecraft. Each method has advantages and disadvantages.
 
In general, direct, or ground sensing, methods provide greater
 
accuracy than remote sensing methods. Sensor resolution
 
may be the limiting factor in remote sensing. However,
 
much of the desired earth resources data can be provided
 
satisfactorily with present sensors and those currently
 
being developed.
 
The Skylab Earth Resources Experiment Program, (EREP)
 
composed of six remote sensing systems, was designed as
 
a spaceborne facility for use as a part of, and in support
 
of, the already existing broad-base international studies
 
on the techniques and application of earth remote sensing.
 
These studies encompassed multispectral -sensing at ground
 
level, by aircraft, and by unmanned spacecraft in addition
 
to Skylab.
 
The Skylab EREP provided additional and more precise
 
data on spacecraft sensing capabilities, allowing a more
 
thorough evaluation of sensor techniques and returned-data
 
correlation and application. Also, the manned earth resources
 
satellite offered unique features'not presently possible
 
with automated systems. These were the ability to evaluate
 
test site conditions, to acquire and track uniform, small
 
test sites off the ground track, and to vary the data
 
acquisition activities as a system conditions warrant.
 
The EREP sensors could be operated individually as
 
a group, depending on the scientific requirements and other
 
factors such as weather and vehicle capability. Data were
 
recorded on tape and film and returned to the Earth for
 
processing.
 
Each EREP experiment consisted of the data collecting
 
instrument and the necessary support hardware for equipment
 
mounting and stowage. The experiments were centrally
 
controlled from the EREP control and display panel. EREP
 
data were recorded on magnetic tape by the tape recorder.
 
These data were supplemented by voice annotation and MDA
 
housekeeping data.
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The EREP hardware was located on the interior and
 
exterior of the MDA. External doors were opened on the
 
S190, 5191 and 5192 experiments to permit optical Viewing
 
of the Earth'-s surface.
 
Principal investigators numbering more than 100 from
 
the United States and 40 from other nations were selected
 
for earth observation experiments.
 
Data from EREP was correlated with information acquired
 
from aircraft and ground observations and sensors on the
 
NASA Earth Resources Technology Satellite. More than 850
 
scientists submitted proposals in April-June 1971, for
 
investigations using LANDSAT and EREP data.
 
Multispectral Photography Facility (S190)
 
S190 had been designed to photograph regions of the
 
Earth's surface, including oceans, in a range of wavelengths
 
from near infrared through the visible. The facility was
 
in two parts: The Multispectral Photographic Camera (S190A),
 
six channel 70 mm cameras that simultaneously photographed
 
the same area, each viewing a different wavelength; and
 
the Earth Terrain Camera (S190B), a single lens camera.
 
The S190A experiment used a six-channel, high-precision
 
70 mm camera system. The matched distortion and focal length
 
camera array contained forward motion compensation to correct
 
for spacecraft motion. The six-inch focal length lenses
 
had a field of view of 21.1 degrees across flats providing
 
a square surface coverage of about 169 kilograms (88
 
nautical miles) from the expected 435 kilogram (235 nautical
 
mile) altitude. The system was designed for the following
 
wavelength/film combinations:
 
.5 - .6 Micrometers Pan-XB&W
 
.6 - .7 " Pan-XB&W
 
.7 -. 8 i IR B&W
 
.8 - .9IR B&W
 
.5 - .88 IR Color
 
.4 - .7 "HI RES Color
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The spectral regions designated were selected to separate
 
the visible and photographic infrared spectrum into the bands
 
that were expected to be most useful for multispectral analysis
 
of earth surface features. Further spectral refinements
 
were made by using different filter combinations.
 
The S190B portion utilized a single 18-inch focal length
 
lens with 5-inch film. Its field of view of 14.2 degrees
 
across flats provided square surface coverage of about 112
 
kilograms (59 nautical miles) from orbit. This camera was
 
designed to use high resolution color film and was operated
 
from the OWS SAL window.
 
The camera compensated for spacecraft forward motion
 
through programmed camera rotation. Shuttle speeds were
 
selectable at 5, 7, and 10 milliseconds with a curtain velocity
 
of 110 inches per second.
 
Areas of Earth surface photographed were of particular
 
interest to EREP investigators. Before each pass the crew
 
received ground update for settings, number of exposures, etc.
 
Infrared Spectrometer (3191)
 
The primary goal of Experiment 3191 was to make an evaluation
 
of the applicability and usefulness of sensing earth resources
 
from orbital altitudes in the visible through near-infrared
 
and in the far-infrared spectral regions. Another specific
 
goal was to assess the value of real-time identificaiton
 
of ground sites by an astronaut.
 
The S192 instrument had 13 spectral bands from 0.4 to
 
12.5 micrometers in the visible, near infrared and thermal
 
infrared regions. The system gathered quantitative high
 
spatial-resolution line-scan imagery data on radiation reflected
 
and emitted by selected ground sites in the U.S. and other
 
parts of the world.
 
The motion of the sensor is a circular scan with a radius
 
of 41.8 kilometers (22.6 nautical miles). Data of ground
 
scenes were recorded as the scan swept a track 75 kilometers
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(37 nautical miles) wide in front of the spacecraft, yielding
 
a 260-foot resolution at an altitude of 435 kilometers (235
 
nautical miles). The S192 optical mechanical scanner utilized
 
a 30 cm (12 inch) reflecting telescope with a rotating mirror.
 
The telescope and mirror were mounted outside the MDA.
 
The data were recorded on the EREP tape recorder. Since
 
the high data rate of S192 was not compatible with the standard
 
recording speed of the recorder, the speed was increased
 
60 inches per second during operation of the scanner.
 
Microwave Radiometer/Soatterometer/Altimeter (3193)
 
The objectives of the experiment were the near simultan­
eous measurement of the radar differential back-scattering
 
cross section and the passive microwave thermal emission
 
of the land and ocean on a global scale and to provide engi­
neering data for use in designing space radar altimeters.
 
The 3193 data was useful in studying varying ocean
 
surfaces, wear conditions, sea and lake ice, snow cover,
 
seasonal vegetational changes, flooding, rainfall and soil
 
types. The sensor generally operated over ocean and ground
 
areas where ground truth data were available; however, addi­
tional targets of opportunity, such as hurricanes and storms,
 
were viewed if the opportunity arose.
 
The 3193 incorporated a radiometer, scatterometer and radar
 
altimeter, all operating at the same frequency of 13.9 gigahertz
 
(GHz). The equipment shared a common gimballed antenna
 
mounted on the outside of the MDA. The scatterometer meas­
ured the back-scattering coefficient of ocean and terrain
 
as a function of incidence angle ranging from 0 to 52 degrees.
 
The radiometer was a passive sensor which measured the bright­
ness temperature, from a cell on the Earth's surface, as
 
a function of incidence angle from the surface.
 
The 3193 ground coverage was 48 degrees forward and
 
48 degrees to either side of the spacecraft ground track.
 
All data were recorded on magnetic tape on one digitized
 
channel.
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L-Band Microwave Radiometer (S194)
 
The experiment objective was to supplement experiment
 
S193 in measuring brightness temperature of the Earth's
 
surface along the spacecraft track,-which provided ocean
 
surface features, meteorology winds and Earth surface features.
 
The S194 experiment was a passive microwave sensor
 
utilizing a fixed planar array antenna. 3194 recorded the
 
brightness temperature of the Earth in the L-band range with
 
a digital output giving an absolute antenna temperature to
 
an accuracy of one degree Kelvin. The system utilized a
 
built-in calibration scheme that sampled known sources.
 
All data were recorded on'magnetic tapes. The data
 
output was at 200 bits per second.
 
Astrophysics
 
Until recently, progress in astronomy has been made
 
by theoretical and observational advances using instruments
 
associated with ground based optical telescopes. Skylab
 
experiments identified advantages and disadvantages of man­
attended space observations and obtained information needed
 
for planning future, more advanced instruments. Most of
 
the observations performed were of a type not possible from
 
the surface of Earth because of the absorbing and light
 
scattering effects of the atmosphere surrounding Earth.
 
Nuclear Emulsion (S009)
 
The objective of this experiment was to record the cosmic
 
ray flux incidence outside the Earth's atmosphere, more speci­
fically, the relative abundance of high energy primary heavy
 
nuclei.
 
Theories of nucleogensis predict the relative abundance
 
of nuclei that would be produced in the thermonuclear reactions
 
occurring in possible sources such as neutron stars. It
 
is, therefore, of great interest to study the relative abun­
dance of the nuclei reaching the Earth. To obtain as accurate
 
a measure as possible of the relative abundance of various
 
nuclei in the primary cosmic ray flux, nuclear emulsions
 
must be carried into space.
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The Skylab nuclear emulsion experiment provided a long
 
exposure to determine the abundance of the rarer heavy nuclei.
 
The instrument consisted of two adjacent stacks of
 
nuclear emulsion strips. This emusion differed from regular
 
photographic emulsions being considerably thicker and con­
taining a much higher density of grain material to improve
 
the detection of tracks left by charged particles. The stacks
 
were hinged together like a book and contained several layers
 
of different emulsion types.
 
The motor which opened and closed the "book" failed
 
during the first mission and the data was uninterpretable.
 
A new unit was fabricated and resupplied on SL-4 and normal
 
performance was restored.
 
The emulsion stacks were mounted inside the Skylab
 
Multiple Docking Adapter, separated from space by a thin
 
section of the spacecraft wall. During exposure, the "book"
 
was open, allowing high energy particles which had passed
 
through the wall to enter the front surface of both emulsion
 
stacks.
 
The exposed emulsion was returned to the Earth and
 
peeled apart in thin strips which were numbered, developed
 
and scanned for tracks. By measuring the variations in
 
thickness and direction of the tracks and tracing their entire
 
path through the strips, the energy and charge of the cosmic
 
rays can be determined.
 
The relative abundances of various nuclei observed from
 
the primary cosmic radiation provide crucial information
 
from which one can learn something about the physical condi­
tions where the nuclei were formed, the time that was elapsed
 
since they were formed, and the nature of their interactions
 
with interstellar material in transit.
 
Dr. Maurice M. Shapiro, Naval Research Laboratory was
 
the principal investigator.
 
Ultraviolet Stellar Astronomy (S019)
 
Experiment S019 was designed to take UV photographs
 
of large areas of the Milky Way in which young, hot stars
 
were abundant. About 50 star fields, each 4 by 5 degrees
 
in area, were photographed during each Skulab mission, two
 
to three exposures on each field. Exposure times were 30,
 
90, and 270 seconds, depending on the brightness of the stars
 
photographed. 
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The S019 experiment consisted of a 6-inch reflecting
 
telescope and a movable mirror. The telescope was operated
 
through the scientific airlock in the OWS. The rotating
 
mirror was extended through the SAL by the extension mecha­
nism to allow the telescope line of sight to be pointed over
 
a large area of the sky. The telescope was operated manually
 
by the astronaut.
 
The telescope was capable of recording ultraviolet
 
radiation down to a wavelength of 1,350 angstroms. Its main
 
objective was to study the differences from star to star
 
in the several strong spectrum lines known to exist in the
 
1,350 and 2,000 angstrom region of the spectrum.
 
Some of these lines are formed by the atmosphere of
 
the star while other lines are formed by the interstellar
 
gas between Earth and the stars. One special advantage of
 
the telescope was its ability to photograph a 4 by 5 degree
 
region of the sky and to record' the spectra of all the stars
 
in that region on one photograph.
 
The principal investigator was Dr. Karl G. Henize, a
 
scientist-astronaut of the Johnson Space Center.
 
UV Airglow Horizon Photography (S063)
 
The Ultraviolet Airglow Horizon Photography was a photo­
graphic experiment with two separate experiment assemblies.
 
One experiment assembly performed ozone photography; the
 
other assembly performed twilight airglow photography.
 
The behavior of ozone is an important factor in the
 
thermal balance of the atmosphere. The amount of absorption
 
can be determined by taking two series of simultaneous photo­
graphs. One series, using a 35mm camera with ultraviolet
 
filters, recorded the varying amounts of absorption of ultra­
violet illuminations, indicating varying densities of ozone.
 
The other series, using a second 35mm camera without UV
 
filters, was aimed at the same target but obtained color
 
photographs of atmospheric and ground features such as water,
 
mountains and clouds.
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The UV camera was mounted at the antisolar SAL and the
 
color camera in the Wardroom window.
 
The twilight airglow experiment photographed the glow
 
occurring in the upper atmosphere caused by chemical reactions
 
in the ozone, oxygen and other gases when they are stimulated
 
by the Sun's radiation. The upper atmosphere was photographed
 
at twilight against the dark sky of space.
 
Principal investigator was Dr. Donald M. Parker, Naval
 
Research Laboratory, Washington, DC.
 
Gegensohein/Zodiacal Light (S073)
 
The purpose of this experiment was to measure the bright­
ness and polarization of the visible background of the skp
 
as seen from the Skylab above the Earth's atmosphere.
 
Previous photographs and light level readings taken
 
from the ground, rockets and satellites have not been suffic­
iently accurate to distinguish between models of the sources
 
contributing to the faint visible background light of the
 
sky outside the atmosphere. Handheld photographs, taken
 
from Gemini spacecraft, of the Gegenschein, or antisolar
 
enhancement, have established that it is extraterrestrial
 
in orgin rather than a phenomenon occurring in the Earth's
 
atmosphere. An Apollo lunar orbit experiment attempted to
 
photograph the Gegenschein from the dark side of the lunar
 
orbit to determine by triangulation whether or not it is
 
due to a "zero phase" enhancement of sunlight scattered off
 
the interplanetary medium or a cloud of dust maintained in
 
the gravitational null point 1,609,000 kilometers (one million
 
miles) from the Earth, opposite the Sun., The Skylab study
 
was to be a complete survey of the sky from above the variable
 
interference of visible airglow emission and atmospheric
 
extinction.
 
There was no dedicated hardware for this experiment.
 
The T027 photometer and 16mm operational data acquisition
 
camera were used.
 
By comparing the amount of light at different colors
 
and polarizations With the spectrum of the Sun one can indirectly
 
obtain information about the sizes, shapes, composition and
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numbers of the dust particles traveling in interplanetary
 
space which reflect the sunlight and produce the zodiacal
 
light. In addition, the variation of the brightness rela­
tive to the direction of the Sun and the ecliptic plane
 
will enable the interplanetary contribution to background
 
light level to be distinguished from the interstellar back­
ground and any contribution from a hypothetical dust cloud
 
associated with the Earth and Moon.
 
During the first mission, this experiment was operated
 
for 14 hours and 37 minutes. An anomaly occurred during
 
Skylab which resulted in the jettisoning of the photometer.
 
(All scientific airlock experiments were designed so they
 
could be jettisoned if any anomaly occurred which prevented
 
their being retracted back into the workshop. S073 experi­
enced a failure in the pointing mechanism and was jettisoned
 
in order to free the SAL for use by other experiments.)
 
The crew later rigged the hardware of the coronograph contami­
nation measurement experiment (T025) and the 35 mm camera
 
from the UV airglow horizon photography experiment (S063)
 
and took seven exposures of the gegenschein. During the
 
last mission, 96 additional photographs were taken.
 
Dr. J. 'L.Weinberg, Dudley Observatory, Albany, New
 
York, was the principal investigator.
 
Particle Collection (S149)
 
The purpose of the S149 Particle Collection experiment
 
was to study the nature and distribution of interplanetary
 
dust by exposing specially prepared surfaces to space.
 
Impacts of cosmic dust at high speeds produce impact craters
 
and in some cases a portion of the profile remained at the
 
impact site. The controlled, exposed surface was also examined
 
to determine the rate of surface contamination of the Skylab
 
environment. The S149 instrument consisted of gold covered
 
smooth plates 15 centimeters (six inches) square and layers
 
of film mounted inside resealable cassettes.
 
Sets of four plates were exposed for 72-hour periods
 
during the manned missions and also during the two unmanned
 
storage periods. After being exposed to the space environ­
ment, the first set of cassettes (four) were returned to
 
Earth for analysis.
 
This experiment also helped to better define the hazard
 
to space travel posed by dust particle erosion of critical
 
optical surfaces and windows.
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The experiment hardware was to be positioned by deploy­
ment of the T027 extension device through the Scientific
 
Airlock.
 
Of course, the solar scientific airlock could not be
 
used. The S149 was deployed during EVA on the third mission.
 
Principal investigator for S149 was Dr. Curtis L. Hemenway
 
of Dudley Observatory.
 
Galactic X-ray Mapping (S150)
 
The objective of this experiment was to conduct a survey
 
of the sky for faint X-ray sources.
 
X-radiation has been observed from more than 40 stellar
 
sources over the past 10 years. Most of these studies have
 
been conducted in the energy region from 1-10 KeY using
 
rockets with a viewing time of only 3 minutes. Satellites
 
such as SAS-A, launched December 1970, have completed the
 
survey of stellar sources in the 1-10 KeV region. The Skylab
 
experiment provided sky survey in the 0.-2-12 KeV energy
 
range.
 
The instrument consisted of a set of proportional counters
 
which covered the spectral region from .2 to 12 KeV. It
 
was physically mounted on the launch vehicle. Accordingly,
 
the life time of the experiment was to be limited to 4-5
 
hours. During this time detectors with a 200 field of view
 
were to determine the location of X-ray sources to within
 
20 arc minutes.
 
In flight, a failure occurred which caused the pressure
 
around the proportional counters to decay and the high voltage
 
power supply turned itself off after 103 minutes of operation.
 
Dr. William Kraushaar, University of Wisconsin, was
 
the principal investigator.
 
Ultraviolet Panorama (S183)
 
The objective of this experiment was to measure ultra­
violet brightness of a large number of stars.
 
Rocket experiments have obtained high resolution spectra
 
of individual bright stars and the 0A0-A2 telescope has
 
obtained images of many star fields in four spectral bands.
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The Skylab experiments provided a photographic survey
 
in three bands with fine spatial and photometric resolution
 
of a number of star fields previously unavailable.
 
The instrument, a spectrographic assembly used the
 
same movable mirror as 3019. Total weight was about 175
 
pounds. The spectrographic assembly was mounted in the
 
antisolar airlock in the wall of the Skylab with the movable
 
mirror extended outward to permit viewing in different
 
directions.
 
The assembly included a grating spectrograph which
 
collected the ultraviolet light from the spectrum of the
 
stars in the field of view into 600 A wide bands centered
 
at 1800 A and 3100 A. Stars as faint as 7th magnitude were
 
recorded with 7 arc minutes of angular resolution over a
 
7 by 9 degree field of view. It also included a small Schmidt
 
camera which recorded the field of view in a 600 A wide
 
band of V radiation centered at 2500 A. angular resolution
 
over a 7 by 9 degree field of view.
 
The photographs were returned to Earth for processing.
 
From the film images, the amount of light emitted by stars
 
in the three ultraviolet bands was determined. These values
 
were compared with theoretical ultraviolet spectra and the
 
spectra of brighter stars obtained by OAO and the S019 experi­
ment to determine average ultraviolet colors or differences
 
between stars of the same type. In addition, the variation
 
with wavelength of observation of distant stars due to interstel­
lar dust were used to study the distribution and composition
 
of this dust. The overall average ultraviolet color of
 
a group of stars such as a cluster or a galaxy were compared
 
with the visible color of unexpected discrepancies.
 
The high temperature experienced in the workshop was
 
thought to have damaged the film for this experiment and
 
a new carousel was launched in the first command module.
 
During the first mission several malfunctions occurred and
 
the carousel jammed. The film was returned to Earth and
 
upon development, the quality was not as good as expected.
 
An intensive failure analysis was made both in France and
 
the United States and outgassing of the gold coating of
 
the plastic film holders was pinpointed as the cause of
 
the poor film quality. A new carousel was designed, built
 
and tested and laundhed on SL-4.
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All in all, this experiment was a highly complex mechan­
ical device and it experienced many problems (jamming, broken
 
glass, improper indexing) and the crew was able to repair
 
most problems.
 
Dr. Georges Courtes, Director of the Laboratoire d'Astro­
namie Spatiale du CRNS, Marseille, France, was the principal
 
investigator.
 
Trans-Uranic Cosmic Rays (S228)
 
The objective of this experiment was to provide a de­
tailed knowledge of the relative abundances of nuclei with
 
Z (atomic map number') greater than 26 in the cosmic radi­
ation, specifically to observe and identify as many trans­
uranic nuclei as possible. This experiment observed and
 
helped determine upper limits on the flux or super heavy
 
cosmic rays with Z greater than 110, and determined simul­
taneously the energy spectrum of cosmic rays with Z=26,
 
Z 85, from about 1,500 to 1,500 MeV/nucleon.
 
The experiment utilized plastic (Lexan) detectors mounted
 
in the OWS and exposed to cosmic radiation. These cosmic
 
rays penetrated the detector packages streaking the plastic
 
sheets within. Subsequent to return to Earth these plastic
 
sheets were chemically etched and the cosmic ray tracks
 
were measured with an optical microscope. With this tech­
nique, both the atomic number and energy of each particle
 
can be determined.
 
An additional detector module was launched with the
 
third crew to collect data on cosmic rays which did not
 
have to penetrate the workshop walls. It was attached to
 
a clipboard on a handrail during the first EVA of the mission
 
and retrieved on the last. Also, one module was left in
 
the docking adapter by the last crew for the collection
 
of very long exposure in the event Skylab is revisited in
 
the future.
 
Dr. P. Buford Price of the University of California,
 
Berkeley Campus, was the principal investigator.
 
Magnetospheric Particle Composition (S230)
 
The objective of S230 was to measure the abundances
 
of heavy, rare ions in the Earth's magnetosphere, princi­
pally the isotopes of the noble gases, and to compare these
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to the abundance ratios previously measured in the solar
 
wind composition experiment used in the Apollo program.
 
Analysis of experiment results helped to determine the
 
origin of magnetospheric particles through careful study
 
of the isotopes.
 
The experiment consisted of sheets of collecting foil
 
of aluminum, aluminum oxide and platinum mounted on the
 
ATM Deployment Assembly truss. Each piece of foil, a rec­
tangle of about 35 by 48 centimeters (14 by 19 inches) was
 
mounted on a flexible backing material and formed into a
 
cuff that was wrapped around one of two spools on the DA
 
truss. Two cuffs were used per spool with one cuff being
 
covered by the other.
 
Two cuffs from one spool were retrieved during the
 
first and third EVA of SL-3, and two cuffs from the other
 
spool were retrieved during the first and second EVA of
 
SL-4. The cuffs were stored in an envelope in the OWS food
 
freezer until returned to Earth for analysis.
 
Coinvestigators are Dr. Don Lind, astronaut, at the
 
Johnson Space Center, and Dr. Johannes Geiss, University
 
of Bern, Switzerland.
 
Materials Science and Manufacturing in Space
 
The condition of weightlessness in orbital flight makes
 
it possible to conduct operations in materials processing
 
that could not be done easily on Earth, if at all. Melting
 
and mixing without the contaminating effects of containers,
 
suppression of convection and buoyance in liquids and molten
 
material, control of voids, and the ability to use electro­
static and magnetic forces otherwise masked by gravitation
 
open the way to new knowledge of material properties and
 
ultimately to valuable new products for use on Earth. These
 
potential products range from composite structural materials
 
with highly specialized physical properties to large highly
 
perfect crystals with valuable electrical and optical pro­
perties to new vaccines that could not be produced by con­
ventional means on Earth.
 
The progress of Space Shuttle planning has raised the
 
prospect that vehicle capabilities sufficient to support
 
large-scale experiment programs and limited commercial manu­
facturing operations will be made available. Practical
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experience developing the materials for Skylab has already
 
proved of great value in concept planning of an improved
 
and enlarged facility for the Space Shuttle program.
 
Evaluation of Skylab results will help engineers finalize
 
the design of Shuttle equipment.
 
Materials Processing Facility (M512)
 
The objectives of the experiment to be performed in
 
the M512 facility were to demonstrate and evaluate the
 
merits of molten metal phenomena for manufacturing in a
 
space enviroment, to gain experience in molten metal charac­
teristics in space for future application of construction,
 
assembly, and maintenance outside the Earth enviroment,
 
and for the manufacture and retrieval of valuable products
 
for use on Earth.
 
The facility provided a basic apparatus and a common
 
spacecraft interface for a group of metallic and non-metal­
lic materials experiments and test and demonstrated a system
 
approximating the "facility approach" projected for future
 
space experimentation, where common hardware will be used
 
to perform multiple experiments.
 
The M512 facility demonstrated in space the feasibility
 
of joining metallic materials'by applying heat through an
 
electron beam and an exothermic source, respectively. The
 
experimental hardware was also utilized as a common facility
 
for materials processing experiments.
 
The M512 facility, hard mounted in the MDA, consisted
 
of a vacuum work chamber with associated mechanical and
 
electrical controls, an electron beam subsystem and a
 
control and display panel. The vacuum chamber was a 40­
centimeter (16.25-inch) sphere with a hinged hatch for access.
 
It was connected to the space enviroment by a 10-centimeter
 
(4-inch) diameter line containing two butterfly poppet valves.
 
The electron beam subsystem was mounted to the chamber so
 
that the beam traversed the sphere along a diameter parallel
 
to the plane of the hatch closure. The chamber wall con­
tained a cylindrical well accommodating the small electric
 
furnaces used for the M518 and M555 experiments. Auxiliary
 
provisions included ports for a floodlight and the 16mm
 
data acquisition camera, a bleed line, a repressurization
 
line and a port for a vacuum cleaner. A subsystem was also
 
provided for spraying water into the chamber during some
 
runs of the M479 experiment for quenching.
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The electron beam operated nominally at 20 kV and 80
 
mA and was provided with focusing and deflection coils that
 
could be operated from the control panel.
 
The control panel had controls and displays for all
 
of the experiments to be performed in the facility, including
 
a gauge for the .vacuum chamber voltage and current meter
 
for the electron beam and a thermocouple temperature indicator.
 
Data from the experiments were samples, those parts
 
of the apparatus that were returned, motion picture records
 
of the two electron beam experiments and M479, plus comments
 
by the operating crewmen. The returned samples are being
 
studied in comparison with control samples produced on
 
Earth.
 
The experiments conducted using the M512 facility,
 
the objectivies of each, and the pricipal investigators were:
 
Metals Melting (M551)
 
The objectives of Experiment M551 Were to:
 
- Study the behavior 'ofmolten metals in micro­
gravity. 
Characterize the structures formed in metals 
melted and rapidly solified in zero gravity.
 
- Test means of joining and cutting metals by elec­
tron beam welding in zero gravity. 
Richard Poorman of the Marshall Space Flight Center
 
was the principal investigator.
 
Exothermic Brazing (M552)
 
The objectives of Experiment M552 were to:
 
Test and demonstrate a method of brazing compo­
nents in space repair and maintenance operations.
 
Study surface wetting and capillary flow effects
 
in weightless molten metals.
 
J. R. Williams of the Marshall Space Flight Center
 
was principal investigator.
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Sphere Forming (M553)
 
The objective of .the experiment was to demonstrate
 
the effects of zero gravity on fundamental solidification
 
phenomena. In particular, high purity nickel, a Ni-12%
 
Sn alloy, Ni-l% Ag alloy, and Ni-30% Cu alloy, were melted
 
on stings and resolidified in both the free flowing and
 
captive conditions.
 
These materials were to permit study of the effects
 
of low-gravity solidification phenomena which could apply
 
equally to the majority of the more complex alloys and
 
solidification procedures which could be of commercial impor­
tance. Because of time limitations during SL-2 only 7 of
 
the 14 samples were completed.
 
E. A. Hasemeyer of the Marshall Space Flight Center
 
was principal investigator.
 
Single Crystal Growth
 
The objective of this experiment was to grow single
 
crystals of gallium arsenide from solution. Unfortunately,
 
this experiment could not be flown because of the volume
 
demands of the SL-2.
 
Experiment M479 - Zero Gravity Flammability
 
The objective of Experiment M479 was to ignite various
 
materials in a five psia oxygen/nitrogen mixture to deter­
mine:
 
- Extent of surface flame propagation and-flashover 
to adjacent materials. 
- Rates of surface and bulk flame propagation under 
zero convection. 
- Self extinguishment. 
- Extinguishment by vacuum and water spray. 
The combustion chambers and controls for this experi­
ment were provided by Experiment M512. Individual flam­
mability tests lasted from a minimum of 10 seconds to a
 
maximum of 4 minutes. Each test was photographed in its
 
entirety so that combustion rates could be determined by
 
post-flight analysis.
 
Principal investigator was J. H. Kimzey of the'Johnson
 
Space Center.
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Multipurpose Electric Furnace (M518)
 
The Multipurpose Electric Furnace system provided a
 
means of performing experiments on solidification, crystal
 
growth and other processes involving phase changes in ma­
terials. The furnace system was used to perform experiments
 
involving phase changes at elevated temperatures in systems
 
comprising selected combinations of solid, liquid and vapor
 
phases. Because of the near zero gravity aboard Skylab,
 
the liquid and vapor phases were expected to be essentially
 
quiescent and phases of different density had little or no
 
tendency to separate.
 
The system consisted of 'three main parts: the furnace,
 
designed to interface with the M512 Materials Processing
 
Facility; a programmable electronic temperature controller
 
which controlled the temperature levels in the furnace;
 
and experiment cartridges which contained the sample materials.
 
The furnace had three specimen cavities so that three material
 
samples were processed in a single run. The furnace was
 
constructed to provide three different temperature zones
 
along the length of each sample cavity as follows:
 
- A constant temperature hot zone at the end of 
the sample cavity where temperatures up to 1,000 degrees C 
(1832 degrees F) were reached. 
- A gradient zone next to the hot zone where temper­
ature gradients ranging from 20 degrees C (63 degrees F)
 
to 200 degrees C (392 degrees F) per centimeter were estab­
lished in the samples.
 
- A cool zone in which heat conducted along the 
samples was rejected by radiation to a conducting path that 
carries the heat out of the system. 
Each sample of material was enclosed in a cartridge
 
in which the actual temperature distribution applied to
 
the sample was controlled by the thermal design of the car­
tridge.
 
The control package provided active control of the
 
furnace temperature. It was set to a specific temperature
 
within the furnace's capability by the astronaut. Two
 
timing circuits in the controller enabled the astronaut
 
to program the soak time spent at the set temperature and
 
the cooling rate of the furnace at the end of the soak'
 
period. Active temperature control continued during pro­
grammed cooling.
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Once the specimens were installed in the furnace and
 
the system activated by the astronaut, the system operated
 
automatically except for complete system shutdown. The
 
material cartridges were returned to Earth for examination.
 
The experiment equipment was comprised of the furnace,
 
control package and 33 cartridges (11 experiment sets),
 
cables to interconnect the system and to connect the system
 
to power and data outlets, two cartridge containers, a tube
 
of thermal grease and a cartridge extraction tool.
 
The 11 experiments used the Multipurpose Electric Fur­
nace, the objectives and principal investigators were:
 
Vapor Growth of II-VI Compounds (M556)
 
To determine the degree of improvement that can be
 
obtained in the perfection and chemical homogeneity of crys­
tals grown by chemical vapor transport under weightless
 
conditions in space. Dr. Harry Wiedemeier, Rensselaer
 
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, was principal investigator.
 
Immiscible Alloy Compositions (M557)
 
To determine the effects of near-zero gravity on the
 
processing of materials compositions which normally segre­
gate on Earth. J. 0. Reger, TRW Systems Group, Redondo
 
Beach, Californid, was principal investigator.
 
Radioactive Tracer Diffusion (M558)
 
To measure self-diffusion and impurity diffusion effects
 
in liquid metals in spaceflight and characterize the distur­
bing effects, if any, due to spacecraft acceleration.
 
Dr. Anthony 0. Ukanwa, Marshall Space Flight Center, was
 
principal investigator.
 
Microsegregation in Germanium (M559)
 
To determine the degrees of microsegregation of doping
 
impurities in germanium caused by convectionless directional
 
solidification under conditions of weightlessness.
 
Dr. Francois A. Padavani, Texas Instrument Corporation,
 
Dallas, was principal investigator. 257
 
Growth of Spherical Crystals (M560)
 
To grow doped germanium crystals of high chemical homo­
geneity and structural perfection and study their resulting
 
physical properties in comparison with theoretical values
 
for ideal crystals, Dr. Hans Walter, University of Alabama,
 
Huntsville, was principal investigator.
 
Whisker-Reinforced Composites (M561)
 
To produce void-free samples of silver reinforced with
 
oriented silicon carbide whiskers. Dr. Tomoyoski Kawada,
 
National Research Institute for Metals, Tokyo, was princi­
pal investigator.
 
Indium Antimonide Crystals (M562)
 
To produce doped semiconductor crystals of high chemi­
cal homogeneity and structural perfection and to evaluate
 
the influence of weightlessness in attaining these properties.
 
Dr. Harry C. Gatos and Dr. August F. Witt, Massachusetts
 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, were
 
coinvestigators.
 
Mixed III-V Crystal Growth (M563)
 
To determine how weightlessness affects directional
 
solidification of binary semiconductor alloys and, if single
 
crystals are obtained, to determine how their semiconducting
 
properties depend on alloy composition. Dr. William R.
 
Wilcox, University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
 
was principal investigator.
 
Metal and Halide Eutectics (M564)
 
To produce highly continuous controlled structures
 
in samples of the fiber-like sodium fluoride-sodium chloride
 
and plate-like bismuth-cadmium and lead-tin eutectics, and
 
to measure their physical properties. Dr. Alfred S. Yue,
 
University of California, Los Angeles, was principal in­
vestigator.
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Silver Grids Melted in Space (M565)
 
To determine how pore sizes and pore shapes change
 
in grids of fine silver wires when they are melted and re­
solidified in space. Dr. A Derutherre, Catholic University
 
of Belgium, Reverlee, Belgium, was principal investigator.
 
Copper-Aluminum Eutectic (M566)
 
To determine the effects of weightlessness on the forma­
tion of lamellar structure in eutectic alloys when direction­
ally solidified. E. A. Hasemeyer, Marshall Space Flight
 
Center, was principal investigator.
 
Engineering and Technology Experiments
 
The Engineering and Technology experiments provided
 
data which is important in the development of future space
 
systems for exploration and the conduct of scientific ex­
perimentation.
 
A number of the experiments were particularly oriented
 
toward the interaction of man with his new zero-gravity
 
environment. In this category were:
 
- Habitability and Crew Quarters, M487
 
- Astronaut Maneuvering Equiptment, M509
 
- Crew Activities/Maintenance, M516
 
- Manual Navigation Sightings, T002
 
- Crew/Vehicle Disturbance, T013
 
- Foot-Controlled Maneuvering Unit, T020
 
The Astronaut Maneuvering experiments (M509 and T020)
 
closely allied. They investigated several different tech­
niques for use by man for extravehicular activity (EVA).
 
In the Skylab program, these maneuvering units were operated
 
inside the OWS working volume.
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Several experiments were designed to study the space­
craft environment, both natural and induced:
 
- Radiation in Spacecraft, D008 
- Thermal Control Coatings, D024 
- Thermal Control Coatings, M415 
- Inflight Aerosol Analysis, T003 
- Coronagraph Contamination Measurement, T025 
- ATM Contamination Measurements, T027 
The two thermal control coating experiments were com­
plementary. The M415 experiment investigated the effect
 
of the launch environment-Earth's atmosphere, retrorockets,
 
etc. - on spacecraft surfaces. The D024 experiment investi­
gated the long-term effects of the space environment, partic­
ularly sunlight, on spacecraft surfaces.
 
Radiation in Spacecraft (DO08)
 
The purpose of Experiment D008 was to test advanced
 
radiation, instruments and techniques for determining the
 
radiation effects on man and to provide correlative data
 
for radiation hazard prediction methods for long duration
 
manned spaceflight mission planning.
 
The D008 experiment was composed of a movable tissue
 
equivalent dosimeter, a linear energy transfer spectrometer,
 
and five passive dosimeters. The passive dosimeters in­
tegrated the does received during the entire mission.
 
DO08 was flown aboard SL-2. The experiment hardware
 
remained in the CM for the course of the mission. No crew
 
participation was required.
 
Principal investigator for the D008 experiment was
 
Capt. Andrew D. Grimm, and coinvestigator was Joseph F.
 
Janni, both of Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.
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Thermal Control Coatings (D024)
 
This experiment consisted of exposing material samples
 
to the space environment and had the following objectives:
 
- Determine the effects of near-Earth space environ­
ments on selected experimental thermal control coatings 
which have been extensively investigated in the laboratory. 
- Correlate the effects of the space environment 
on these coatings with measured effects of ground-based 
simulated space environments. 
- Gain new understanding of the mechanisms of de­
gradation of thermal control coatings caused by actual space 
radiation. 
The experiment was a companion to Experiment M415,
 
which determined the effects of the launch environments on
 
thermal control coatings.
 
Experiment D024 provided the first opportunity to ex­
amine in detail samples that were chemically or physically
 
unaltered since retrieval from space.
 
The experiment package consisted of four panels, two
 
of which contained 36 thermal control coating samples.
 
The samples were 2.54-cm (1-inch) diameter discs coated
 
with various selected thermal control coatings. The other
 
pair of panels contained strips of polymetric plastic five
 
mils thick. The panels were square plates, about 17 centi­
meters (61 inches) on a side and 0.6 centimeters (1 inch)
 
thick. Each had a flexible handle to prevent contamination
 
of the samples while handling.
 
Panels were attached with snap fastners to the AM truss
 
assembly. Here they received no cluster shadowing in the
 
solar inertial attitude held during most of the mission.
 
Protective covers were removed from the panels 24 hours
 
before launch. Protected by the payload shroud during launch,
 
the samples should not have been affected by the launch
 
environment.
 
Dr. William L. Lehn of the Air Force Materials Laboratory,
 
Wright Patterson Air Force Base; was principal investigator.
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Thermal Control Coatings (M415)
 
The objective of Experiment M415 was to determine the
 
degradation effects of prelaunch, launch and space environ­
ments on the thermal absorption and emission characteristics
 
of various coatings commonly used for passive thermal control.
 
The principal elements of this experiment consisted
 
of two panels, each containing 12 thermal sensors arranged
 
in four rows of three. Three different thermal control
 
coating samples were mounted on the sensors in each row.
 
All of the coating samples were thermally isolated from
 
surrounding structures. Unlike Experiment D024, detailed
 
spectral reflection measurements could not be made since
 
the coatings were not retrieved. Thermal properties were
 
measured by temperature sensors and the data were telemetered
 
to the ground.
 
Eugene C. McKannan, Marshall Space Flight Center, was
 
principal investigator.
 
Habitability/Crew Quarters (M487)
 
Throughout the three manned visits to the Skylab, flight
 
crews were asked to evaluate everyday spacecraft-type activi­
ties such as sleeping, eating and the ease or difficulty
 
of getting around. The crew documented with film and tape­
recorded comments the habitability features of the workshop
 
as part of Experiment M487, the objectives of which were
 
to provide data useful in the design of future manned spacecraft.
 
Habitability features such as architecture, environ­
mental elements and communications techniques affect everyday
 
spacecraft activities and crew performance. Objective and
 
subjective data were obtained on OWS environment, internal
 
architecture, adequacy of mobility aids and restraints,
 
food and water, garments and personal accounterments, personal
 
hygiene, housekeeping, internal communications, and subjective
 
data on the adequacy of the off-duty activity provisions.
 
Instruments, including a measuring tape, portable thermom­
eters, surface temperature digital thermometer, sound meter
 
and frequency analyzer, velometer and force gauge were provided
 
for the experiment.
 
Principal investigator was Caldwell C. Johnson, Jr.,
 
of the Johnson Space Center.
 
262 
Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment (M509)
 
The objectives of this experiment were to: demonstrate
 
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit flying qualities and piloting
 
capability; test.and evaluate system-response; and relate
 
the data and experience gainedto ground-based analysis,
 
future AMU design requirements; and projected EVA capabilities.
 
The astronaut maneuvering equipment consisted of two
 
jet-powered AMU's, a back-mounted hand controlled unit called
 
the automatically stabilized maneuvering unit (ASMU or back­
pack) and handheld maneuvering unit (HHMU).
 
The -ASMU had a rechargeable/replaceable high pressure
 
nitrogen propellant tank and battery. Control moment gyro
 
and reaction jet stabilization modes were provided. A third
 
mode allowed the pilot to fire the reaction jets directly
 
through the hand controllers. The ASMU provided propellant
 
and instrumentation for evaluation of the HHMU mode.
 
The ASMU was maneuvered by 14 thrusters located in
 
various positions on the backpack. The thrusters were
 
controlled by two hand-controllers mounted on arms extending

from the backpack. The left hand controlled translation
 
forward, backward, up, down, and sideways; and the right
 
hand, using an aircraft-type handgrip, controlled rotation
 
in any direction.
 
The HHMU was a handgrip unit with a pair of thrusters
 
that pulled the astronaut forward, a single thruster that
 
pushed him backwards, and thruster controls.
 
Skylab crew members flew the units in a shirt sleeve
 
and pressure suit mode inside the forward dome of the workshop.
 
The observer operated the cameras; cued the pilot on
 
test operations procedures and analyzed and described the
 
test progress over the voice communication system. Comments
 
made by the pilot and observer during and immediately after
 
each experiment run (varying from 50 to 80 minutes duration)
 
were taped and dumped to tracking stations at the scheduled
 
intervals.
 
Principal investigator for M509 was Major C. E. Whitsett,
 
Jr., assigned to the Air Force Space Transportation System
 
Office at the Johnson Space Center.
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Crew Activities/Maintenance (M516)
 
This experiment investigated crew performance in zero
 
gravity, long duration missions, primarily through observa­
tions of normal Skylab tasks. It was related closely to
 
M151 and M487. The experiment called for:
 
- Systematic documentation of man's performance
during prolonged weightless spaceflight. 
-
data. 
Acquisition and evaluation of inflight maintenance 
- Evaluation of data relative to design criteria 
for Skylab and future missions.
 
- Evaluation and report of findings in terms useful 
to future manned mission planners. 
Performance data were gathered in the areas of manual
 
dexterity, locomotion, mass handling and transfer, and main­
tenance.
 
M516 was handled in the following phases:
 
Preflight - Crew performance data acquired during
 
preflight simulations and training sessions to be used to
 
establish baseline data for comparison with data acquired
 
inflight.
 
Inflight - M516 used film coverage provided by various
 
other experiments and'operational activities which related
 
to crew performance activities.
 
Postflight - The crewmen provided subjective and tech­
nical comments during debriefing regarding crew performance
 
activities.
 
Principal investigator was R. L. Bond of the Johnson
 
Space Center.
 
Manual Navigation Sightings (TO02)
 
The objective of this experiment was to investigate
 
the effects of the spaceflight environment (including long
 
mission time) on the navigator's ability to take space navi­
gation measurements through a spacecraft window using handheld
 
instruments.
 
_-_ 
264 
Previous data obtained with the use of simulators,
 
aircraft, and the Gemini spacecraft had already demonstrated
 
that man, in a space environment, could make accurate naviga­
tion measurements using simple handheld instruments. This,
 
together with already developed techniques for reducing
 
the data to a position determination, meant that a technique
 
is available for man to navigate in space using simple in­
struments and without a computer. The intent of this ex­
periment was to determine whether long mission duration
 
appreciably affects the capability of man to obtain accurate
 
measurements.
 
The equipment for this experiment consisted of two
 
handheld instruments, a sextant and a stadimeter. The sex­
tant measured the angles between two stars, and between
 
single stars and the edge of the Moon. The stadimeter,
 
also an optical device, determined spacecraft altitude by

measuring the apparent curvature of the horizon.
 
Data returned was logbook entries of the sextant and
 
stadimeter readings, supplemented by crew comments on the
 
voice tape recorder.
 
Robert J. Randle, Ames Research Center, and Major Stanley

Powers, USAF, were coinvestigators.
 
In-Flight Experiment Aerosol Analysis (T003)
 
The objective of this experiment was to measure the
 
size, concentration and composition of particles in the
 
atmosphere inside the Skylab as a function of time and lo­
cation.
 
An aerosol analyzer had been designed for Experiment
 
T003 which was capable of separating particulates into three
 
size ranges, accumulating the total particles in the three
 
size intervals and displaying the results immediately to
 
the astronaut. The instrument also contained a particulate
 
collection system so that postflight analysis could be used
 
to ascertain the shape and composition of the individual
 
particles.
 
The instrument was a multi-channel, battery operated
 
particle counter capable of sorting aerosol particles into
 
three size groups: 1 to 3 microns, 3 to 9 microns, and
 
9 to 100 microns.
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The instrument was handheld by an astronaut at the
 
desired point of measurement. Representative locations
 
throughout the spacecraft were tested.
 
Dr. William Z. Leavitt, Department of Transportation,
 
was principal investigator.
 
Crew/Vehicle Disturbances (T013)
 
The objective of this experiment was to measure the
 
effects of various crew motions on the dynamics of manned
 
spacecraft, specifically the torques, forces, and vehicle
 
motions produced by the astronaut's body motions; to verify
 
information obtained from ground simulation programs; and
 
to determine the effects of astronaut motion on the attitude
 
and control of the vehicle.
 
Experiment T013 was designed to provide system designers
 
with accurate models of crew motion disturbances.
 
Body motion of the astronaut was measured by the Limb
 
Motion Sensing System (LIMS) which is a skeletal structure
 
incorporated into a suit, with pivots at the major body
 
joints. Each pivot was monitored by a linear potentiometer
 
which provided a continuous measurement of body limb posi­
tion as the subject astronaut performed the assigned task.
 
Onboard motion picture photography, using two 16mm Data
 
Acquisition Cameras, was used concurrently with the LIMS.
 
A Force Measuring System (FMS) consisting of two Force
 
Measuring Units (FMUs) was used to measure the forces and
 
moments applied to the OWS structure during the assigned
 
task, which included soaring between the FMUs.
 
The measurement data of the LIMS and FMS were processed
 
and telemetered to the ground along with real-time transmis­
sion of the applicable ATM Pointing Control System data.
 
Bruce A. Conway, Langley Reseach Center, was principal
 
investigator.
 
Foot-Controlled Maneuvering Unit (T020)
 
This experiment evaluated an astronaut maneuvering
 
device that did not require use of the astronaut's hands.
 
Both the ASMU (Automatically Stabilized Maneuvering Unit)
 
and the HHMU (Handheld Maneuvering Unit) used in Experiment
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M509 required the astronaut to use his hands to control
 
the unit. The foot-controlled maneuvering unit (FCMU) was
 
a foot-operated propulsion device that was straddled by
 
the operator as if riding a bicycle. The unit was propelled
 
by high pressure nitrogen contained in the detachable pro­
pellant tank used in the M509 experiment.
 
Donald E. Hewes, Langley Research Center, was the
 
principal investigator.
 
Coronograph Contamination Measurements (T025)
 
The primary objective of Experiment T025 was to vis­
ually and photographically observe and record the amount
 
of light scattered by particles from thruster firings and
 
waste dumps. One purpose of T025 was to determine the
 
extent and nature of the induced contaminant and to assess
 
its effect on other optical experiments on the spacecraft.
 
Another objective was to look through the Earth's upper
 
atmosphere to determine the type and amount of particulate
 
matter.
 
The T025 experiment hardware consisted of a modified
 
35mm Nikon camera attached to a coronagraph which was to
 
be fitted into the solar Scientific Airlock.
 
Since the solar SAL was used for the parasol thermal
 
shield, a special bracket had to be devised to attach the
 
experiment outside the workshop so it could be used during
 
extravehicular activities. A special occulting disc was
 
also needed. The needed equipment was flown to the workshop
 
on SL-4, the last manned visit. (This experiment was also
 
used to record data from the Comet Kohoutek).
 
The discs occulted the solar disk, and the SWS was
 
oriented so that only scattered light from particulate
 
matter was recorded on the photographic film.
 
Principal investigator for this experiment was
 
Dr. Mayo Greenberg of Dudley Observatory. Coinvestigator
 
was George Bonner of the Johnson Space Center.
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Contamination Measurements (T027) 
-
This experiment consisted of two separate pieces of
 
hardware, T027 Sample Array and the T027/S073 Photometer
 
System, each with its own objectives. The Universal Exten­
sion Mechanism, part of the Photometer System was also used
 
to deploy the portable TV and Experiment 3149 through the
 
SAL. Photometer system hardware was also to be used to
 
meet the objectives of Experiment S073.
 
T027 Sample Array
 
The basic objective of the T027 Sample Array experiment
 
was to obtain controlled data on the degradation effects
 
of contaminants associated with Skylab on the optical prop­
erties of various windows, mirrors and diffraction gratings.
 
A secondary objective was to obtain near-real-time data
 
on contamination rates during sample exposure by use of
 
Quartz Crystal Microbalances.
 
Window contamination on Gemini and Appollo flights
 
have interfered with star sightings and lunar surface photo­
graphy experiments. Sources of contaminant depositions
 
have been found to be thruster firings and molecular evapora­
tions from various materials on the spacecraft.
 
The Sample Array System was to expose optical samples
 
to the space environment for controlled periods. The Sample
 
Array was deployed outside the spacecraft on a boom. The
 
total of 248 samples of different types were to be exposed.
 
The samples consisted of window materials, mirrors, gratings
 
and other optical surfaces suitable for various wavelength
 
regions.
 
Since the solar SAL was unavailable, the anti-solar
 
SAL was used and abnormal temperatures were encountered.
 
Also, because of the workshop meteroid shield incident,
 
the experiment could not be deployed until in the mission
 
and, as a result, was outgassing throughout its operation.
 
At the end of the first mission the instrument was returned
 
for analysis and it was found to have failed and no good
 
data were recorded.
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T027 Photometer System
 
The objective of the T027 Photometer System was to
 
measure the brightness and polarization of the scattered
 
sunlight from the solar illumination of the particulate
 
contaminant cloud surrounding Skylab. Variations of the
 
contaminant cloud with respect to time and location were
 
also to be measured.
 
The Photometer System measured three parameters which
 
fully characterize the radiation from the skyglow and from
 
the Skylab corona; i.e., brightness of the total and of
 
the polarized components, and orientation of the plane of
 
polarization. Measurements pertaining to the skyglow (zodiacal

light, Gegenschein, starlight, F-region airglow) are best
 
performed on the dark side.
 
The photoelectric photometer was deployed through the
 
Scientific Airlock (SAL) by means of the Universal Extension
 
Mechanism. The Photometer Head was mounted on a gimballed
 
system at the end of the mechanism to permit scanning in
 
elevation and azimuth through limits of 0 to 112.5 degrees

and 0 to 354 degrees respectively.
 
The photometer head contained an optical train with
 
a polarizing disk, ten selectable filters, a field of view
 
system and a photomultiplier tube to sense and analyze the
 
integrated light entering the system. A radioactive cali­
bration source was provided to allow automatic system
 
calibration.
 
During the second manned mission the photometer was
 
installed and, using the universal extension system, deployed.
 
(The photometer had been used on the first manned mission
 
for 11 scans of the sky). At the completion of the run
 
a malfunction occurred which-made it impossible to retract
 
the experiment. It was necessary to jettison the photometer
 
and the universal extension system in order to free up the
 
airlock for other experiments. (Jettisoning of the experi­
ments was designed into the SAL to insure that the equipment
 
would have maximum usage).
 
The loss of the photometer affected not only the T027
 
experiment, but also the S073 experiment. Loss of the
 
extension system affected S149 and the use of the universal
 
television. Later schemes were improvised using T025 and
 
S063 hardware as well as S073 data such that the principal
 
investigators did receive some useful data.
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The principal investigator was Dr. Joseph A. Muscari,
 
of Martin Marietta Aerospace.
 
Comet Kohoutek (1973f)
 
A major effort was made during the last manned mission
 
to view the Comet Kohoutek from Skylab. The fact that the
 
space station was in orbit during the time of the perehelion
 
passage of the comet and the wide array of scientific instru­
ments Skylab carried, offered scientists an opportunity
 
which was unparalleled. Since the comet was discovered
 
early in its passage, there was ample time to develop a
 
comprehensive and coordinated viewing plan.
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration obser­
vation plan included, not only Skylab instruments, but also
 
balloons, rockets, ground observatory and unmanned satellite
 
instruments. The observation frequencies ranged from X­
ray to microwave. The observation by the Skylab astronauts
 
were the only viewings that could be made at perihelion.
 
Existing Experiments:
 
Ultraviolet Stellar Astronomy S019 - To assist in the 
determination of the composition of the comet and to study 
the astrophysical processes which occur in the comet as 
a function or time. 
Ultraviolet Airglow Horizon Photography S063 - To study 
the spatial and temporal variation in the selected atomic 
and molecular constituents and the degree of linear polari­
zation of the coma and tail. 
Gegenschein and Zodiacal Light S073 - To study the
 
distribution of comet particles.
 
Coronagraph Contamination Measurements T025 - To study
 
particulate production rates and spatial distribution and
 
to study the production and distribution of hydroxol, cya­
nide, sodium, ammonia, and carbon monoxide molecular compo­
nents of the coma and tail.
 
White Light Coronagraph S052 - To study the structural
 
density and its evolution with time and to study the tail
 
mass changes near perihelion passage.
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X-ray Spectrograph S054 - To study the mass density
 
of medium weight elements such as carbon, nitrogen and
 
oxygen.
 
Ultraviolet Scanning Polychromator Spectroheliometer
 
S055A - To study the radiance of the hydrogen halo.
 
X-ray Telescope S056 - To study the soft X-ray fluores­
cence of materials.
 
Extreme Ultraviolet Spectroheliograph S082A - To study

the chemical composition and the ratio of helium to hydrogen.
 
Spectrograph and Extreme Ultraviolet Monitor S082A -

To study the metallic, diamotic, and polytomic emission
 
lines for unique data on the chemical composition.
 
New Hardware
 
Far Ultraviolet Electronographic Camera 3201 - 3201
 
was flown on Apollo 16 and the backup unit was modified
 
to fit the Scientific Airlock of Skylab. The articulated
 
mirror system was used to aim the instrument at the comet.
 
The camera was mounted in a vacuum tight aluminum cannister
 
(along with the camera high voltage power supply and elec­
tronics). The cannister was mounted on the SAL and opened
 
to vacuum. Light entered the forward end and passed through
 
a transparent collector plate. A 5-inch spherical mirror
 
focussed the light on a potassium bromide photo cathode.
 
The resulting photoelectrons were accelerated by a -20 KV
 
potential on the cathode and focussed by a magnetic field
 
on a 35mm NTB-3 film at the near end. Two corrector plates
 
were automatically interchanged: lithium floride for the
 
1,050 to 1,600 angstrom bandpass and calcium floride for
 
1,250 to 1,600 bandpass.
 
Each activation caused 11 exposures at 1, 2, 5, 6, and
 
15 seconds through the lithium floride plate and 3, 10,
 
30, and 107 seconds through the calcium floride plate (three
 
frames were wasted during corrector plate change).
 
The objectives were to study the far ultraviolet emis­
sion of the comet with special emphasis on examining the
 
hydrogen halo.
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The principal investigator for 3201 was Dr. Thornton
 
Page of the Naval Research Laboratory.
 
Kohoutek Photometric Photography 3-233
 
S-233 was a somewhat ad-lib operation using an opera­
tional 35mm Nikon camera with a 55mm lens. Pictures were
 
taken from various windows with the handheld camera. Since
 
time exposures of 60 to 8,180 seconds were required, the
 
crew had to make extensive use of improvised mounting surfaces
 
(i.e., tape, cardboards, etc.) to steady the equipment.
 
The principal investigator was Dr. Charles Lundquist of
 
the Marshall Space Flight Center.
 
Student Experiments
 
In October 1971 NASA and the National Science Teachers
 
Association announced a national competition for student
 
(grades 9 through 12) proposals for an experiment for Skylab.
 
NSTA administered the competition in cooperation with the
 
NASA Educational Program Division and Skylab Program Office.
 
More than 3,400 proposals were received, evaluated and judged
 
by the NSTA. Of these 3,400 proposals, 301 were selected
 
as regional winners and 25 national winners were announced
 
in March 1972. Of these 25 national winners, 11 were selected
 
for development of hardware for Skylab, eight others used
 
existing hardware, and six could not be accommodated as
 
proposed because of Skylab performance requirements or
 
schedule constraints.
 
Four of the six that could not be accommodated were
 
provided data from existing Skylab experiments which either
 
were similar to the student's proposal or satisfied an
 
alternate interest of the student. The remaining two were
 
associated with NASA researches in areas closely related
 
to their proposed subject of interest.
 
All student experiments were handled in a manner very
 
similar to the mainline Skylab experiments with the student
 
investigator assuming the role of principal investigator
 
under the guidance and with the assistance of a science
 
advisor from the Marshall Space Flight Center. Consulting
 
science advisors were assigned from the Johnson Space Center
 
in Houston.
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The 25 students and experiments selected for partici­
pation in the Skylab Program were:
 
Joe B. Zmolek, Oshkosh, Wisconsin ­
"Atmospheric Heat Absorption" - ED 11 
Lourdes High-School, William L. Behring, Teacher/Sponsor 
Experiment was to determine the attenuation, due to
 
the Earth's atmosphere, of radiant energy in the visible
 
and near IR regions over both densely populated and sparsely
 
populated sections of the Earth.
 
Troy A Crites, Kent, Washington
 
"Volcanic Study" - ED 12
 
Kent Junior High School,, Richard C. Putnam, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
Experiment was to determine the feasibility of pre­
dicting volcanic activity based on remotely sensed thermal
 
infrared surveys.
 
Alison Hopfield, Princeton, New Jersey
 
"Libration Clouds" - ED 21
 
Princeton Day School, Normal Sperling, Teacher/Sponsor
 
Experiment was to observe the two zero-force regions
 
in the Earth-Moon system where it is expected that small
 
space particles will accumulate.
 
Daniel C. Bochsler, Silverton, Oregon

"Objects Within Mercury's Orbit" - ED 22
 
Silverton Union High School, John P. Daily, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
Experiment was to identify a planetary body (or any
 
other identifiable object) which may orbit the Sun at a
 
radius substantially less that that of Mercury's orbit.
 
John C. Hamilton,. Aiea, Hawaii
 
"UV from Quasars" - ED 23
 
Aiea High School, James A. Fuchigami, Teacher/Sponsor
 
Selected photographs obtained by ultraviolet stellar
 
astronomy equipment were analyzed.
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Joe W. Reihs, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
 
"X-Ray Steller Classes" - ED 24
 
Tara High School, Helen W. Boyd, Teacher/Sponsor
 
Experiment was to make observation of celestial regions
 
in X-ray wavelengths in an attempt to relate X-ray emissions
 
to other spectral characteristics of observed stars.
 
Jeanne L. Leventhal, Berkeley, California
 
"X-Rays From Jupiter" - ED 25
 
Berkeley High School, Harry E. Choulett, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To detect X-rays from the planet Jupiter and establish
 
the correlation of X-ray emission with solar activity and
 
decametric radio emission.
 
Neal W. Shannon, Atlanta, Georgia
 
"UV from Pulsars" - ED 26
 
Fernbank Science Center, Dr. Paul H. Knappenberger,
 
Teacher/Sponsor
 
To attempt to measure the radiation from known Pulsars
 
in the UV spectral region to determine whether or not the
 
UV data correlates with known existing Pulsar Spectral data.
 
Robert L. Staehle, Rochester, New York
 
"Bacteria and Spores" - ED 31
 
Harley School, Alan H. Soanes, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To assess the differences in survival, growth and muta­
tions of bacteria when compared with similar group of Earth
 
enviroment spores.
 
Todd A. Meister, Jackson Heights, New York
 
"In Vitro Immunology" - ED 32
 
Bronx High School of Science, Vincent G. Galasso,
 
Teacher/Sponsor
 
To determine the extent to which the absence of gravity
 
affects the in vitro demonstration of the immune-response
 
mechanism.
 
Kathy L. Jackson, Houston, Texas
 
"Motor Sensory Performance" - ED 41
 
Clear Creek High School., Mary K. Kimzey, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To measure the changes in fine, manipulative capabilities
 
of a crew member due to extended exposure to the Skylab
 
environment.
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Judith S. Miles, Lexington, Massachusetts
 
"Web Formation" - ED 52
 
Lexington High School, J. Michael Conley, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To observe the web-building process and the detailed
 
structure of the web of the common cross spider (Araneus
 
diadematus) in a normal environment and in a Skylab environment.
 
Joel G.. Wordekemper, West Point, Nebraska
 
"Plant Growth" - ED 61
 
Central Catholic High School, Lois M. Schaaf, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
Donald W. Schlack, Downey, California
 
"Plant Phototropism" - ED 62
 
Downey High School, Jean C. Beaton, Teacher/Sponsor
 
These two experiments were combined into a single joint
 
experiment whose objectives were:
 
To determine the differences in root and stem growth
 
and orientation of rice seeds in specimens grown in zero
 
gravity and on Earth under similar environmental conditions.
 
To determine whether light can be used as a substitute
 
for gravity and on Earth under similar environmental condi­
tions.
 
To determine whether light can be used as a substitute
 
for gravity in causing the roots and stems of rice seeds
 
to grow in the appropriate direction in zero gravity, and
 
to determine the minimum light level required.
 
Cheryl A. Peltz, Littleton, Colorado
 
"Cytoplasmic Streaming" - ED 63
 
Arapahoe High School, Gordon B. Scheele, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To perform microscopic observation of leaf cells of
 
elodea plants in zero gravity to determine if there is any
 
difference between the intracellular cytoplasm motion com­
pared with cytoplasmic motion of similar leaf cells on
 
Earth.
 
Roger G. Johnston, St. Paul, Minnesota
 
"Capillary Study" - ED 72
 
Ramsey High School, Theodore E. Molitor, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To determine if the zero gravity environment induces
 
changes in the characteristics of capillary and wicking
 
action from the familiar Earth-gravity characteristics.
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Vincent W. Converse, Rockford, Illinois
 
"Mass Measurement" - ED 74
 
Harlem High School, Mary J. Trumbauer, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To demonstrate the principle of the existing Skylab

specimen mass and body mass measurement devices, utilizing
 
the classical spring-mass mechanical oscillator.
 
Terry C. Quist, San Antonio,-Texas
 
"Neutron Analysis" - ED 76
 
Thomas Jefferson High School, Michael Stewart, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
To record impacts of.low energy neutrons.. The detectors
 
mounted on the inboard faces of water tanks will be able
 
to discriminate between neutrons in four energy spectra.
 
W. Brian Dunlap, Youngstown, Ohio 
"Liquid Motion in Zero G" - ED 78 
Austint6wn Fitch High School, Paul J. Pallante, Teacher/ 
Sponsor 
To observe and photograph the motion of a liquid-gas
 
interface (gas bubble surrounded by a liquid) subjected
 
to an impulsive force.
 
The following six student experiments could not be
 
accommodated in the Skylab Program as proposed. The student,
 
his experiment as proposed, the reasons for its not being
 
included directly in the Skylab Program, and the alterna­
tives are listed below.
 
Keith Stein, Westbury, New York
 
"Microorganisms in Varying 'G'
 
W. Tresper Clarke High School, Dennis Unger, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
To subject numerous different species of bacteria,
 
ciliated cells, and other microorganisms to a complex regime
 
of varying levels of gravitational forces.
 
The development of a centrifuge qualified for manned
 
spaceflight could not be accomplished in the limited time
 
available. Data on microorganisms in zero "G" from the
-
Skylab Microbiology Detailed Test Objective were provided.
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Kent M. Brandt, Grand Blanc, Michigan

"Chick Embryology"
 
Grand Blanc Senior High School, Charles E. Martell
 
III, Teacher/Sponsor
 
This experiment involved the launching of a number
 
of fertile chicken eggs, incubating the eggs in orbit.
 
At stated intervals the development of one or more eggs
 
was to be terminated and the egg preserved. At least one
 
egg would have been carried to full term and, hopefully,
 
hatched. The embryonic eggs and the live chick were to
 
be returned.
 
It was concluded that the hardware involved placed
 
too great a demand in terms of weight, volume, and crew
 
time to enable launching in the Command Module. He was
 
associated with Dr. John Lindberg, the principal investi­
gator for S071--Circadian Rhythm--Pocket Mice.
 
Keith McGee, Garland, Texas
 
"Colloidal State"
 
South Garland High School, Ann Patterson, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
To determine the effect of zero-g environment on a
 
series of colloidal suspensions, solutions and gels, as
 
well as electrophoretic processes.
 
The successful performance of this experiment would
 
require a highly stable platform. The normal vibration
 
levels in Skylab, together with the required attitude changes
 
and maneuvers, precluded achieving the required stability.
 
He was associated with the NASA researchers who were
 
involved in the Apollo 14 and 16 electrophoresis demonstra­
tions.
 
Kirk M. Sherhart, Berkley, Michigan
 
"Powder Flow"
 
Berkley High School, Helen Politzer, Teacher/Sponsor
 
To study the parameters involved in achieving the flow
 
of powdered or granulated materials as opposed to liquids.
 
Detailed studies revealed that significant development
 
problems existed that precluded production of hardware within
 
the allowable time.
 
He was affiliated with the NASA researchers on material
 
flow in zero gravity environment.
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Gregory A. Merkel, Springfield,
 
"Brownian Motion"
 
Wilbraham and Monson Academy, Solon Economou, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
To investigate the effect of zero gravity on the Brownian
 
progression of a solutethrough its solvent. This experi­
ment required a highly stable platform for time periods
 
of up to a month. The Skylab was not capable of providing
 
the required degree of stability.
 
He has indicated a strong interest in the field of
 
astronomy. Thus, he'was affiliated with,Dr. Karl Henize,
 
the principal investigator for S019--UV Stellar Astronomy.
 
James E. Healy, Bayport, New York
 
"Universal Gravity".
 
St. Anthony's High school, Dr. Paul E. Mottl, Teacher/
 
Sponsor
 
To measure the 'ass attraction force (universal gravity)
 
using a space qualified Cavendish balance.
 
The forces being measured were found to be at least
 
three orders of magnitude less than the forces induced by
 
the Skylab motions and, thus, were incapable of measurement.
 
He exhibited an interest in the effect of crew motion
 
on the attitude stability of the Skylab. Thus, he was af­
filiated with Bruce Conway, the principal investigator on
 
T013.
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